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 Abstract 
 This dissertation addresses the legal framework of the bid protest system in Iraq, which is 
designed to check illegalities and irregularities in awarding public contracts by contracting 
agencies. Several regional and international agreements emphasize the significance of bid protest 
processes for member states. However, the mere existence of bid protest forums is not sufficient 
to ensure their effectiveness. The vast majority of developing countries have bid protest 
mechanisms, but this does not mean that they are functioning as necessary. This work begins by 
assessing the theoretical controversies surrounding the issue of what works best, more discretion 
or more oversight, in public administration and legal jurisprudence. 
  
In addition, the procedural rules of bid protests in Iraq are examined. Since availability of 
effective remedies is a prerequisite for a functioning bid protest system, remedies available to 
unsatisfied bidders under the Iraqi laws and regulations are also examined. Other forms of 
monetary compensation available to protesters are also addressed. Cooperation between anti-
corruption agencies and bid protest mechanisms is also considered. 
 
This dissertation concludes that the bid protest system in Iraq does not effectively 
scrutinize the processes of awarding public contracts that require more transparency. Bid protest 
processes should be improved by amending the laws and regulations involved. Such amendments 
should be conducted in light of the principles of transparency and accountability by facilitating 
access to bid protest mechanisms and expanding the rights of those challenging procurement 
activities.  
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Introduction 
 This dissertation addresses the bid protest system in Iraq and its ability to reduce the level 
of corruption in the public procurement field. Corruption is rampant in Iraq in a way that 
transparency International lists the country among the most corrupt countries in the world. It has 
a deep root in the government of Iraq. There are many reasons that made corruption 
uncontrollable including several major wars, economic siege, sectarian war, and political 
divisions. Since Iraq was historically adopted a socialist policy, the public sector was and still 
huge controlling all major sectors of services and market. Such policy made corruption spread 
easily to all sectors in the Country including education, health, electricity, and so on.  
 Public administration does not function properly especially in terms of transparency and 
accountability. Accordingly, introducing bid protest processes, which allow challenging the 
decisions of contracting agency, was new to the Country. In fact, agencies in Iraq enjoyed a great 
deal of discretion in awarding public contracts to contractors. There were no strict transparency 
measures that require contracting agencies to award contracts through competition. Most of 
public contracts were awarded through the sole-source contracting method. In fact, the entire 
administrative system was not transparent.  
 Bid protest processes were introduced after the fall of the previous regime in 2003 by the 
Coalition provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA was an American-led authority which governed 
Iraq for a year after the 2003 invasion. It designed the bid protest system in Iraq after the US 
model. Such protest system contradicted the traditions governed the public procurement 
processes because the US procurement was more developed and transparent than the system in 
Iraq. Thus, such transplantation created some major problems for enforcement of procurement 
laws and regulations.  
 
 
 
 
In addition, the administrative environment and staff is quite conservative regarding 
changes that require transparency and openness. It is difficult to enforce measures that allow 
individuals and business entities to access documents held by public agencies. Secrecy is a norm 
in government agencies. Applying strict centralization adversely affects the function of 
government agencies. The administrative system relies on a strong hierarchy of distribution of 
administrative powers, which causes delay, complexities, and costly rules and procedures. It is 
common that a paper work is delayed for months because of a signature of a minister or director 
general. Although many laws and regulations have been changed to conform to transparency 
measures and to decentralize distribution of powers, this culture is still dominant.  
Introducing a new bid protest system that incorporate measures facilitate transparency 
and openness was new to the Iraqi procurement system. Accordingly, such new rules and 
procedures created contradictions with the administrative traditions widespread in the country. 
For instance, Order 87, which is public procurement law in Iraq, grants contracting powers to 
either a semi-independent agency or a division in each contracting agency. In contrast, 
contracting powers are specifically granted to the head of agencies. Order 87 is not followed by 
agencies because the tradition is that contracting powers are solely in the hands of heads of 
agencies including ministers or heads of non-cabinet agencies. In other words, the reform is not 
easy to be accepted in an environment that was accustomed to strict administrative hierarchy.     
The bid protest system is part of the public procurement processes in which unsatisfied 
bidders are allowed to challenge the decision of contracting agencies. The organization and 
function of bid protest systems has recently been the focus of regional and international 
agreements, legal and public administration scholars, and various countries especially developing 
nations. The major force behind such a development of bid protest mechanisms and rules is 
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liberalization of trade among countries. There are several regional and international free trade 
agreements that cover certain aspects to of public procurement. 
 Some of these regional and international agreements and models are specifically 
dedicated to public contracting. For instance, the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law), EU Public Contracts Directives, and the 
World Trade Organization Government Procurement Agreement (WTO/GPA) are some 
examples. The UNCITRAL Model Law is not an agreement, but it is a model designed originally 
for developing countries intending to reform their procurement system. Although each agreement 
has its own goals, there are several fundamental principles that such agreements introduce to 
regulate public procurement activities among member states. 
 The principle of non-discrimination between suppliers participating in competition to win 
a public contract is one of the most common principles that both free trade agreements and 
special procurement conventions generally embrace. Another major principle in public 
procurement is protecting the integrity and transparency of the process from corruption, abuse of 
power, and illegal acts that prejudice the rights of participants. In addition, the availability of bid 
protest mechanisms to correct procurement breaches is another fundamental principle of modern 
public procurement policy and law. In fact, bid protest processes are considered the enforcement 
mechanisms of such fundamental principles.  
 The structure and form of bid protest mechanisms vary from one jurisdiction to another. 
Generally speaking, there are three forms of bid protest mechanisms in the field of public 
procurement. First, many countries provide for agency-level bid protest mechanism according to 
which unsatisfied bidders may, or sometimes must, submit their protests to the contracting 
agency that issued the initial decision. In some jurisdictions, a higher body other than the 
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contracting agency itself receives protests. For instance, in Iraq ministerial review committees 
receive bid protests for procurement transactions of all subordinate agencies that are part of the 
ministry.  
 Second, in some countries administrative independent agencies are also allowed to 
receive and review bid protests. Such independent agencies are sometimes designed to address 
general procurement issues or to resolve bid protests exclusively. In some jurisdictions, 
independent agencies function as a judicial review for bid protests as they are required to follow 
judicial procedural rules in resolving bid protests. Third, there is also judicial review for bid 
protests in almost all countries. It should be noted that some countries have all the three bid 
protest mechanisms such as the US, while Iraq has only agency-level and judicial review for 
resolving bid protests. Accordingly, the legal and administrative structures of a particular country 
decide questions involving such diversity in bid protest fora.             
 Fundamental principles governing bid protest system varies among state, regional and 
international agreements and models. Under the EU Directives member states are required to 
review effectively bid protests submitted by contractors alleging infringements of the Directives. 
However, the Directives are silent on what constitutes effective review. In addition, the 
Directives also require member states to make a decision on bid protests as rapidly as possible. 
Speedy review means that reviewing bodies should follow the time limits contained in the 
Directives. The most important time limits in bid protest review are the time limit for filing bid 
protests by unsatisfied bidders and the timeline for resolving such protests by reviewing bodies.  
 In addition, the Directives require that bid protest fora be independent in their decision-
making process from the contracting agencies that issued the protested decision. Such 
independence requires that members of the reviewing body described as independent must be 
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appointed and leave office in the same manner as members of the judiciary. Further, 
independence also means that the review body, in resolving bid protests, must adhere to certain 
procedural rules or guarantees that are tantamount to those of an ordinary court. Accordingly, 
there are structural and procedural elements to the meaning of independence under the remedies 
directives. 
 Under the WTO/GPA, parties are required to provide for bid protest processes that are 
non-discriminatory, timely, transparent, and effective. The requirements of the WTO/GPA are 
similar to those of the EU Remedies Directives. The WTO/GPA also requires independence of 
the review body through making sure that the body has no interest in the outcome of the 
procurement. In addition, it requires that members of such a body be secured from external 
influence. Finally, a review body that is not a court must be subject to judicial review or 
otherwise adhere to court-like procedures in resolving bid protests.  
 The UNCITRAL Model Law, which has been incorporated into the domestic law of some 
developing countries, emphasizes the importance of the principle of independence. The text of 
UNCITRAL does not provide any information regarding independence of review bodies. 
However, the Guide to Enactment mentions some features of independence. It states that the 
body exercising the review function be independent of the procuring entity. It further states that 
when the reviewing body is the one that is to approve procurement actions of the contracting 
agency, the section responsible for protest review must be independent from the section that is 
responsible for the approval process. Yet UNCITRAL does not identify any requirements for 
procedural rules to be followed by the administrative body that conduct the review function. 
 It is generally true for all the above-mentioned regional or international instruments that 
they offer little guidance respecting the underlying procedures involved in resolving bid protests. 
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Since procurement agreements usually apply to several countries with various legal systems, it is 
extremely difficult for such agreements to address details of bid protests. In addition, the bid 
protest resolution itself is complicated as it involves judicial and administrative issues that are 
sometimes controversial. For instance, standing to challenge contracting agencies’ decisions, the 
bases on which provisions of tenders can be challenged, and the remedies available to unsatisfied 
bidders are issues that vary widely from a jurisdiction to another. 
  This dissertation analyzes these underlying procedures of bid protest resolution. 
Specifically, it examines the Iraqi structures and procedures utilized in bid protest mechanisms to 
resolve such protests. It compares the experience of Iraq to other countries to identify how other 
procurement systems deal with issues related to the functionality of bid protest fora. Such 
comparisons are important because Iraq has only relatively modest experience in bid protest 
processes compared to some other countries. In order to conduct such comparison, it is necessary 
to examine the underlying procedures of the Iraqi system. 
 The dissertation first covers the controversial issues of oversight and discretion in the 
public procurement field. This controversy centers on whether oversight or discretion benefits 
the public procurement process. Since bid protest processes function as an oversight mechanism 
over public procurement, it is often viewed as restrictive of the discretion of contracting 
agencies. Some scholars strongly suggest that, for public procurement to function more 
effectively, the discretion of contracting officers managing procurement activities should be 
released.  
Such scholars believe that more discretion allows agencies to select the best contracting 
methods and terms, thus selecting the right and suitable contractor for obtaining services or 
goods needed. Furthermore, they believe that tightening oversight on contracting agencies results 
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in delay and complication of procurement procedures. The bid protest system is an oversight 
mechanism on the procurement process which requires both time and expenses. Accordingly, 
more oversight undermines the innovative behavior among contracting agencies. In this case, 
contracting agencies act in a way to please the contractors’ community to avoid bid protests. 
On the other hand, there are scholars that emphasize the importance of oversight on the 
public procurement process. They underscore that public procurement involves public funds and 
taxpayers money. Thus, contracting agencies should not be left to spend such money on their 
own or without strong checks and detection because they are should maximize benefits to the 
public. In addition, they disagree with pro-discretion scholars that oversight including bid protest 
processes undermines the innovative behavior of procurement officials. Bid protest processes 
will not prevent contracting agencies from exercising their discretion; instead, they are only 
designed to prevent corruption and abuse in awarding public contracts.  
In this view, public procurement is vulnerable to massive corruption and collusion 
especially in developing countries. Effective oversight over procurement activities is essential to 
prevent illegal activities. These scholars agree that, bid protest processes impose some 
restrictions on the discretion of procurement officials. After all, such procedures are costly, time-
consuming, and complicated. However, they conclude that the benefits of restrictions imposed 
on the procurement sector outweigh these costs. Oversight strengthens the public’s trust that their 
money is spent fairly and transparently. Discretion should not be strengthened at the expense of 
transparency and accountability. 
Striking a balance between discretion and oversight is not an easy task and it remains one 
of the major difficulties facing designers of public procurement systems. The author believes that 
answering the question of which one works best, oversight or discretion, is complicated because 
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it relies on several major factors. For instance, it requires extensive studies in a particular 
jurisdiction regarding historical backgrounds of public procurement, the level of corruption, and 
the culture of transparency in public administration. A quick answer for such an important 
question is neither sufficient nor productive. 
 Generally speaking, in developing countries in which the level of corruption is high, 
strengthening bid protest processes would assist in reducing corruption. This proposition should 
not be stated in absolute terms because bid protest is not enough if there is not a sufficient will 
on the part of the government and politicians to support anti-corruption efforts. It also relies on 
the culture of challenging government decisions by contractors because sometimes offerors 
decline to challenge government decisions not only out of fear of retaliation. This is an important 
cultural factor that often must be overcome.  
Whether corruption can be effectively reduced through bid protest procedures also 
depends on how far procurement laws allow contractors to challenge contracting decisions. For 
instance, in some countries procurement laws allow contractors to challenge the method of 
contracting, e.g., whether it is public tendering or single source contracting. In contrast, in some 
jurisdictions procurement laws do not permit contractors to challenge the method of contracting 
selected by contracting agencies. Some jurisdictions allow contractors to challenge the 
provisions of a tender document, while some others do not. Remedies available also can vary 
from one jurisdiction to another.  
Suspension of procurement procedures is one of the tempting remedies for contractors. 
Under such a remedy, when an unsatisfied offeror challenges a decision of a contracting agency, 
procurement procedures will be ceased until the protest is settled. In fact, this remedy is the basis 
for strong criticisms of the bid protest system as it delays procurement processes. Nonetheless, 
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UNCITRAL, the WTO/GPA, and the EU Procurement Directives provide for the remedy of 
suspension under these circumstances. In fact, it becomes a crucial element in assessing the 
effectiveness of a bid protest system in a particular country.  
Another issue that this dissertation analyzes is the structure of bid protest mechanisms. 
Structural issues are crucial as they affect the level of independence of bid protest fora and 
independence is one of the major elements of a successful bid protest system. These issues have 
not been examined in detail in regional and international procurement agreements because of the 
diversity of legal and administrative structures of member states. In addition to this issue, another 
structural aspect is whether bid protest mechanisms are centralized or decentralized and how this 
affects the function of bid protest mechanisms. 
Independence has been discussed in light of the requirements set forth by regional and 
international agreements mentioned above and the standards of independence under the Iraqi 
legal system. The independence of the IAT conforms, to a reasonable extent, to the requirements 
of such agreements as it is structurally independent from contracting agencies and follows strict 
procedural rules in resolving bid protests. However, the appointment of the majority of the 
members of the IAT is vested with the Minister of Planning. Awarding appointment powers to 
the Minister of Planning is against the standards set in such agreements. According to these 
agreements, the appointment of members of an independent agency should rather be similar to 
that of the members of the judiciary.    
It is worth noting, however, that the requirements of independence under the Iraqi legal 
system are quite close to the guidelines contained in regional and international agreements. For 
instance, independent agencies are generally not part of the executive as they are part of the 
legislative branch, though there are some independent agencies that are related to the executive. 
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Nonetheless, being part of the legislative or executive branches does not necessarily mean that 
there is interference in the activities of such independent agencies. In fact, the law in Iraq 
regulates the composition and function of these agencies. Accordingly, many independent 
agencies in Iraq have their own statutes that regulate their duties and jurisdictions. The role of 
Parliament or the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) is limited to appointment of the head of 
such agencies. The rest of the function of these agencies is organized by law.  
The above was the status of independent agencies in Iraq at least until 2011 when the 
Federal Supreme Court (FSC) issued a decision limiting the independence of such agencies. The 
content of the decision is that when the constitution states that some independent agencies are 
under the jurisdiction of Parliament or the OPM, this means that the supervising body is allowed 
to intervene in the affairs of agencies subordinated to them. More importantly, the FSC rules that 
all independent agencies including those that are part of Parliament are subject to the supervisory 
power of the OPM. The 2011 decision contradicts the constitutional principles organizing 
independent agencies as separate from both Parliament and the OPM. 
This dissertation also assesses the role of the underlying procedures involved in bid-
protest resolution. The effectiveness of bid protest processes relies on major elements mentioned 
above, including independent review, effective remedies, and speediness. Achieving these 
elements also depends on the underlying procedures of the bid protest process. For instance, 
many regional and international procurement agreements emphasize effective review of bid 
protests. However, such agreements do not address what review procedures constitute 
effectiveness. Accordingly, examining the procedures used in any bid-protest system is the only 
way to evaluate the effectiveness of bid protest processes. 
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An important issue that can be examined through the underlying procedures is the 
jurisdiction of review mechanisms. Not all review fora have the same jurisdiction because the 
jurisdiction of such review bodies varies from one legal system to another. Some jurisdictions 
allow bid protest fora to only protest the award decision determining the winning contractor in 
the competition. This is the case in Iraq. In other jurisdictions, bid protest mechanisms are also 
allowed to challenge provisions of a tender including the choice of selecting contracting methods 
by agencies. In addition, bid protest fora in some countries are empowered to receive protests 
challenging decisions of contracting agencies related to an award of a public contract including 
disqualifying a contractor from competition. In other words, this issue centers on the question of 
what can be protested. Understanding this diversity in the jurisdiction of bid-protest bodies is 
crucial to examining the effectiveness of a protest review forum and it is also important for 
comparative legal studies.             
One of the major questions that can be answered by examining the underlying procedures 
revolves around who has the right to challenge decisions of contracting agencies. Many 
procurement agreements and domestic procurement systems, as noted above, use interested 
parties that have the right to submit bid protests, but who, again, the issue arises as to who should 
be regarded as an interested party. The answer to this question is specific to the respective 
procedures of each country. Some countries allow only those bidders that have actually 
submitted tenders for a public contract to protest. However, some countries expand the term to 
also include those bidders that have not submitted tender for a particular contract but are 
otherwise eligible to participate. Other countries expand the definition even more to allow other 
parties to submit bid protests that are not even contractors, such as consumer protection agencies. 
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Identifying and assessing remedies that bid protest mechanisms are empowered to grant 
is another benefit of examining underlying procedures of bid protests. Remedies are the ultimate 
result that unsatisfied bidders intend to obtain from their protests. There are several major types 
of remedies for unsatisfied contractors: suspension of procurement procedures, corrective 
actions, and monetary compensation. Although many jurisdictions provide for the same remedies 
for unsatisfied bidders, the requirements under which such remedies are awarded vary from one 
jurisdiction to another. These variations will be explored in this dissertation.  
Every jurisdiction has its own laws and regulations that organize the award of such 
remedies. Every remedy also has its own requirements or conditions that must be followed by 
protesters seeking to obtain such remedy. For example, some jurisdictions award a suspension 
remedy automatically once an unsatisfied bidder submits its protest, without additional 
requirements. However, in some other jurisdictions, protesters are required to meet specific tests 
and requirements in order to obtain a suspension remedy. In addition, the period of suspension 
and availability of exceptions also vary from one jurisdiction to another.    
Obtaining other forms of remedies, including corrective actions and monetary 
compensation, also varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Such variations belong to the 
difference in legal and administrative systems. For instance, not all of these remedies are 
awarded by bid protest mechanisms in every jurisdiction. Some of these remedies are awarded 
by courts in some countries and under different legal requirements and procedures. In addition, 
the distinction between civil law and common law systems changes the types of remedies 
available, the body or court that is empowered to grant such remedies, and the procedures that 
are used to obtain them.  
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 The power of bid protest mechanisms to issue decisions binding on contracting agencies 
and contractors is a critical element that will be examined in assessing the effectiveness of bid 
protest processes. Decisions of some bid protest mechanisms are binding, while other mechanism 
are empowered to issue only recommendations. In fact, various enforcement powers exist even 
in countries that have multiple layers of bid protest mechanisms. In such cases, one forum might 
be empowered to issue binding decisions, while others may only issue recommendations. Yet it 
happens only rarely that recommendations of bid protest mechanisms have the power of a 
binding decision.  
 These and other issues are central to evaluating the effectiveness and shortcomings of a 
bid protest system. For instance, when a procurement system allows unsatisfied bidders only to 
protest the award decision but not provision of a tender, there is a limitation on the right to 
protest. Further, a procurement system that allows only those bidders that participated actually in 
tender procedures to protest a procurement decision provides little transparency. Such procedural 
details can only be addressed properly by examining the underlying procedures of bid protest 
processes in a particular jurisdiction.  
 Cooperation or interaction between the anti-corruption system and bid protest processes 
in Iraq is another major subject of this dissertation. There has been an anti-corruption system in 
Iraq since 2004 that consists of three major institutions: the Integrity Commission (IC), the 
Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), and the Offices of Inspectors General (OIG). The goal of this 
system is to prevent and reduce the level of corruption in Iraqi government institutions. Since an 
anti-corruption system involves complicated and sensitive tasks and exercises an oversight 
function on government institutions, the IC and the BSA are independent agencies subject to 
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parliamentary oversight in their activities. They are not part of the executive and their function is 
organized by laws that guarantee such independence.   
Each institution is empowered with specific jurisdiction in the fight against corruption. 
The jurisdiction of the IC is to a reasonable extent general in terms of its scope as it is 
empowered to fight corruption by adopting effective preventive and curative measures. 
Preventive measures include strengthening the awareness of Iraqi officials and the public 
regarding the negative consequences of corruption and developing a code of conduct for public 
officials. They also include regulations that must be promulgated by the IC organizing conflicts 
of interests of government officials. On the other hand, the curative measures include exclusively 
investigating corruption cases which include a wide range of acts such as bribery, embezzlement, 
and abuses of power.  
The BSA’s jurisdiction is limited to financial auditing of all government records or 
documents. The BSA is an old institution, established in 1927, but Coalition Provisional Order 
(CPA) Order 55 and Order 77 amended the law of the BSA by incorporating it into the anti-
corruption system. It is granted various powers in performing its duties including unrestricted 
access to records, documents, data, and any other documents the Board deems necessary. It is 
also required to report any irregularities revealed in its audits to specialized investigative 
authorities or the IC for proper actions.  
On the other hand, the OIG’s jurisdiction is to uncover and undertake an administrative 
investigation into acts of fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption in every Iraqi ministry. The OIG is 
empowered to exercise its function within the administrative boundary of a particular minister, 
meaning that every ministry has its own OIG. It is also granted a broad range of powers 
including access to all documents, processes, programs, or data of the ministry concerned. In 
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addition, it is empowered to conduct administrative investigation into allegations of fraud, waste, 
and corruption and make appropriate recommendation to the minister or head of non-cabinet 
agencies. 
As discussed above, both anti-corruption institutions and bid protest forums share a major 
goal, which is fighting corruption according to their respective statues. One of the major 
strategies in fighting corruption is cooperation between not only government institutions but also 
public and private sectors. However, in Iraq there is very little cooperation or interaction, formal 
or informal, between bid protest forums and anti-corruption agencies. Statutes organizing 
structures and functions of these agencies do not provide for any forms of cooperation or 
interactions, whether formal or informal.  
Anti-corruption and bid protest bodies in Iraq function under the traditional theory of 
administration as they work in isolation to each other. Under such theory, every agency works 
within strict jurisdictional boundaries described by statutes that organize the structure and 
function of such agencies. Accordingly, any form of cooperation or interaction between public 
agencies is viewed as intervention in the affairs of each other. In contrast, the modern 
administration theory considers cooperation or interaction as necessary for producing more 
efficient outcomes.  
This dissertation suggests that interactions between anti-corruption and bid protest 
systems is necessary for reducing the high level corruption in public procurement in Iraq. It also 
suggests close interaction in the field of bid protest resolutions by involving anti-corruption 
institutions in the bid protest processes. The bases of such involvement and its form will also be 
examined in detail. For instance, independence is a serious concern in every bid protest system 
including Iraq, but anti-corruption agencies enjoy a much higher level of independence. Thus, 
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the problem of independence in bid protest resolutions may be reduced by involving an agency 
that is independence by statute form the executive.  
Of course, such involvement might create some practical problems including overlaps of 
statutory jurisdictional and other issues related to appointment of staff and budget. However, the 
author believes that the benefit of involvement of anti-corruption agencies in the resolution of 
bid protest outweigh the disadvantages that result in such interaction. The best way to mitigate 
the impact of problems associated with such interaction is through statutory amendments that 
carefully define the features of such potential interaction. By introducing inter-agency 
cooperation in the field of bid protest processes, the resistance to cooperation or interaction that 
exists because of the traditional theory will diminish over time. 
The dissertation is divided into four chapters. After this Introduction, Chapter I addresses 
general backgrounds about public procurement in general, including its goals. It also examines 
corruption in public procurement as one of the major obstacles challenging the effectiveness of 
such processes as in Iraq. In addition, it covers the difference between civil law and common law 
legal systems in organizing public procurement. Public procurement laws and regulations in Iraq 
are also examined including governing principles and the importance of bid protest processes. 
Chapter I also reviews the literature of public procurement and public administration regarding 
discretion and oversight. Regional and international agreements are examined in addressing such 
issues. 
Chapter II addresses two major issues in procurement bid protests: structural and 
procedural. Structural issues examine the centralized and decentralized structures of bid protest 
mechanisms and their influence on the effectiveness of bid protest processes. Bid protest 
mechanisms in Iraq are centralized, creating difficulties in accessing them by unsatisfied bidders 
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though increasing routine and predictability to the process. On the other hand, procedural issues 
involve the detailed procedures used in resolution of bid protests. Such procedures address the 
jurisdiction of bid protest mechanisms, including who has standing to submit bid protests, and 
what can be protested. In addition, they include time limits for submitting protests by unsatisfied 
bidders and resolving protests by bid protest mechanisms. 
Chapter III of the dissertation examines remedies that can be granted by bid protest 
mechanisms. As discussed above, availability of effective remedies is one of the fundamental 
elements of a successful bid-protest system. Accordingly, the Chapter examines remedies that 
are available to unsatisfied bidders under Iraqi public procurement laws and regulations and 
comparing them to remedies in procurement agreements and other countries. Suspension of 
procurement procedures as a major remedy has been examined mostly because it has been 
criticized for delaying the procurement process.  
In contrast, others praise suspension as it encourages unsatisfied bidders to challenge 
decisions of contracting agencies resulting in revealing illegal activities. Suspension also makes 
granting remedies easier, including, e.g., cancellation of the protested procurement or awarding 
the contract to the protester. Awarding such remedies is quite difficult after the award of the 
contract. Other forms of remedies are examined in Chapter III, including corrective actions and 
monetary compensations. Corrective actions generally include cancelling the award decision, 
requiring the contracting agency to re-solicit the contract, or requiring the contracting agency to 
change the method of contracting. Monetary compensation includes awarding bid preparation 
costs, bid protest costs, and other forms of compensation.  
Chapter IV of the dissertation examines the issue of cooperation or interaction between 
the bid protest system and the anti-corruption system. It addresses the similarity between the 
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goals of the two systems which is reducing corruption and irregularities in government 
institutions. Advantages and disadvantages of cooperation or interaction between anti-corruption 
agencies and bid protest mechanisms are addressed. In addition, forms of cooperation or 
interaction between the two systems are also analyzed. Recommendations to amend Iraqi laws to 
promote better interaction between and among anti-corruption and bid protest agencies are also 
made. Finally, a brief Conclusion ends this dissertation. It includes several additional 
recommendation bid protest system in Iraq in order to enhance its effectiveness.             
            
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
Chapter I 
1. Bid Protest Mechanisms in the Public Procurement System 
1.1 A Brief Overview of the Public Procurement Process and Its Major Goals 
 Generally speaking, the public procurement is the process of buying goods and services 
from the private sector by government agencies. Public procurement or government purchasing 
is a complicated process consisting of several various phases with different sets of procedures 
governing those phases. In contrast to the private sector, government agencies would not enter 
into contracts with other parties when and how they prefer.1 There are specific regulatory frames 
for the government to follow with respect to when, how, and with whom to enter into contracts.2 
Although public procurement laws are different according to different jurisdictions, in systems 
operating under the rule of law, they share major governing principles such as transparency, 
competition and accountability. 
 Public agencies purchase a wide variety of goods, services and public works from the 
private sector, from basic commodities to large construction projects.3 Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) Order 874, or Public Contract Law in Iraq, defines procurement as “the 
acquiring by contract with public funds of goods, services or construction services by and for the 
use of the government through purchase or lease.”5 Government procurement is a major 
economic activity of governments that constitutes a substantial percentage of world-wide GDP 
1 William E. Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 
461, 466-467 (Fall, 1995).  
2 Id.  
3 OECD, OECD PRINCIPLES FOR INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMRNT, 9 (2002). 
4 Order 87 issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2004. The CPA was a transitional government led 
by the United States and its allies which is established in 2003 following the fall of the former Iraqi regime. It vested 
itself with all executive, legislative and judiciary authority from April, 2003 to June, 2004. It issued tens of orders, 
regulations and memorandums that had the force of law. For more information visit this website 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/#Regulations.       
5 Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 87: Public Contracts, Sec. 1, CPA/ORD/14 May 2004/87, available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040516_CPAORD_87_Public_Contracts.pdf.  
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estimated at 10-15%.6 The percentage of public procurement in some developing countries is 
estimated at 15-30% of the GDP.7 There are no reliable and specific data about the size of public 
procurement expenditures in Iraq8; however, it is assumed to be large as the percentage of 
government spending, including the salaries of all public officials, reached approximately 68% 
of the 2012 budget which approximated US$ 100 billion.9  
1.2 Goals of the Public Procurement Process 
 It is difficult to identify with precision the purposes of a public procurement system.10 A 
part of this difficulty can be attributed to the domestic versus the regional and international 
perspectives about the function of public procurement. Authors also vary on the purposes of the 
procurement process. Concerning the issue from a domestic perspective, Schooner suggests, nine 
non-exhausted objectives for the procurement systems: “(1) competition; (2) integrity; (3) 
transparency; (4) efficiency; (5) customer satisfaction; (6) best value; (7) wealth distribution; (8) 
risk avoidance; and (9) uniformity.”11 He identifies three among the nine goals as the pillars of 
the United States procurement process: system transparency, procurement integrity, and 
competition.12 To Arrowsmith, the procurement objectives are; (a) value for money; (b) 
efficiency in the government contracting process; (c) integrity; (d) fair and equal treatment of 
offerors; (e) promoting industrial, social and environmental objectives; and (f) outsourcing 
6 Supra note 3, at 9. 
7 Saima J. Zuberi, The High Cost of Controlling Corruption: The Achilles' Heel of the OECD 
Dacmethodology for Assessment of National Procurement Systems, 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 209, 211. 
8 OECD, SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, OECD 170, 
footnote 1 (2010). 
9 The Federal Budget Law of the Republic of Iraq No. 22 (2012), Article 2.  
10 Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, P.P.L.R. 2002, 2, 103 
(2002). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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policies.13 In addition, key policy objectives of public procurement are often considered to be 
value for money and competitiveness.14 Value for money is defined as “the optimum 
combination of whole-life cost and quality to meet the user’s requirements to be achieved 
through competitive tendering.”15  
 Of course, there is also international perspective on government procurement. The 
purpose of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is 
to open the national procurement market to international competition as much as possible.16 
Similarly, the European Community Procurement Directives (EC Directives) intend to create an 
internal European market with genuine free movement of goods and services through effective 
competition rules.17 Public procurement has been viewed as an important non-tariff trade barrier 
in the community by EC members.18 Thus, the major purpose of the WTO GPA and EC system 
is to open national procurement markets to the member countries. In addition, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted in 2011 a new version of the 
Model Law on Public Procurement (UNCITRAL Model Law). Under the new model, “achieving 
13 SUE ARROWSMITH ET AL., REGULATING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, 27 (2000).  
14 PETER VINCENT-JONES, THE NEW PUBLIC CONTRACTING REGULATION, RESPONSIVENESS, 
RELATIONALITY, 14 (2006).  
15 Id.  
16 World Trade Organization, Understanding the  WTO, the Agreements, Gocernment Procurement: Opening up for 
Competition, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, (2014), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm#govt.   
17 SIMON EVERS HJELMBORG ET AL, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW: THE EU DIRECTIVE ON 
PUBLIC CONTRACTS, 12 (2006). 
18 CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, EC PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: CASE LAW AND REGULATIONS, 12 (2006).  
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value for money and avoiding abuses in the procurement process”19 are among the major goals 
of public procurement.   
1.3 The Problem of Corruption in Public Procurement 
 Corruption in public procurement is common among both developed and developing 
countries. Public procurement activities are considered among the most vulnerable to fraud and 
corruption.20 According to a survey of the World Economic Forum, international firms offer 
bribes more frequently in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries in public procurement process than in taxation, utilities and the judiciary.21 
Yet, public procurement provides multiple opportunities for both the public and private sectors to 
divert public funds for private gains.22 Procurement involves essential public services such as 
health, education, and infrastructure that have a significant impact on the development process.23  
Corruption encourages competition in illegal acts and has the potential to reduce the 
quality of the goods and services provided to the public.24 It can occur at all stages of the 
procurement process from issuing the solicitation to the process of awarding a contract and 
finally to the enforcement of government contracts.25 According to a report from Transparency 
International (TI), approximate of US$ 400 billion is lost annually around the world in 
procurement due to bribery.26 Iraq is no exception. 
19 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement (2011), 
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html.  
20 Supra note 3. 
21 Id.  
22 OECD, INTEGRITY IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: GOOD PRACTICE FROM A-Z, 9 (2007). 
23 Supra note 19. 
24 Supra note 7, at 212. 
25 Id. 
26 Supra note 3. 
22 
 
                                                          
 
 
1.4 Corruption in Iraq 
 According to the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the TI, Iraq is listed in the 2012 
index as the seventh most corrupt country in the world.27 It is reasonable to assume that public 
procurement constitutes a significant share of such corruption because of the considerable 
amount of money allocated for the purchase of goods, services, and construction works by the 
government of Iraq.28 Corruption has a history in Iraq, but it was exacerbated at the time of the 
Gulf War which led to the imposition of international sanctions on Iraq from 1990 to 2003.29 Nor 
was corruption in Iraq purely a domestic matter. The Oil-for-Food Programme that implicated 
major international companies and individuals is an example.30 The aftermath of the fall of 
Saddam’s regime resulted in a US-led administration, the CPA, which itself engaged in financial 
irregularities such as no-bid contracts.31 There is also the corruption of the Iraqi government 
since 2004.32  
Many of the scandals associated with the forgoing occurred through public procurement 
transactions. Thus, to limit the level of corruption, Iraq has established for the first time in its 
27 Transparency International: Corruption Perception Index 2013, available at 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/.   
28 This proposition based on the large government spending under the Iraqi Budget Law (2012) which is 
approximately 68% of the entire budget. It is reasonable to assume that a large proportion of the 68% government 
spending is allocated for the purchase of goods and services by the government of Iraq.    
29 Supra note 8, at 105. 
30 See the report of the Independent Inquiry Committee that was established according to United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1538 to investigate corruption in the Oil-for-Food Programme. The Committee chaired by Paul 
Volcker who issued a final report, Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Program by the Iraqi Regime, regarding the 
result of the investigation confirming that US$ 10 billion has been wasted because of corruption, the report is 
available at, http://www.humanrightsvoices.org/assets/attachments/documents/volcker_report_10-27-05.pdf.    
31 See Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction website, Quarterly Reports and Semiannual Reports To 
Congress, assuming that US$ 9 billion spent on reconstruction projects unaccounted for because of inefficiencies 
and mismanagement, available at, 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/sigir/20130930185834/http://www.sigir.mil/publications/quarterlyreports/inde
x.html.   
32 See Supra note 27. 
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history a comprehensive anti-corruption system through Order 55.33 Regardless of the existence 
of the anti-corruption program, corruption in public procurement is still widespread.34 One of the 
major ways to reduce the level of corruption in the public procurement process is through 
making the bid protest or bid challenge system more effective.    
1.5 Response to Corruption in Public Procurement  
 Strengthening integrity and transparency in the management of public procurement may 
well be the key to reducing corruption in this sensitive sector. Since public procurement field has 
become part of the international trade with an eye to opening this market to international 
competition, several regional and international organizations have become involved in the 
development of transparency and integrity-related measures to limit corruption in the 
procurement process.35 In addition, as a response to demands of more transparent and 
accountable government, several countries have established programs to reduce corruption in the 
public sector especially in public procurement.36  
The fight against corruption in public procurement has been launched from two major 
fronts; strengthening transparency and enforcing accountability measures in the procurement 
33 Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 55: Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public 
Integrity, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20040204_CPAORD55.pdf.  
34 Supra note 8, at 10. 
35 See the United Nation Convention against Corruption has attempting to involve procurement-related aspects to its 
convention, for more information see http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_1/INF.2.pdf.   The 
OECD also attempts to enhance transparency and accountability of the procurement markets. The OECD has issued 
several books, reports, and assessment reports for the effectiveness of its members’ procurement system especially 
with respect to transparency and integrity of public procurement. For more information see 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/integrityinpublicprocurement.htm.  
36  See for example, the World Bank; Public Procurement Reforms in the Middle East and North Africa, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22880747~menuPK:3
949143~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:256299,00.html. In addition, many countries have prepared and 
established reform programs with the aim of reducing corruption such as South Africa, see for more information, 
http://www.polity.org.za/polity/govdocs/green_papers/procgp.html#PROCESS, or India, for more information see 
Sandeep Verma, Integrity Pacts and Public Procurement Reform in India: From Incremental Steps to a Rigorous 
Bid-Protest System. Inaugural International Conference on Public Procurement Regulation in Emerging 
Economies, 2010, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1656722.    
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process.37 In addition, many international and regional organizations working in the area of 
economic development and a free market economy introduced several sets of transparency-
related standards for member states to embrace in their public procurement systems such as 
availability of bid protest mechanisms,38 or publication of procurement opportunities39. The 
World Bank, various UN agencies, the OECD, the WTO, and the Asian Development Bank are 
among those organizations that developed such measures.40   
This dissertation examines the bid protest process, which is considered an oversight 
mechanism on the entire public procurement process. The underlying procedures of the bid 
protest process are crucial in enhancing transparency and accountability in public procurement. 
Making the bid protest process effective strengthens the level of accountability of the 
procurement system because it allows unsatisfied protesters to be more active in challenging 
wrongful or suspicious actions of contracting agencies. In addition, transparency and 
37 Raj Kumar, Corruption, Development, and Good Governance: Challenges for Promoting Access to Justice in 
Asia, 16 Mich. St. J. Int'l L. 475, 496 (2008).  
38 See the Preamble of the EC Remedies Directive: 89/665/EEC, On The Coordination Of The Laws, Regulations 
And Administrative Provisions Relating To The 
Application Of Review Procedures To The Award Of Public Supply And Public Works Contracts, which states  
“…….Whereas the absence of effective remedies or the inadequacy of existing remedies could deter Community 
undertakings from submitting tenders; whereas, therefore, the Member States must remedy this situation…”, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1989L0665:20080109:EN:PDF. 
See also the Preamble of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Government Procurement Agreement (WTO/GPA) 
which states “……..Recognizing the need to establish international procedures on notification, consultation, 
surveillance and dispute settlement with a view to ensuring a fair, prompt and effective enforcement of the 
international provisions on government procurement and to maintain the balance of rights and obligations at the 
highest possible level…” available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_01_e.htm.  
39 See Article XI of the WTO/GPA which states “In accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3, entities shall publish an 
invitation to participate for all cases of intended procurement, except as otherwise provided for in Article XV 
(limited tendering).” And see also Article 24 of UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction 
and Services (1994) (UNCITRAL Model Law) which states “A procuring entity shall solicit tenders or, where 
applicable, applications to prequalify by causing an invitation to tender or an invitation to prequalify, as the case 
may be, to be published in ... (the enacting State specifies the official gazette or other official publication in which 
the invitation to tender or to prequalify is to be published).” Available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement/ml-procure.pdf.    
40 See supra note 36, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22880747~menuPK:3
949143~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:256299,00.html, or the United Nations through the Commission 
on International Trade Law issues Model Procurement Law that is specifically designed for developing countries, 
see http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/2011Model.html.   
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accountability principles should be examined more. Furthermore, the dissertation analyzes 
transparency and accountability measures available under the current Iraqi procurement law to 
determine its adaptability with what has been developed internationally. 
1.6 Public Procurement Law and Regulations in Iraq Prior to 2003 
1.6.1 French Public Law and Its Influence on Iraqi Law 
 Generally speaking, the legal system in Iraq has adopted the French legal tradition which 
is the civil law system. The civil law tradition has several distinctive characteristics from the 
common law system such as the legal systems of the United Kingdom and the United States. The 
most fundamental distinction is the existence of separate bodies of law for governing public and 
private activities.41 In civil law countries the distinction between public and private functions in 
the daily legal affairs is acute.42 
The idea of public function or public utility as the cornerstone of the public sector goes 
back to Ulpian.43 According to Ulpian, there is a major separation between what is done for the 
public good and what is done for private benefit.44 There are four elements for an action to be 
41 EVA STEINER, FRENCH LAW, A COMPARATIVE APPROACH, 249 (2010).  
42 Id. 
43 JOHN BELL ET AL, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW, 169 (2008). See also Encyclopedia Britannica, Ulpian 
(Domitius Ulpianus, born , Tyre, Phoenicia—died ad 228), is Roman jurist and imperial official whose writings 
supplied one-third of the total content of the Byzantine emperor Justinian I’s monumental Digest, 
or Pandects (completed 533). He was a subordinate to Papinian when that older jurist was praetorian prefect (chief 
adviser to the emperor and commander of his bodyguard) under Lucius Septimius Severus (reigned 193–211), and 
he annotated Papinian’s works. Afterward Ulpian was master of petitions to the emperor Caracalla, and 
under Severus Alexander he served as praetorian prefect from 222 until 228, when he was murdered by officers in 
his command. 
Ulpian wrote prolifically on law in a clear, elegant style. Like Papinian, he was an intelligent editor and interpreter 
of existing ideas rather than an original legal thinker, such as Marcus Antistius Labeo. His major works are the 
commentaries Libri ad Sabinum (51 books interpreting the civil law; incomplete) andLibri ad edictum (81 books 
concerning praetorian edicts). Justinian’s compilers, headed by Tribonian, drew heavily on these and other treatises 
and monographs by Ulpian. A work variously called Tituli ex corpore Ulpiani, Epitome Ulpiani, or Regulae 
Ulpiani is no longer believed to be his. Available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/613301/Ulpian.  
44 Id. 
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considered public under the civil law traditions,45 including the legal system of Iraq. First, the 
purpose behind performing an action is to serve the public interest.46 Second, the mechanisms 
used to perform the administrative activity or action whether it is an administrative decision or 
government contracts.47 Third, the public institution or body executes the activity or service as a 
state representative.48 Finally, parties involved in providing the service which may be the civil 
service personnel or sometimes a private party, as in public contracts.49  
Furthermore, this distinctiveness of public order and public service justify distinctive 
regulations and legal principles.50 In other words, the notion of giving public service or order a 
special status led to the existence of two different laws; public law and private law. Some 
scholars trace the existence of the two major bodies of laws to the post-revolutionary France and 
its special values and traditions.51 More importantly, the principle of separation of powers, which 
received a very rigid interpretation, became the pathway for the public/private divide. Further, 
Montesquieu’s seminal work The Spirit of the Laws which illustrates two forms of laws, political 
and civil, had a great impact, too.52  
Inherent in the civil law system is a strong rejection of the interference of the judiciary in 
administrative functions. This rigid application of the separation of powers has a historical 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. Under the civil law tradition, government acts are classified into two categories; first, administrative decisions 
which is issued unitarily by an agency and affect the rights and freedom of the people concerned. Further, there are 
other acts that require the existence of the government and a private party in the relationship such as public 
contracts.  
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id., at 176-177. 
51 Supra note 41, at 249. 
52 Id.  
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background.53 Prior to the French Revolution, Parlements that worked as the common-law courts 
of appeal were very powerful and obstructed the decisions of the King to reform the 
administrative system.54 They opposed those reform efforts in order to maintain their interests 
and powers throughout the eighteenth century.55 Thus, abolishing these parlements was one of 
the dominant requirements of the Constituent Assembly and they were eliminated in 1789.56  
As a result, this distinction has been formalized in a statute by the Constituent Assembly 
during 1789 and the Law of 16-24 August 1790, which is still applicable today and states: 
Judicial functions are and shall remain separated from administrative ones. 
Ordinary judges shall not interfere in any way whatsoever with the activities of 
public authorities nor hear a claim brought against a public authority in relation to 
the performance of their official duties.57 
  
Consequently, the rough struggle that the administrative system had experienced because of the 
judicial oversight and interference in the executive issues which created distrust to the entire 
judicial process caused not only a complete separation of administrative and judicial functions, 
but also separate court systems.58 “Ordinary courts can neither award an injunction against 
administrative bodies, nor question the lawfulness or quash any administrative act or decision.”59 
Since then the French legal system and many countries adopted this system have two separate 
court structures. The highest court for the administrative justice in France is the Conseil d’etat.       
53 Id., at 250, and see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE 
COMMON-LAW WORLD, 6 (1954). 
54 Id. 
55 Supra note 41, at 250. 
56 Supra note 53. 
57 Supra note 41, at 249-250. 
58 Supra note 53. 
59 Supra note 41, at 250-251. 
28 
 
                                                          
 
 
The Ottoman Empire also affected the legal system of Iraq because Iraq was ruled by the 
Ottomans for centuries.60 The Ottoman law has also been affected by the European law.61 By 
19th centuries the Ottomans adopted reforms that were based on European models of law and 
administration.62 The reform program was known as Tanzimat, which means reorganization in 
Turkish, and was undertaken by Abdulmecid I and Muhammed II.63 The content of the reform 
included new regulations regarding administration, taxation, the conscript system, the rights of 
individuals, and the educational system.64 These new regulations guaranteed the equality of all 
subjects regardless of religion in taxation, military service, eligibility for civil service positions, 
and access to higher education institutions governed by the state.65  
In addition, the program guaranteed citizens the security of life, property, and dignity 
within the empire.66 Several laws were adopted based on European examples such as a Penal 
Code in 1858, modeled after the French Penal Code, a Commercial Procedures Law of 1861, and 
a Civil Code of 1876.67 The Ottomans also codified Islamic jurisprudential rules of the Hanafi 
School in a digest named: the Gazette of Jurisprudential Rules “ةیلدعلا ماكحلاا ةلجم”.67F68 The Gazette 
of Jurisprudential Rules was one of the main sources of the law of contract and delictual liability 
60 The Law Library of Congress, Iraq:Legal History and Traditions, 7-8, available at 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-history/iraq.php.  
61 Id., at 8-9. 
62 Id., at 9. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
67 Id., at 9-10. 
68 Wikipedia, the Gazette of Jurisprudential Rules (Arabic Version), available at 
http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AD%D9
%83%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9.  
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of Iraq and many other Arab countries written by the Egyptian well-known scholar Abdulrazaq 
Al-Sanhuri.69  
Iraq adopted and implemented the French legal system. The judiciary and jurisprudence 
of Iraq relies indirectly upon the French legal traditions. It mostly seeks the Egyptian law for 
guidance about an issue that the Iraqi law and courts are silent. Even judges and scholars in the 
academia rely on Egyptian court decisions and scholarly writings. Thus, Egyptian law is a 
secondary source for the Iraqi law. Of course, the Egyptian legal system itself is based on the 
Napoleonic Codes.70 Just as in France, there are two separate fields of law in Iraq; public and 
private law.  
In addition, law schools’ faculty is sharply divided between public and private law areas 
of research. Public law is the law that regulates the activities of the state and covers those legal 
relationships to which the state or one of its bodies is a party provided that the state possesses 
extraordinary powers and privileges which cannot be found in private legal relationships.71 For 
instance, constitutional law, administrative law, financial laws, and public international law 
belong to the public law branch.  
On the other hand, private law is the law that governs the activities of individuals among 
themselves and individuals with the state or one of its bodies provided that the state acts like a 
private party without possessing any extraordinary powers or privileges.72 The law of contract, 
delictual liability (torts), civil procedure, evidence, and commercial and business transactions are 
deemed part of the private law world.  
69 Wikipedia, Abdulrazaq Al-Sanhuri (Arabic Version), available at 
http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9
%82_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%86%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A.   
70 The Law Library of Congress: Legal Research Guide; Egypt, available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/egypt.php.  
71 MAZIN LILO RAZI, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 6 (2009). 
72 Id. 
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Regardless of the fact that Iraq has adopted the French legal tradition, it is interesting that 
until 1989, unlike France it did not have two separate court systems. In other words, the regular 
civil courts had jurisdiction over all disputes between ordinary people, individuals and public 
agencies, and between public agencies themselves. However, in 1989 the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) issued an amendment to the Council of State Law No. 65 (1979) 
(COSL) that established for the first time an administrative court in Iraq. Under Article 7 of the 
COSL, an administrative court structure was created wholly outside the regular judiciary.73 The 
administrative courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes arising under administrative 
decisions issued by public officials.74                            
1.6.2 Public Contracts or Government Contracts under the Civil Law Tradition including 
Iraq 
 Since there is a distinction between public and private law in the civil law tradition, there 
are separate legal principles that govern contracts of government agencies. Government contracts 
are called in civil law countries “contrats administratifs,”75 administrative contracts, government 
contracts, or public contracts.76 The obvious distinction is suggested by these expressions that 
the government, represented by one of its public bodies, is a party to the contract. In addition to 
the ordinary private law of contract, therefore, civil law countries have a separate law for 
administrative contracts.  
73 Council of State Law (COSL) No 65 (1979) of Iraq, Article 7 (2) (a) states that the administrative court is vested 
with the power to review administrative orders and decisions issued by officials or public bodies provided that there 
is no ways of challenging such orders and decisions under any laws and regulations.  
74 Id., Article 7 (2)(d). In addition, the newly-created Federal Supreme Court now has jurisdiction over 
administrative courts, see Mazin Lilo, Administrative Adjudication: A Study to the Fundamental Principles of 
Administrative Adjudication in Iraq, 110. 
75 Hector A. Mairal, Government Contracts Under Argentine Law: A Comparative Law Overview, 26 Fordham Int'l 
L.J. 1716, (2003). 
76 Administrative contracts, government contracts, and public contracts are used in this dissertation interchangeably. 
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Under the French civil law system government can enter into contracts as a private party 
which is subject to private law.77 In these situations, the legal justification for considering such 
contracts as ordinary is that the state enters into such contracts without having extraordinary 
powers.78 For instance, the contract of buying stationaries and supplies for daily uses of a public 
body in France and Iraq is not deemed an administrative contract even though the government is 
a party to it because such a contract does not usually contain extraordinary conditions.  
There are several criteria that can be used to determine the status of a contract, whether it 
is administrative or not. The first is that one of the parties to a contract is a public body. The 
second criterion is that the contract is closely involved in the provision of public services to the 
people concerned.79 Finally, the contract in question should contain provisions granting special 
and extraordinary powers to the government that are not usual in ordinary private contracts such 
as the power to amend the provisions or even to terminate a contract unilaterally.80 However, 
courts have the sole jurisdiction to identify the administrative or ordinary characteristic of a 
disputed contract.81  
The criterion of possessing extraordinary powers in a contract by the state is very 
controversial and complicated. It is almost impossible for the administrative judiciary and 
administrative law scholars to define precisely these extraordinary powers and to identify the 
limits of such powers except by giving examples.82 Nevertheless, most of these extraordinary 
powers are related to the contract-enforcement or post-award phase rather than the pre-award 
77 Muhammad Sulaiman Al-Tammawi, General Principles of Administrative Contracts: A comparative Study, 26 
(1991). 
78 Id. 
79 A.C.L. DAVIS, THE PUBLIC LAW OF GOVERNMRNT CONTRACTS, 55 (2008). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 See Razi, supra note 71, at 313. 
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phase of a public contract. The most common examples of extraordinary powers under French 
and Egyptian laws, which would be instructive for Iraq, are: 
- “Allowing the contractor to exercise some extraordinary powers over beneficiaries 
such as taking properties from individuals and seizing some properties of individuals 
without their consent;  
- Referring contractors to follow certain conditions prepared by contracting agencies 
for certain contracts; 
- Allowing contractors to directly participate in providing public services”83 
- Allowing contracting agencies to directly enforce the provisions of a contract in case 
the contractor fails to perform its contractual duties, such agencies can issue 
administrative orders to claim what they spent in enforcing the contract without any 
judicial procedures.84  
 Regardless of the controversies surrounding the elements of public contracts especially 
the existence of extraordinary powers in the benefit of the government, there are specific 
contracts that are always considered administrative contracts mostly specified by law and 
regulations. These contracts include: concession of public service, construction works, supply of 
goods and services, and public debt.85 Most of the Arab countries identified through legislation 
three of these contracts, concession, construction works, and supply of goods and services, as 
administrative contracts.86 On the other hand, most of public contracts are specifically defined by 
83 See Al-Tammawi, supra note 77, at 94-98. 
84 Id., at 90. 
85 See Razi, supra note 71, at 299-301. 
86 ALI KHATTAR SHATNAWI, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 690 (2003). 
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law and courts have the sole jurisdiction to label them as ordinary or administrative under the 
three criteria mentioned above. 
 Public contract law has seen a major development in the last forty years. This 
development occurred mostly as a result of opening up the market of public procurement to 
regional and international competition based on public procurement agreements such as the 
WTO/GPA, UNCITRAL, and EC Directives.87 Procurement agreements generally require more 
transparent and more accountable procurement process in the member states of each 
congregation.88 Consequently, contracting agencies lost too much of their discretion in 
regulating various aspects of the procurement process especially in awarding government 
contracts.89  
 On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that the new procedures of awarding public 
contracts overcome the problem related to the distinction between public and private contracts in 
civil law countries. The scope of the application of these agreements is to cover all contracts of 
procuring of goods, services, and construction works conducted by public agencies. Under 
Article 1 of the WTO/GPA, the agreement applies to procurement by any contractual means such 
as purchase and lease for obtaining any combination of products and services.90 Similarly, the 
2011 UNCITRAL Model Law stipulates that it applies to all public contracts for acquiring 
goods, services and construction works.91 Under Article 7 of the EC Directive 2004/18, the 
87 Supra note 13, at 157, EC Remedies Directives and WTO/GPA, supra note 38, and the 1994 and 2011 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement.   
88 Supra note 38 and 39. 
89 In the past, contracting agencies had great discretion in choosing the method they prefer. However, these regional 
and international agreements require or, at least, recommend their member states to award public contracts 
according to specific mechanisms that maximize competition and transparency. See for example, Article VII to XVI 
of the WTO/GPA, and see Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 28-34.   
90WTO/GPA, Art 1, supra note 38, nonetheless, there are some exceptions to the scope of the agreement such as 
military-related contracts. See for more information Supra note 13, at 198.  
91 UNCITRAL 2011, Article 1,2, supra note 19. 
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directive applies to public contracts which are not excluded pursuant to the exceptions provided 
for in Articles 10, 11, and 12-18.92 It states that public contracts are defined to be contracts 
concluded between a government agency and contractors for procurement of public works, 
supply and services and also to contracts regarding the utility sectors; waters, energy, transport, 
and postal sectors.93  
 None of these agreements uses the phrase “administrative contract” to refer to 
government or public contracts. They intended to avoid the controversies that existed in the 
French civil law traditions regarding public/private contract law. Contracts that are subject to the 
award procedures of these agreements are mentioned to be any contracts for acquiring goods, 
services, or construction works. Similarly, in Iraq, Order 87 does not involve itself with the 
problems associated with the concept of “administrative contract”. It states that “procurement is 
the acquiring by contract with public funds of goods, services or construction services by and for 
the use of the government through purchase or lease.”94  
 If these agreements and Order 87 mentioned only “public or administrative contracts” 
instead of “contracts of acquiring goods, services, and construction works”, the scope of their 
application would have been very ambiguous in countries that follow civil law traditions 
including Iraq. Agencies and contractors would have been ambivalent to identify precisely 
whether the contract is administrative thereby subjecting it to special award procedures or 
92 EU Directive 2004/18/EC: On the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public 
Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, Article 7, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02004L0018-20090821&from=EN.  
93 Id., See also EU Directive 2004/17/EC, coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02004L0017-20140101&from=EN. 
94 Order 87, Section 1 (1), supra note 5. 
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whether it is a regular contract that the agency can award without following the required 
administrative procedures.  
 In addition, contracting agencies also could have avoided the award procedures required 
by the procurement laws and obligations and award the contract without competition. In other 
words, the transparency and integrity of the process would have been jeopardized by ignoring 
award procedures which have been adopted to reduce corrupt opportunities in the procurement 
process. The only option left to contractors in such cases is the courts in order to challenge, 
under the three major criteria mentioned above, that the contract in question is administrative.  
 These uncertainties would have negatively affected the public procurement process which 
requires fast, simple, and clear procedures.95 More importantly, the procurement systems 
currently seek to avoid judicial proceedings to overcome problems associated with judicial 
review. Judicial proceedings are complicated, costly, and cause delays in resolving controversies, 
resulting in interruption in providing services to the public.96 Many procurement systems now 
recognize the mechanism of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) including the Iraqi system to 
settle disputes between the contractors and procuring agencies without recourse to the courts.97 
 Thus, Order 87 took the right direction by not mentioning the term of art “administrative 
contracts” when it determined the scope of application of the order. This approach overcame the 
controversies of public/private contract law in the legal system and created much more clarity in 
the application of the public contract laws and regulations. In addition, it reduced huge dockets 
95 Erik A. Troff, The United States Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism: A Model For Bid Challenge Procedures 
In Developing Nations, 57 A.F. L. Rev. 113, 122-125 (2005). 
96Zhang Xinglin, Forum For Review By Suppliers In Public Procurement: An Analysis And Assessment Of The 
Models In International Instruments P.P.L.R. 5, 201, 223-224 (2009), and Henry Gao, The Bid Challenge 
Procedures Under The WTO Government Procurement Agreement: A Critical Study Of The Hong Kong Experience 
P.P.L.R. 4, 211, 216 (2007). 
97 Order 87, Sec. 12 (f), and The Implementing Regulations on Government Contracts No. 1 (2008)  IRGC, Art 
10(7) (a). 
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of cases in the courts that might have been brought in order to decide the nature of a contract in 
question. Court proceedings will have delayed the conclusion and enforcement of public 
contracts creating problems to the provision of services to people affected by these contracts.  
 However, there is a real concern regarding the applicability of Order 87 and its 
implementing regulations to contracts of public service concession. There are no indication in 
Order 87 and the IRGC regarding their applicability to concession contracts. Service concession 
contracts are defined, under civil law traditions, as:  
An administrative contract under which an individual investor or a firm or a group 
of contractors or firms undertake to provide a public service to the people on the 
contractor or contractors’ expenses instead of the state or one of its agencies and 
according to restrictions and conditions set out by the state or one of its bodies in 
exchange for allowing such a contractor or contractors to exploit the project for a 
specified period of time and to earn the profit from the service fees paid by the 
beneficiaries.98  
Under concession contracts the private party provides the public service instead of a government 
agency. There are two types of contractual provisions or conditions in contracts of concession of 
public services: regulatory contractual provisions, which normally govern the methods of 
providing the service to the public99 such as the price of a service unit, and the area that should 
be covered by the contract. The public agency has the right to amend these regulatory provisions 
any time without the consent of the service provider.100 This rule can be interpreted as a form of 
extraordinary powers granted to the public agency in administrative contracts that distinguish 
them from ordinary contracts.  
In addition, public service concession contracts contain another set of provisions that are 
known as non-regulatory contractual provisions or simply contractual provisions. Non-regulatory 
98 See Al-Tammawi, supra note 77, at 108. 
99 Id., at 109. 
100 Id., at 109-110. 
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provisions consist of financial obligations between the public agency awarding the concession 
and the contractor.101 These provisions are subject to the rule pacta sunt servanda according to 
which the public agency cannot amend them without the consent of the contractor providing the 
service.102 In other words, these provisions are subject to private contract law. Examples of these 
contractual provisions include; provisions related to the period of the concession and how the 
concession should return to the public agency.                    
Section 1 of Order 87 does not mention concession contracts as it applies only to 
contracts of procuring goods, services, and construction works. The contract of concession of 
public service is a term of art under the Iraqi administrative law. This means that as long as the 
concession contract has not been mentioned specifically in section 1 of Order 87, the application 
of the order cannot be extended to such contracts. The Iraqi legal system follows a rigid 
positivism that does not allow judges to engage in a type of statutory interpretation103 that 
extends the application of Order 87 on concession contracts.      
Awarding concession contracts under civil law traditions has its own procedures. 
Concession contracts are usually awarded without competition as the contracting agency 
determines the contractor and involve in negotiations on the provisions of the contract.104 The 
EU Public works Directive also does not require specific procedures for awarding concession 
contracts except for advertisement.105 The contract is awarded for a long period of time 
sometimes up to 30 years.106 Thus, there is a great chance that awarding contracts of public 
101 Razi, supra note 71, at 319.  
102 Supra note 77, at 109. 
103 M. Cherif Bassiouni & Michael Wahid Hanna, Ceding The High Ground: The Iraqi High Criminal Court Statute 
And The Trial Of Saddam Hussein 39 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 21, 65 (2006-2007).  
104 See Sl-Shatnawi, supra note 86, at 692. 
105 Supra note 18, at 143-145. 
106 See Al-Tammawi, supra note 77, at 119. 
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service concession would be subject to corruption and abuse by government officials. Basically 
the award of the contract occurs without competition.               
1.6.3 Order 87 and Its Implementing Regulations 
 Currently the public procurement process in Iraq is governed by Order 87 and its 
implementing regulations known as the Implementing Regulations on Government Contracts No. 
1 (2008) (IRGC). Order 87 issued by the CPA in 2004 and abolished all previous Iraqi laws and 
regulations on government contracts.107 It is established after the United States procurement 
models. Section 2 of the order established the Office of Government Public Contract Policy 
(OGPCP) within the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.108 The OGPCP issued 
in 2007 the first IRGC, but it was superseded by the 2008 IRGC.  
 In addition, the scope of application of the order includes contracts concluded by the 
government of Iraq through ministries, regions, governorates, and all other subdivisions of the 
state of Iraq that may commit public funds for procurements of goods, services, or public 
construction works.109 Further, it applies to the contracts of procurement of goods, services, or 
construction services entered into by Iraqi State-owned enterprises that are directly financed by 
the government of Iraq.110 Yet Order 87 also states that “every governmental unit or agency shall 
designate a contracting office that shall be responsible for the contracting activities of the 
governmental unit or agency.”111 It is not clear what the order means by “governmental unit or 
agency” because it can be interpreted either as a ministry or general directorate; however, the 
107 Order 87, Sec. 13. 
108 Id., at Sec. 2.  
109 Id., Sec. 1 (1). 
110 Id., Sec. 2 (2) (c)  
111 Id., Sec. 2 (2) (a). 
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IRGC interprets “governmental unit or agency” to mean every ministry, the main office of any 
other public institutions that are not connected to ministries, or a governorate council.112   
However, it, further, states that “the authority to obligate government funds, award and 
sign government public contracts, enter into and authorize material modifications to such 
contracts, and authorize the payment of invoices and claims, shall rest solely with a qualified 
government agency or a committee duly appointed under the authority of this Order.”113 It is thus 
ambiguous whether contracting offices are deemed as a “qualified government agency or a 
committee duly appointed under the authority of this order” to be empowered to sign contracts.  
With respect to opening up the Iraqi procurement market to regional and international 
competition, there is no specific provision in Order 87 that directly allows non-Iraqi contractors 
to participate in tenders to obtain public contracts. However, the order implies the participation 
of international contractors in tender procedures while identifying the requirements of 
publication of notices of tenders. It requires that such notices be published at a minimum in the 
Arabic and Kurdish languages114 as well as other languages when it is anticipated that other 
contractors outside Iraq will be participating.115 To eliminate doubts with respect to this issue, 
the IRGC specifically mentions that non-Iraqi contractors may participate in tender procedures to 
obtain government contracts.116  
112 The IRGC, Supra note 97, at Article 11, which states that there should be a contracting office in every ministry, 
any other non-cabinet agency, region, or governorate council. These contracting offices shall be responsible for 
enforcing procurement law and regulations in cooperation with Offices of Inspectors General and Provincial 
Councils according to the mechanisms set forth by the OGPCP.  
113 Oder 87, Sec 3 (1), supra note 5.   
114 Under The Iraqi Constitution of (2005), Art. 4(1), Arabic and Kurdish are the two official languages throughout 
Iraq, available at http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf.  
115 Order 87, Sec 4 (3) (a), supra note 5. 
116 IRGC Art. 1 & 2, supra note 97.  
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1.6.4 The Office of Government Public Contract Policy (OGPCP) 
 Under Order 87, the head of the OGPCP “shall report directly to the 
minister of planning.”117 The OGPCP is responsible for: 
(i) Coordination of public contract policies for all ministries and public agencies;  
(ii) Issuance of the implementing regulations to Order 87 after following notice 
and comment requirements to receive feedbacks from the interested parties; 
(iii) Establishment of the Independent Administrative Tribunal (IAT) to have 
jurisdiction over settling disputes arising under the procedures of awarding public 
contracts;    
(iv) Recommendations for amendments to order 87 and other public contract 
rules;  
(v) Development and adoption of standard government contract provisions and 
providing trainings for procurement staff.118  
 
The OGPCP has a specific section on the website of the Ministry of Planning (MOP) which 
consists of several subsections titled government contract law and regulations, other guidelines, 
workshops and trainings, investments, field visits, annual planning of the office, and blacklist of 
offerors violated procurement law and regulations.119  The OGPCP consists of five major 
divisions; Secretariat and Correspondences, Coordination and Follow-up, Counseling and 
Trainings, Tendering and Contracts, and the Administrative Tribunal.120        
 Under the Order, the OGPCP has enormous powers for organizing public procurement 
activities in the country through issuing public procurement regulations. However, one of the 
major problems of public procurement law and regulations in Iraq is the rapidly-changing public 
contract regulations. The OGPCP in 2007 issued the implementing regulations to Order 87, but 
after only one year issued the 2008 IRGC. The rapid changes of the IRGC created confusions 
117 Order 87, Sec. 2 (1) (a), supra note 5. 
118 Id., at Sec 2, supra note 5. 
119 The Website of the Ministry of Planning: the Directorate of Government Contracts, available in Arabic at, 
http://www.mop.gov.iq/mop/index.jsp?sid=1&id=589&pid=580&lng=ar. The English version of the website does 
not include any information. 
120 Id.  
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among ministries and other public agencies regarding which IRGC to apply and generated 
uncertainty to interested parties as well.  
In a questionnaire prepared by the OECD Middle East and North Africa (MENA) section, 
representatives from Iraq’s private sector expressed that in the same agency certain public 
officials used procurement regulations from the CPA period while others used the 2007 
regulations.121  The coexistence of various public procurement regulations was a major concern 
of the World Bank report in 2006 about rebuilding Iraq.122  Further, the MENA questionnaire 
showed that awareness of the 2008 regulations was very limited among Iraqi public agencies.123 
The MENA report suggested that the limited awareness was partially because the Iraqi Official 
Gazette published the 2008 Regulations only in May, 2008.124  
The OGPCP is interestingly required to follow some types of notice and comment 
procedures before issuing the IRGC.125  This obligation is based on the US notice and comments 
requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).126 Regardless of this notice and 
comment requirements in Order 87, there is no evidence that the OGPCP has communicated with 
the interested parties affected by the IRGC before its issuance. Perhaps the reason behind that is 
the fact that Iraqi administrative law is not familiar with the requirements of notice and 
comments. 
1.6.5 The 2008 IRGC 
 As mentioned above, the OGPCP is required under Order 87 to issue the implementing 
regulations. As a result, it issued the 2007 and 2008 IRGC in rapid succession. The IRGC is 
121 Supra note 8, at 135. 
122 Id. 
123 Id., at 136. 
124 Id. 
125 Order 87,  Sec2.1 (b) (i), supra note 5. 
126 5 U.S.C. §553.  
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much longer than the Order and it contains much more detailed provisions. It consists of 25 
articles covering many issues starting from the scope of application, purposes of the regulations, 
procedures of preparing tender documents, methods of tendering, publication of tenders, 
procedures regarding the formation of agency-level bid protest, and other issues. The IRGC has 
been issued only in the Arabic language. 
 The IRGC does not only interpret and implement Order 87 it also complements it. Some 
commentators have criticized this complementary role of the IRGC because implementing 
regulations should usually have only an interpretive role to facilitate enforcement. Implementing 
regulations are not supposed to have a complementary role under the Iraqi legal system.127 This 
situation has been considered a shortage and failure of Order 87.128 For instance, order 87 
requires the existence of an independent tribunal to review bid protests from unsatisfied offerors, 
but it leaves the details to the IRGC including the composition of the tribunal, its members, and 
procedures of resolving these protests. These important issues should have been covered by 
Order 87 itself not the IRGC.           
1.7 Principles of the New Public Procurement System 
 The new public procurement system is based on several principles. Those principles 
include “International standards of transparency, predictability, fairness and equality of 
treatment.”129 They also include full, fair, and open competitive tender procedures through 
publication of bidding opportunities, objective evaluation of bids and using electronic tendering 
127 Judge Luqman Sabit Al-Samaraiy, the Role Of The Independent Administrative Tribunal Of The Ministry Of 
Planning In The Oversight Of Tender Procedures Of The Government, No Page Number (Arabic Version), available 
at http://tqmag.net/body.asp?field=news_arabic&id=350&page_namper=p3. Visited Feb. 14. 2013.  
128 Id. 
129 Order 87, Sec. 1 1 (b), supra note 5. 
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process.130 They assert the integrity of the procurement process through raising ethical standards 
and reduce the conflict of interests.131 More importantly, availability of bid protest or bid 
challenge mechanisms to settle disputes in a timely fashion arising from bidding procedures is 
one of the key principles.132 These principles will be discussed in detail throughout this 
dissertation. 
 With respect to the publication of bidding opportunities, which is now an international 
requirement in the public procurement area, the order requires that the OGPCP issue the details 
of the publication of notice of tenders.133 Advertisement of procurement opportunities is one of 
the applications of the principle of transparency in the field of government contracting. Order 87, 
however, identifies several major requirements for the OGPCP to follow in issuing the 
regulations regarding publications of notices including: 
1. Notices of tenders shall be published at a minimum in the Arabic and Kurdish languages 
and in other additional languages where it is expected that firms outside Iraq will 
participate in bidding for a specific contract.134 
2. “The notice shall provide potential offerors with sufficient information, including but not 
limited to, standard terms and conditions, the statement of work and a delivery schedule, 
to reasonably respond to the tender. In this regard, all tenders shall also contain the 
factors upon which offerors shall be evaluated, and the failure of the government to 
130 Id., at Sec. 1 (1) (a). 
131 Id., at Sec. 1 (1) (c). 
132 Id., at Sec. 1 (1) (d &e). 
133 Id., at Sec. 4. 3. 
134 Id., at Sec. 4 (3) (a). 
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evaluate an offer against the stated evaluation factors in the notice shall be a basis for 
filing a tender protest pursuant to this Order.”135 
3. The notice shall provide perspective bidders enough time to respond.136 It shall also allow 
potential bidders to request clarifications regarding the tender and extensions of time to 
respond to the tender.137  
4. The notice shall provide for the deadline for submitting bids and determine those 
circumstances where late offers can be accepted.138 
In addition, the Order states that the IRGC shall specify exceptional circumstances where 
notice of tenders is not required.139 The requirement of notice of tenders under the IRGC is more 
specific. The IRGC requires that notice of tenders be published in three widespread domestic 
newspapers provided that one of them is the gazette of the Ministry of Finance.140 In case the 
gazette of the ministry of Finance has stopped publishing for any reason, another widespread 
newspaper shall be used.141 The winner of the bidding process shall pay the fees of publication 
of notices except for those bids that are related to importing foods and medicine.142 
1.8 Methods of awarding Public Contracts under Order 87 and Its Implementing 
Regulations 
 This dissertation will not focus extensively on the methods of awarding government 
contracts. However, these phases of the public procurement process are strongly intertwined and 
cannot be dealt with completely separately. There are several methods of awarding government 
135 Id., at Sec. 4 (3) (b). 
136 Id., at Sec. 4 (3) (c).  
137 Id., at Sec. 4 (3) (d). 
138 Id., at Sec. 4. (3) (e).  
139 Id., at Sec. 4. (3) (f).  
140 The IRGC, Art. 3 (3) (a), supra note 97. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
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contracts with quite different procedures and various level of openness and competition. Under 
Order 87, the general rule for awarding contracts by government agencies is through full and 
open competition.143 The order does not explain what “full and open competition” means. It only 
states “to the maximum extent practicable, government public contracts shall be awarded on a 
competitive basis.” The CPA, which issued Order 87, borrowed exactly “full and open 
competition” from the USA Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Under the FAR, “full and 
open competition” include 
(a) Sealed bids. 
(b) Competitive proposals. If sealed bids are not appropriate under paragraph (a) 
of this section, contracting officers shall request competitive proposals or use the 
other competitive procedures under paragraph (c) or (d) of this section. 
(c) Combination of competitive procedures. If sealed bids are not appropriate, 
contracting officers may use any combination of competitive procedures (e.g., 
two-step sealed bidding). 
(d) Other competitive procedures. 
(1) Selection of sources for architect-engineer contracts in accordance with the 
provisions of 40 U.S.C. 1102 et seq. is a competitive procedure (see Subpart 36.6 
for procedures). 
(2) Competitive selection of basic and applied research and that part of 
development not related to the development of a specific system or hardware 
procurement is a competitive procedure if award results from— 
(i) A broad agency announcement that is general in nature identifying areas of 
research interest, including criteria for selecting proposals, and soliciting the 
participation of all offerors capable of satisfying the Government’s needs; and 
(ii) A peer or scientific review. 
(3) Use of multiple award schedules issued under the procedures established by 
the Administrator of General Services consistent with the requirement of 41 
U.S.C. 259(b)(3)(A) for the multiple award schedule program of the General 
Services Administration is a competitive procedure.144 
  
It is not clear whether “full and open competition” under Order 87 includes the same methods as 
those of the USA under FAR or whether it has a different meaning under Iraqi law. It seems that 
Order 87 takes a different direction from that of the USA and implies that “full and open 
143 Order 87, Sec 4, supra note 5. 
144 Federal Acquisition Regulation, 48 C.F.R. § 6. 102 (2006), [hereinafter FAR].  
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competition” denotes what is known in USA as sealed bidding, in other jurisdictions as formal 
tendering, or open tendering under the WTO. This implication comes from the fact that Section 5 
of the order sets forth the exceptions to the “full and open competition” as “other than the lowest 
price” or “negotiated procedures”.145 In Iraq this method is named in the IRGC as public 
tendering which will be discussed below.  
Government agencies may award contracts in “other than full and open competition” 
while certain restrictions apply.146 Thus, awarding contracts in other than full and open 
competition is an exception. Government agencies may use other than full and open competition 
in the following circumstances: 
(a) When the goods or services required are only manufactured or supplied by a particular 
supplier or by a limited number of entities for technical or artistic reasons.147  
(b) When there is extreme urgency caused by events beyond the discretion of the contracting 
authority whereas the public interest does not allow awarding the contract on a 
competitive base.148 
(c) When the goods to be procured are replacement for goods purchased under an existing or 
previous contract or the goods are interchangeable with existing goods purchased from 
the original source who supplied the existing goods.149 
145 Order 87, Sec. 5 (2)(a), supra note 5. 
146 Id., at Sec. 5. 
147 Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(a). 
148 Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(b). 
149 Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(c). 
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(d) “When the use of other than full and open competitive public contracting procedures is 
necessary to promote economic or institutional development among certain population 
sectors or geographic regions of the State of Iraq or of Iraqi state-owned enterprises.”150 
(e) When international agreements or treaties (bilateral, plurilateral, or multilateral) to which 
the state of Iraq is a party require the use of other than competitive bidding by explicit 
terms or by implication.151 
(f) When the value of the contract to be awarded is below certain monetary threshold 
determined by the IRCG which is to be known a streamlined procedure for public 
procurement.152 
Since Order 87 allowed the OGPCP to identify other situations that justify procuring 
agencies to contract through other than full and open competition,153 The OGPCP added through 
the IRGC some other exceptions to those mentioned in Order 87. The IRGC added the following 
exceptions; when a contract requires secrecy in its contracting procedures and execution, when 
there are security reasons, or when there is no firm willing to participate in a bidding procedure 
publicized for the second time.154 However, many of these exceptions are problematic because 
they are very broad and can contribute to increase the discretion of the officials in contracting 
agencies to limit competition. This issue will be raised again in subsequent chapters.    
Although Order 87 identifies only two major methods of contracting for government 
agencies, the IRGC specifies six various contracting methods. Contracting agencies may select 
the method of contracting they prefer, but their discretion is limited by the restrictions placed on 
150 Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(d). 
151 Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(e).  
152 Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(f).  
153 Id., at Sec. 4 (1)(g). 
154 The IRGC, Art. 4 (a)(1 & 3), supra note 97. 
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using other than full and open competition mentioned above. The methods of contracting under 
the Iraqi procurement law and regulations are as follow: 
1.8.1 Public Tendering  
According to this method, the government agency shall announce to the public the 
specifications of the product or service requested by the agency and specify a period of time for 
receiving written offers from interested firms or contractors.155 The announcement of the tender 
usually includes instructions of how to prepare bids. The offers of the firms shall usually include 
the price and other terms for the supply of the product and service required.156 Then the agency 
opens all tenders publicly and awards the contract to the lowest bidders.157  
In other words, every interested party may submit a tender, and price is the sole 
determinant for selecting a successful bidder. However, under the IRGC, the contracting 
agencies are not obliged to award the contract to the lowest bid because they have to consider 
other factors.158 Notice of tenders for public tendering is subject to the general rules of 
publications set forth in the IRGC that was mentioned above. Public tendering may be used for 
any contract worth Iraqi Dinars (ID) 50,000,000159 or more. This method is known as “sealed 
bidding” in the United States.  
1.8.2 Restricted Tendering 
 Under the IRGC, contracting agencies shall advertise to the public any contract worth ID 
50,000,000 or more to all interested parties in two stages.160 First, in this stage interested firms 
155 Id., at Art. 4 (1). 
156 There is nothing in Order 87 and the IRGC to specifically require that offers from firms include certain 
information such as quality of the product, price, quantity, or any other information. 
157 The IRGC, Art. 6 (7)(c), supra note 97.   
158 Id., at Art. 5 (2)(k). 
159 ID 50,000,000 equal to US$ 43,177 at this writing.  
160 The IRGC, Art. 4 (2), supra note 97. 
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submit documents that prove their technical and financial capabilities to execute the contract to 
be evaluated by a specialized committee in the contracting agency to select qualified offerors.161 
Second, the contracting agency asks those who have been selected as qualified contractors to 
submit their bids provided that the number of the invitees is not less than six firms.162  
1.8.3 Two-Stage Tendering  
 Contracting agencies may use the two-stage method when the contract is complex and it 
is difficult to determine precisely the technical and financial specifications in the tender 
advertisement.163 Under the IRGC, there is a pre-qualification stage for this method exactly like 
the one in the restricted tendering. In the first stage the agency invites the firms to submit their 
technical specifications as the preliminary design of the project.164 In the second stage, those 
who have been selected in the pre-qualification stage and whose technical offers have been 
accepted are invited to submit their bids.165 
1.8.4 Direct Invitation   
 Under the IRGC, in the direct invitation contracting method, there are no pre-
qualification stages for the bidders by the contracting authority. Instead, the contracting agency 
directly sends invitations to no less than five firms or interested parties with necessary technical 
and financial qualifications.166 The discretion of the contracting agency to use this method is 
restricted to availability of certain conditions. The direct invitation method is justified in case of 
necessity, when the contract requires special capabilities, when the contracting procedures and 
execution demand secrecy, security reasons, urgent situations such as natural disasters, or in case 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id., at Art. 4 (3)(a). 
164 Id., at 4 (3) (b).  
165 Id.. 
166 Id., at Art. 4 (4). 
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where no firms showed interest to participate in the tender procedure after advertising the 
contract twice.167    
1.8.5 Sole Source Contracts 
 Under the sole source method, the contracting authority invites only one firm to execute a 
contract that has a monopolistic nature based on necessity grounds and other justifications.168 
The IRGC requires several conditions to be met if a contracting agency decides to award a 
contract using the least competitive method which is the sole source. The requirements are: 
a) The contracting offices in the ministries and other public agencies shall inform the Central 
Contracting Committee (CCC) in the General Secretariat for the Council of Ministers about 
awarding a contract using this method with detailed justifications for such a decision.169 
b) Financial powers of the contracting authorities shall be observed carefully in awarding sole 
source contracts. When the head of the contracting authority lacks financial powers to decide 
over the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee to award or not award the contract, such 
recommendation shall be sent to the CCC in the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers for final 
action.170 
c) If the Central Committee in the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers fails to make a 
decision approving or rejecting the recommendation of the Evaluation Committee to award a 
contract within 14 business days from registering the request for approval, such failure is 
167 Id. 
168 Id., at Art. 4 (5). 
169 Id., at Art. 4. (5)(a). 
170 Id., at Art 4 (5)(b). 
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considered an approval of the recommendation and the contracting authority concerned may 
initiate the award procedures. 171   
1.8.6 Small Purchase Committees  
 Contracting agencies are allowed to enter directly into contracts with whomever they 
want, even without any competition procedures for contracts under ID 50,000,000 for purchasing 
small items that are necessary for the day-to-day operations of government agencies such as 
stationary or furniture for office use.172 However, the Council of Ministers according to Order 
Number 56 (2012) raised the price of contracts to be subject to Small Purchase to ID 
100,000,000.173  
1.9 The Significance of the Bid Protest Process to the Public Procurement System 
 For a public procurement system to function properly it is not sufficient that effective 
laws or rules are in place. There needs to be a mechanism through which these rules are 
enforced.174 Bid protest processes are viewed as providing systemic transparency by allowing 
unsatisfied offerors or other interested parties to examine procuring agency records and 
decisions.175 Such protest procedures foster contractor participation in the procurement process, 
obtaining better goods and services for the government.176  
 According to UNCITRAL, an effective bid protest system makes the model law more 
“self-policing and self-enforcing.”177 It also strengthens public confidence in the procurement 
171 Id., at Art. 4 5(c). 
172 Id., at Art. 4 (6).  
173 The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Iraq, Order 56: the Power of Governors, (2012), available at, 
http://www.mop.gov.iq/mop/resources/GCD/175.pdf.  
174 Supra note 13, at 749. 
175 Supra note 95, at 116.  
176 Id. 
177 UNCITRAL: the Consolidated Draft Guide to the Enactment of the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Procurement, (with no page numbers), available at 
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system and functions as a deterrent by discouraging violations of procurement laws and 
regulations.178 In addition, competent bid-challenge procedures make procuring officials use 
their discretion carefully in awarding contracts that maximize the benefits government receives 
from procurement spending.179 Private-sector actors in public procurement activities act, in 
essence, like private attorneys general.180  
 The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires signatory 
members to adopt “an effective system of domestic review, including an effective system of 
appeal, to ensure legal recourse and remedies in the event that the rules or procedures established 
under the convention for the procurement process are not followed.”181 Iraq has ratified this 
convention through the Accession Law No. 35 (2007).182 In addition, in a Conference of the 
States Parties to the UNCAC, member states emphasized the role of effective oversight on the 
integrity of the procurement system.183 They specifically called for more robust oversight 
mechanisms including, among others, an effective audit system on procurement activities and “a 
functioning review or challenge mechanism, in that losing suppliers are good watchdogs.”   
Regional and international agreements do not cover the form or procedures of the bid 
protest process but to a limited extent. Thus, for details regarding the form and function of the 
bid protest system, researchers have to examine the administrative and judicial structure of a 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/construction/Final-MU-CONSOLIDATED-Guide-post-WG-
session-may-2012.pdf.  
178 Id. 
179 Supra note 1, at 491. 
180 Robert C. Marshall, et al, The Private Attorney General Meets Public Contract Law: Procurement 
oversight By Protest 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1991). 
181 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention against Corruption, Art. 9 (1)(d), 
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.  
182 Iraqi Council of Representatives, The Accession Law of Iraq to the 2004 United Nations Convention against 
corruption, available at http://ar.parliament.iq/LiveWebsites/Arabic/PassedLaws.aspx.    
183 Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption: United Nations 
Convention against Corruption: Implementing Procurement-Related Aspects, 19, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/workinggroups/wg_1/INF.2.pdf.   
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particular country. Nonetheless, there are, in general, two major categories of bid protest 
mechanisms used in the various jurisdictions. The first one is a protest review that is internal to 
the procurement organizational structure, because it is conducted by the procuring agency. This 
system is known as agency-level bid protest in the United States.  
The second one is an external review, conducted either by an independent body or by the 
judiciary, sometimes by a specialized court, or by both. This means that in some countries there 
are three types of reviews; the agency-level, an independent body, and the judiciary. For 
instance, the United States offers three venues for unsatisfied bidders: the contracting agency, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), acting as an independent body, and the Court of 
Federal Claims (COFC), as the judicial forum.       
Two types of review are available to unsatisfied bidders in Iraq. There is an internal 
review mechanism at the agency-level or ministerial-level which is less formal in terms of 
procedures used in reviewing protests submitted by interested parties.184 There is also an external 
review mechanism represented by a specialized administrative tribunal, the IAT. The review in 
the tribunal is formal as the IAT must comply with the procedures set forth in the Law on Civil 
Procedures (LCP) for ordinary civil trials. In addition, there is an appellate review for the 
decisions of the IAT conducted by the Federal Supreme Court (FSC).  
1.10 Costs and Benefits of the Bid Protest System 
 There are basically two major groups of scholars involved in examining the pros and cons 
of the bid protest process. The first group can be called pro discretion scholars who are against 
stricter bid protest system. The second group is pro oversight scholars who tend to support 
184 Under Article 10 (a) of the IRGC, there is no agency-level bid protest mechanism in the Iraqi procurement 
system; rather it is a ministerial level.   
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stricter bid protest procedures. The latter group usually emphasizes the benefits of a bid protest 
system, while the pro discretion group examines the costs and negative impacts of the bid protest 
on the entire procurement system. In fact even the opponents of the bid protest system do not ask 
for the removal of the bid protest process; rather, the difference of opinion centers on the extent 
of that oversight on the procurement system. The section examines the arguments of both sides, 
specifically in light of the American experience.  
1.10.1 The Importance of Discretion in the Public Procurement System 
In the 1990s the Clinton Administration adopted the National Performance Review, a 
broad reaching effort to reinvent government by making it more businesslike.185 Reforming 
public procurement was one of the most successful programs within this effort.186 The 
procurement reform was supervised and conducted by Harvard Professor Steven Kelman, who 
re-shaped the procurement process according to his vision in Procurement and Public 
Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance.187  
From 1993 through 1997, Kelman served as Administrator of the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy in the Office of Management and Budget. During his tenure as 
Administrator, he played a lead role in the Administration's "reinventing government" effort.188 
He led Administration efforts in support of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and 
the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995.189 Although this analysis is related to the American 
experience, it works to a reasonable extent to other procurement system in other contexts 
because it tackles the major controversy of discretion versus oversight. 
185 Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 627, 628-629 (2001). 
186 Id., at 629. 
187 Id. 
188 The Web Home of Prof. Steve Kelman, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/skelman/.  
189 Id. 
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Kelman examines how the federal government buys computer technology, including 
computers, networks, applications, and support services.190 The book states that lessons derived 
from problems with computer and computer-related purchasing can be applied to some extent to 
the functioning of the government procurement system generally.191 It concludes that the fear of 
allowing procurement officials discretion to exercise good judgment in the purchasing process 
prevents agencies from selecting the best contractor and inhibits the performance quality of the 
contractors selected.192  
Kelman states that the goals of the regulations of the public procurement are: (1) equity, 
fair access to government contracts; (2) integrity, limiting corruption in the procurement process; 
(3) economy and efficiency, acquiring goods and services at the lowest possible price.193 To 
achieve these goals, procurement regulations require that government contracts be awarded 
based on “full and open competition.” He states, further, that competition lowers prices; hence, it 
promotes economy.194 It also allows all contractors to participate in the procedures of obtaining 
government contracts.195 Finally, full and open competition prevents corruption in the 
procurement process because it is harder to bribe an official and easier to detect considering the 
fact that the lowest price is the crucial winning factor.196  
Kelman also suggests that historical background had had an impact on introducing the 
“full and open competition” criterion because Americans do not trust government.197 In addition, 
190 STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT THE FEAR OF DISCRETION 
AND THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE, 1 (1990). 
191 Id., at 2. 
192 Id., at 9.  
193 Id., at 11. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id., at 12. 
197 Id., at 13. 
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the USA was born in an armed struggle against government tyranny and many Americans 
emigrated from their countries to escape the power of government.198 This distrust in 
government, in Kelman’s view, spills over into the regulation of the contracting powers, 
therefore people are suspicious that the contract award process can be tainted with corrupt 
practices such as cronyism and bribery.199 Furthermore, procurement officials are not necessarily 
motivated to acquire good products with the lowest possible price because they are not spending 
their own money.200 
Thus, the best procedure to achieve “full and open competition” is contracting using 
sealed bidding under which the contract is to be advertised to all comers and the owner of the 
lowest price will win.201 This procedure was a response to the efforts of congressmen to secure 
contracts for friends in the nineteenth century.202 During the twentieth century government 
agencies awarded contracts by receiving proposals from contractors explaining how they plan to 
perform and for what price as an alternative to sealed bidding.203 However, this alternative was 
controversial because of the degree of discretion it allows as to how often this method can be 
used.204  
In the 1940s Congress amended the procurement law that continued favoring sealed 
bidding, but allowed other contracting methods as exceptions.205 Several years later, the 
exceptions became so common that only 10 to 15 percent of contracts, considering the dollar 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id., at 15. 
202 Id. 
203 Id., at 16. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
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value, were awarded using sealed bids.206 Finally, in 1984 Congress passed the Competition in 
Contracting Act removing the statutory preference for sealed bids and both sealed bids and 
competitive negotiations were considered “full and open competition.”207 The legislative history 
showed that the exceptions allowed to the sealed bidding under the previous law were often 
applied inappropriately to justify the use of sole-source.208 Thus, the Competition in Contracting 
Act is designed to limit to the minimum the use of sole-source method.209 
The sole-source method is allowed as an exception provided that certain restrictions are 
applied. First, there must be a written justification by the contracting officer for the use of other 
than full and open competition and a certificate by the technical and requirements personnel 
supporting the necessity of using such a method.210 The justification must include information 
including a description of the goods and services required, the statutory bases that allow this 
exception, and a determination that the proposed cost will be fair and reasonable.211  
Second, the justification must be approved by officials determined according to the dollar 
value of the contract. For instance, for contracts not exceeding US$ 550,000 the approval of the 
contracting officer suffices, but the approval of the competition advocate for the procurement 
activity is required for contracts over US$ 550,000 but not exceeding US$ 11.5 million.212 
Contracts over US$ 11.5 million but not exceeding US$ 57 million the approval of the head of 
206 Id., at 16 & 17. 
207 Id., at 17. 
208 Id.  
209 Id. 
210 FAR § 6.303-1, supra note 144, and see supra note 190, at 18. 
211 FAR § 6.303-2. 
212 Id., at § 6.304. 
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the procuring activity and contracts over US$ 57 million requires the approval of the senior 
procurement executive of the agency.213  
 Although Kelman admits that the competitive proposal or request for proposal to award 
government contracts provides theoretically for greater discretion of officials, in practice there 
are real limitations on this discretion.214 He identifies three major limitations which are the rules 
and practices establishing the government’s requirements; the criteria by which proposals from 
vendors are evaluated; and the information that may be used in evaluating proposals against 
those criteria.215 
According to Kelman, requirements are specifications of what the government wants to 
purchase such as how much computing capacity, what sorts of application, and so forth.216 Under 
the FAR, “agencies shall specify needs in a manner designed to promote full and open 
competition.”217 In addition, “specifications may include restrictive provisions or conditions only 
to the extent necessary to satisfy the minimum needs of the agency.”218 If specifications are 
tailored to prefer a product or services of a specific vendor, such specifications violate the FAR 
and trigger protests.219  
On the other hand, in establishing criteria to evaluate the proposals of contractors, 
agencies are granted considerable discretion.220 Price or cost to the government is included as an 
evaluation factor in every source selection, but the award need not be made to the lowest 
213 Id. 
214 Supra note 190, at 19. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
217 Id., at  20. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
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bidders.221 Although it appears that agencies have huge discretion in determining evaluating 
factor, such discretion is limited too.222 Evaluation criteria are related to agency need based on 
its statutory mission as determined by Congress.223  
Furthermore, all evaluation criteria are identified in the Request for Proposal (RFP).224 
Officials may not use other evaluation criteria after they have seen the proposals even if they 
discover a crucial criterion in a particular proposal which has been neglected in the solicitation 
documents, because doing so is considered favoring one of the contractors.225 The purpose 
behind the obligation of identifying evaluation criteria in the RFP is to make sure contractors 
know in advance on what criteria they will be judged in the competition.226   
Finally, another limitation on the discretion of the procuring officials is that contractors 
must be judged only on their written proposals submitted in response to the RFP.227 Officials 
may not evaluate a proposal based on information they have obtained on their own initiative, on 
communications with other bodies and agencies that have past experience with the contractor, or 
on reviews from other sources regarding the performance of the potential contractor.228 If 
officials do not comply with this requirement, their decision will be considered void and 
corrupt.229 In fact, this requirement emerged from procurement practices and not from 
contracting regulations.230 
221 Id. 
222 Id., at 21. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Id., at 21 & 22. 
230 Id., at 21. 
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On the other hand, Kelman’s major complaint about the old procurement system was that 
agencies or buyers were not allowed to use past performance as a crucial factor in the evaluation 
process to identify the winner.231 Past performance was given only little weigh in evaluating 
contractors’ proposals.232 The reason for ignoring past performance was the requirement that 
agencies evaluate offers based solely on elements found in the contractor’s proposal.233 
However, currently extensive regulations and guidance requires agencies to formally weigh the 
past performance of contractors on existing or previous contracts for future works.234 
Thus, Kelman’s major criticism is that the procurement environment became highly 
regulated in a way that officials do not have enough discretion to exercise judgment in selecting 
the winning contractor.235 He does not deny the importance of rules in defining, directing, and 
coordinating the behavior of large numbers of people and describes rules as one of the greatest 
achievements of the human experience.236 Rules, according to Kelman, allow a complex tax to 
be divided into parts and coordinated because each person knows that others follow the rules.237    
Kelman, however, states that rules do not work for all times and situations and existing 
rules became inappropriate when the environment changes.238 He suggests that in such an 
environment officials have to be given greater discretion.239 He believes that over-reliance on 
rules to be enforced in situations that require more than blind application of such rules 
suppresses creativity and striving for excellence.240 He calls for a balance between discretion and 
231 Id., at 39. 
232 Id., at 40. 
233 Id., at 39. 
234 Supra note 185, at 656- 657. 
235 Supra note 190, at 26-28. 
236 Id., ar 26. 
237 Id. 
238 Id., at 27.  
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
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rules in the public management arena.241 The over-reliance on rules, according to Kelman, came 
from the Americans’ doubtful perception of government previously discussed.242 Government 
agencies became rule-based not because such rule dominance is the best way to achieve better 
performance, but because it was required to avoid scandal.243  
Thus, clearance points are multiplied as additional checks with the aim of limiting 
malfeasance.244 Kelman believes that a bias against discretion exist in the American political 
science literature.245 He notes that researchers frequently point out, as a problem, that there is 
still some discretion left to lower-level officials.246 He comments that the self-same problem of 
little discretion is common in the procurement process.247 Kelman believes that organizational 
rules serve to prevent disasters but at the cost of stifling excellence, adding that excellence 
requires the ability to demonstrate distinctiveness, while rules imply uniformity.248 Discretion is 
limited to reduce the incidence of misbehavior, but this limitation reduces outstanding 
achievement.249 
Kelman argues that the environment of public procurement changes more rapidly than the 
rules governing it, and the procurement process is too complicated to be translated into simple 
rules.250 In such an environment, a decision-making process that depends heavily on rules is 
untenable.251 He suggests that not only do rules need to change, but the system that relies too 
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much on rules itself needs to change.252 Kelman believes, again, that the existing rules might 
serve the limited goals of equity, integrity, and economy, but they are not suitable to achieve 
excellence in performance.253  
Kelman basically implies that a plethora of rules restricts the discretion of officials to 
exercise judgments in awarding public contracts and generates more disputes and protests, 
because rules increases the bases of complaints. In addition, more rules broaden the boundary of 
oversight especially to third-party observers, which are potential or actual bidders. Further, rules 
undermine the spirit of distinctiveness and innovation of procurement officials, while exercising 
their authorities.  Kelman expresses disappointment and dissatisfaction towards bid protests or 
the idea of oversight generally especially by third parties. 
Professor Kelman believes that bid protests are time-consuming and expensive.254 In 
addition, when agencies lose the protest they have to pay bid preparation costs and legal fees 
from taxpayer’s money.255 He believes that the time and monetary cost are only the direct impact 
of bid protests, while the indirect costs are even more disappointing.256 For instance, bid protests 
open the door to some companies to win government contracts not by satisfying contracting 
agencies but through litigation.257 This phenomenon is in contrast with to the principles that 
govern commercial relationships in the private sector.258  
252 Id., at 89. 
253 Id. 
254 Steve Kelman, Silence of Protesters’ Bark Signals New Era, THE BUSINESS OF FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY 
available at, http://fcw.com/Articles/1999/02/21/Silence-of-protesters-bark-signals-new-era.aspx?Page=1.  
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In addition, civil servant’s career could be jeopardized when an agency loses a protest 
because the loss is a blot on his or her record.259 According to Kelman, the direct and indirect 
costs of the bid protest system result in pernicious effects on the entire procurement process.260 
For instance, bid protests make contracting agencies excessively risk-averse and slow in source 
selection.261 In addition, agencies start producing redundant documentation and objectification of 
every decision in order to be able to defend themselves in a potential protest.262 “Better choose 
the wrong vendor, many appeared to believe, than to choose the right one based on ‘subjective’ 
or less than exhaustively documented grounds.”263  
Kelman continues in showing the negative impacts of bid protests. The bid protest system 
has a devastating effect on a partnership between the government and contractors.264 Building a 
partnership relationship with a particular contractor creates grounds for protests based on corrupt 
acts such as favoritism and the system forces agencies to inter into business relationship with 
companies who protested at every procurement opportunity.265 Partnership ultimately increases 
the quality of the goods and services government receives from contractors. 
Kelman praises highly that two major IT companies that did not protest the award of 
public contracts which they lost.266 He considers the decisions of Lockheed Martin and AT&T 
not to protest as an announcement of the end of the bid protest era and a birth of a more 
constructive government/contractor relationship.267 In such a relationship, the purchasing process 
focuses on choosing the winning contractor based on who can deliver results, reasonable prices, 
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and the ability to establish good partnerships to achieve those results.268 He urges agencies to 
take their share of responsibility for reducing reliance on bid protests.269 
Kelman believes that the era of “procedural trivia” and the bureaucratic process that 
involved contracting agencies in unreasonable decisions in source selection is “happily gone”.270 
Nonetheless, he suggests that the need for common sense and an open mind in decision-making 
remains regarding which contractor represents the deal for the government, not only to avoid 
protests but to make the best business decision for the government as well.271 He also encourages 
contractors to take other steps to eliminate the culture of bid protests through voluntary promise 
not to protest an award decision, as one contractor did.272  
Finally, Kelman states that “the sooner we stop worrying about litigation and start 
focusing on delivering value for the government's IT investments, the better off government and 
vendors will be.”273  The main purpose behind Kelman’s reform of the public procurement is to 
reinvent government, according to the NPR program, by making it more businesslike.274 The 
comparison Kelman makes is about how the private sector purchases computer and IT-related 
services and how the government acquires them. According to Kelman, the US government 
procurement currently functions in a more businesslike fashion through adopting businesslike 
concepts including customer satisfaction and efficiency.275   
268 Id. 
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1.10.2 The Role of Oversight in Public Procurement Processes      
On the other hand, other scholars prefer stricter oversight on the discretion of public 
officials including contracting officers. One of the most extensive responses to Kelman regarding 
the idea of bid protests, or third parties oversight, is Steven L.Schooner’s article Fear of 
Oversight: the Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government.276 Schooner advocates for 
more oversight on the discretion of the agencies when they make contracting-related decisions. 
Schooner’s views are outlined below. Schooner’s major disagreement with Kelman is on the 
discretion of officials. Schooner praises Kelman for his effort to make the procurement process 
functions more efficiently.277 Nonetheless, Schooner disagrees with Kelman who “views less 
litigation as a public good because it enhances transaction efficiency.” Public procurement to 
Schooner is not just about administrative efficiency and he refuses to consider administrative 
efficiency as a fundamental goal of the procurement process.278  
To Schooner “less litigation cannot be a public good unless the procurement system’s 
traditionally robust third-party monitoring is replaced with increased internal government 
oversight.”279 Interestingly, reduced oversight, as Schooner points out in the public procurement 
field, was not deliberate but it was inadvertent to the acquisition reform efforts.280 The 
elimination of oversight or the imposition of restrictions on private attorneys general and other 
276 Supra note 185. 
277 Id., at 673-674. 
278 Id., at 674, and footnote 153 stating that there are other goals behind the regulation of public procurement such as 
promoting social policies including wealth distribution, more participation for small and women-owned businesses, 
compliance with labor law, occupational safety standards, preferences for environmentally friendly purchasing 
practices, etc.  
279 Id., at 676. 
280 Id., at 678. 
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third-party monitoring, was not even an argument in the reform effort.281  Whether reduced 
oversight was intended or not, the outcome is unfortunate to Schooner. 
Schooner first starts with Kelman’s objection to litigation by quoting a scholar who states 
that ““If the Government’s trains are running on time at the expense of oversight, due process, 
and access to litigation, it would not be at all surprising. After all, the system was remodeled by a 
man who is known to detest lawyers.”282 For the reasons mentioned above with respect to the 
costs of litigation, Kelman rejects the mechanism of the private attorney general in the 
procurement process.283 According to Kelman “government over time, albeit unconsciously, 
increased its reliance on the contractor community to fulfill its duty and it seemed comfortable 
with the concept of third-party monitoring.”284  
 In contrast, Schooner replies to Kelman by listing the benefits of third-party oversight on 
public procurement. First, Schooner points out that even Kelman himself does not deny the 
importance of the concept of oversight.285 Kelman states that any loosening of the regulatory 
restrictions should be accompanied by increased resources for corruption investigations to 
investigate misbehavior inside and outside the agencies responsible for procurement.286 Thus, 
Schooner suggests that from a policy standpoint, Kelman should welcome the idea of the private 
attorney general.287 
281 Id. 
282 Id., at 679. 
283 See p. 45-47 of this dissertation. 
284 Id., at 681. 
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Schooner asserts that opponents of litigation cannot identify a more cost effective, 
requiring less enforcement regimes, than the bid protest system.288 In addition, contractors doing 
business with the government have traditionally played the role of the private attorney general 
either as legitimate interested parties or, more recently, as opportunistic interested parties.289 In 
addition, Congress has implicitly deputized actual and potential contractors as private attorneys 
general to monitor the procurement process.290 Courts have acknowledged explicitly this 
monitoring of government activities by the private sector. In Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer291 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated that “prospective contractors, injured by arbitrary and 
capricious government actions, should be able to sue or protest to vindicate their real interests, 
while at the time furthering the public interest.”292  
 Furthermore, bid protests help to reinforce the impartiality of the procurement system.293 
They serve to correct rare incidents of inadvertent or worse, illegal, arbitrary, or capricious 
actions of the contracting agencies.294 Contractors now become strangely quiet in monitoring the 
procurement process because of the reforms Kelman conducted.295 If contractors relinquish their 
right to monitor the procurement system to ensure its integrity, and the policy makers implicitly 
or explicitly urge this abdication, the entire procurement process suffers.296 Nonetheless, 
288 Id., and see Daniel I. Gordon, Bid Protests: The Costs Are Real, But the Benefits Outweigh Them, 42 Pub. Cont. 
L.J. 489, 507-508 (2013) , (emphasizing that the bid protest system offers a low-cost form of accountability to the 
procurement system. contractors decide which government contract is to be checked for mistakes or irregularity. If 
no interested party protests, the GAO and the COFC would not investigate a procurement transaction. In contrast, if 
a contractor protests, then the GAO and the COFC would consider the allegation of the protest.) 
289 Supra note 185, at 680. 
290 Id., at 680 & 681.  
291 Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
292 Id., cited in Supra note 185, at 680, footnote 173. 
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Schooner emphasizes that litigation is not the optimal method to resolve problems that arise in 
the marketplace precisely because it is inefficient.297  
 Another major criticism to the bid protest system is that contractors take advantage of the 
system by delaying the procurement process through submitting frivolous protests.298 Schooner 
believes that some scholars have stereotyped the private attorney general so badly that they fail 
to exclude those offerors that meet the standing requirement and serve the public interest by 
coming forward to challenge contract award decisions.299 Thus, the concept of the private 
attorney general includes three various types of groups.300 The first one are those contractors 
who take advantage of the regulatory bureaucracy to obtain some attorney fees.301 The second 
group is the social advocate group which considers litigation as a form of pressure group 
activity.302 Finally, the third group is actual or honest private attorneys general that already meet 
the standing requirements for submitting protests.303 Schooner calls the third group “accidental 
private attorney[s] general” to include those interested parties who serve the oversight function 
through bid protests in the course of conducting their routine business transactions.”304 He 
suggests that these contractors should be encouraged to protect their rights more aggressively.305  
Schooner believes that notions of taking advantage of the bid protest system comes from 
the concentration of the exploitation of bureaucracy by lawyers, akin to the ambulance-chaser 
stereotype, which assumes that fees motivate attorneys to bring law suits.306 Nevertheless, he 
297 Id. 
298 Kelman, supra note 254, see also Gorden, supra note 288, at 501-502. 
299 Supra note 185, at 688. 
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does not advocate attorney-initiated litigation, but contractor-initiated litigation.307 According to 
Schooner, “for the accidental private attorneys general, bringing suit must make business sense 
(from the business’s standpoint, not from outside council’s) in light of the pending dispute and 
not based upon a prospective windfall.”308 
On the other hand, another benefit of the bid protest process is not related to oversight, as 
Schooner states. Clarification of procurement regulation and standard contract clauses that bind 
the government is another important benefit.309 Furthermore, precedent has a substantial value in 
a highly regulated system subject to frequent congressional modification.310 Since buyers, 
sellers, and counsel frequently utilize various provisions of solicitations and contract clauses, 
publication of procurement precedent by protest forums informs agencies and contractors to 
modulate their behavior.311 
The drafters of the FAR avoided introducing extensive guidance to the published 
regulation.312 As a result, the protest decisions published by protest forums provide necessary 
interpretation to the terms and provisions of procurement regulation to those involved in 
procurement activities.313 Also, “judicial opinions can reduce uncertainty regarding the validity 
and meaning of a term and the interaction of the term with relevant legal requirements…..this 
reduction in uncertainty reduces the expected costs of corporate planning and of litigating 
disputes regarding a contract term.”314 For instance, corporate lawyers know that the GAO 
307 Id. 
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strictly applies the rule “late is late” because of the publication of bid protest decisions, so that 
counsel advise their clients to file their protests on time.315 
On the other hand, reduced oversight threatens public trust. Kelman himself anticipates 
and warns against diminished oversight as a consequence of procurement reform.316 He claims to 
“take very seriously the goal of keeping the level of corruption in government low.”317 He states 
that “corruption can devastate the ethical tones of society as a whole and decrease the inclination 
of citizens to behave ethically in their everyday life.”318 But, he doubts that corruption is 
widespread in the procurement process, believing that there is much exaggeration about it.319  
Kelman believes that broad procurement reform should be accompanied by increased oversight 
mechanisms to ensure compliance by buyers and contractors with the revised rules.320 
Nevertheless, corruption in the procurement system should be tackled through other methods 
such as investigative techniques, including undercover agents and wiretaps.321 Thus, Kelman 
also suggests that the fight against corruption should be removed from the procurement 
regulatory system.322 
In contrast, Schooner strongly disagrees because “his implementation efforts failed to 
recognize that oversight generally, and third-party monitoring specifically, could add significant 
value to this flexible, discretionary, and rapidly evolving buying regime.”323 Yet, Kelman 
315 Gorden, supra note 288, at 510. 
316 Supra note 185, at 706. 
317 Supra note a90, at 96. 
318 Id. 
319 Id., see Gorden, supra note 288, at 508, which states that the public only rarely focuses on public procurement 
unless there is a protest that is mentioned in the press. For instance, when the Boing Company filed a protest against 
the Air Force’s award of a tanker contract to Northrop Grumman. Such press coverage of government contracts’ 
award may raise the public’s trust in the fairness of the government in how it spends public funds).  
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himself states that “one need not sacrifice equity and integrity to obtain better substantive 
procurement performance.”324  
With respect to undermined public trust, Schooner argues that Kelman, as a public policy 
scholar, knows that reduced oversight threatens fundamental norms of the public procurement 
system.325 The procurement system is based on competition, individual and institutional 
integrity, and transparency, all of which are crucial to maintaining public trust.326 When 
interested parties exercise their due process rights through bid protests, they intentionally or 
inadvertently strengthen these major policies.327 Without competition in the procurement 
process, the elements of price and quality of goods and services cannot be achieved, especially as 
it has long been established that procurement officials are less motivated to maximize 
competition.328  
Furthermore, recent procurement reforms resulted in reduction of the procurement 
workforce that changed the balance from full and open competition to increased efficiency.329 It 
is true that government can save agency resources including time, energy, and money when 
fewer contractors compete for a public contract.330 Still, less competition makes it very difficult 
for the government to obtain the best value in its contract activities.331 Schooner believes that the 
balance between efficiency and competition is the ultimate hurdle facing the acquisition reform 
program.332  
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Schooner states that when the public loses confidence in how agencies spend its money, 
when contracts are awarded based on favoritism rather than rules, or when competing contractors 
believe that they are not in an equal position with incumbent contractors, the system suffers.333 
According to Schooner, Kelman himself acknowledges the role that public trust plays in public 
procurement.334 In this context Kelman states that the general public observes and perceives 
corruption as a major problem because frequent corruption scandals in municipal and in federal 
procurement suggest that payoffs are an endemic problem in procurement.335  
However, Schooner states that “Kelman’s reform largely ignores the transparency issue 
and his reform initiatives frequently come at the expense of transparency.”336 In addition, as 
transparency in public procurement is characterized by clear rules and by means to verify that 
those rules are followed, the direction to increase the discretion of procurement officials could be 
considered antithetical to certain perceptions of transparency.337 According to Schooner, this 
trend does not trouble Kelman because his reform or model are inspired by the function of the 
private sector.338 In the private sector transparency is not considered an optimal goal.339 Reduced 
oversight more likely uncovers less legality, less non-compliance, fewer errors in judgment, and 
less sloppiness.340 
   Another major criticism that Schooner relies on to challenge Kelman’s philosophy 
regarding public administration is the basic fact that government is different from the private 
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sector.341 First and foremost, government does not have a profit motive and should operate with 
more transparency.342 Further, both of them serve different ends that ultimately create distinct 
cultures and norms.343 The government is also not in an equal position with the contractors that 
buys from them.344 Although some claim that when the government enters into a commercial 
relationship it will be subject to the same laws that governs the relationship between private 
parties, this myth is being slowly diminished.345  
 Furthermore, businesses get most of their money from customers while governments get 
most of their money from taxpayers.346 Businesses are usually driven by the principle of 
competition, while the governments are monopolies.347 Government is democratic and open and 
it moves more slowly than business because government’s fundamental goal is to do good not to 
make money.348 In addition, government is under obligation to treat everybody equally.349 These 
differences demonstrate that government cannot be administered like a business.350 Even peoples 
advocating for governmental reinvention admit that there are limits to a business model in 
governance.351 
Thus, this difference in the philosophy of how each sector functions, as Schooner 
suggests, makes it difficult to model the government after the private sector. Schooner gives an 
example regarding how public and private sectors utilize rules in their daily tasks. A 
businessman who deviates from rules is considered to be flexible. Rules are highly general and 
341 Id., at 715. 
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allow scope for individual initiative in the pursuit of profit.352 In contrast, a civil servant 
deviating from relevant rules is considered to be guilty of misconduct. A rule book provides 
officials with some discretion in their dealings with the public, but at the same time they must 
avoid arbitrariness.353  
1.11 What does the empirical data tell us? 
 Daniel Gorden, in an empirical study, responds to the misperceptions that are extant 
regarding the bid protest system. He corrects some misunderstandings that lead to negative 
judgments regarding bid protests. In particular, Gorden responds to two major problems often 
triggered against the protest process by those who advovate limiting the opportunity of 
challenging contracting agencies’ decisions by unsatisfied bidders. The first misperception is that 
bid protests are more common in the procurement system than they really are.354 The second one 
is that many believe that protesters use the system as a business tactic to obtain contracts from 
the government.355  
1.11.1 Protests are rare 
 Gorden compares the numbers of protests to the numbers of contracts that the US federal 
government enters into annually. He states that contracting officers believe that bid protests are 
frequent over the years he or she worked in the procurement arena.356 Yet, if the same 
contracting officer is asked how many contracts he or she processed, the number of contracts 
would outweigh the number of protests by far.357 Thus, to identify the frequency of bid protests 
352 Id., at 716, footnote 300. 
353 Id. 
354 Gorden, supra note 288, at 492. 
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357 Id., at 494. 
75 
 
                                                          
 
 
to contracts awarded, there are difficulties in determining precisely both the number of bid 
protests and the number of federal contracts.358  
There are no accurate data regarding the number of federal government contracts that are 
conducted every year.359 A study by RAND Corporation of Air Force procurements that were 
protested to the GAO showed that approximately 20,000 contracts were awarded by the Air 
Force in 2008 representing approximately $63 billion.360 On the other hand, the overall 
procurement spending of the Federal Government in 2008 was over S500 billion which is eight 
times the amount spent by the Air Force.361 Thus, this calculation suggests that the number of 
contracts awarded was approximately 160,000.362 However, Gorden suspects that this number is 
lower than it actually is, so an accurate estimate would be more than 250,000 contracts.363 Thus, 
for the purposes of the study Gorden conducted, he assumed that the number of contracts and 
protestable orders awarded in 2008 is 200,000.364 
 With respect to the number of protests, there is confusion caused by the way the GAO 
counts the protests it receives.365 The GAO counts protests in a way that may exaggerate the 
numbers of protests.366 When a contractor files a protest against the provisions of a solicitation, 
the GAO assigns it a docket number which begins with a “B”, known as “B number” (for 
example, B-123456).367 If the unsatisfied bidder reveals new grounds for a protest and files a 
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supplemental protest of that same solicitation terms, the GAO will register that as B-123456.2.368 
If another unsatisfied offeror submits a protest to the same solicitation terms, the GAO will 
docket the initial protest of that offeror as B-123456.3 and its supplemental protest (in case filed) 
as B-123456.4.369 These are examples of pre-award protests. If the agency awards the contract, 
an unsatisfied bidder might protest to the award decision and this protest would be docketed as 
B-123456.5.370 Finally, if another losing offeror files a protest against the same award decision, 
the GAO dockets it as B-123456.6.371 Thus, in this example, the GAO’s record shows 6 or more 
protests for one procurement transaction.372 Gorden states that 6 protests for one procurement is 
unusual, but two or three protests for one procurement is routine.373  
This method of recording protests suggests that the reported number of bid protests by the 
GAO substantially overstates the number of procurements actually challenged.374 Although the 
GAO reports that for the fiscal year 2008, there were 1652 protests, elsewhere the GAO reports 
that 1027 protests were filed in that same year.375 As a result, the GAO indicates that, on 
average, there were approximately 1.6 docket numbers assigned to each protested contract.376 
Considering this ratio, the 2353 protests filed in the fiscal year 2011 represented only 1470 
procurement transactions actually protested.377  
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Obviously, the number of federal procurements was not the same in fiscal year 2008 and 
2011.378 If, however, it is assumed that there were approximately 200,000 procurements based 
on the RAND Corporation data in those two years, that would indicate that 0.51% of 
procurements were protested in fiscal year 2008 and 0.74% were protested in fiscal year 2011.379 
Accordingly, these numbers indicate that approximately 99.3% and 99.5% of procurements were 
not protested.380 These data show that only a very low percentage of contracts result in protests, 
as compared to the number of procurements conducted by the Federal government. 
Again, 99.5% of the Air Force procurement transactions were processed without being 
protested to the GAO in Fiscal Year 2008.381 Even assuming that the number of protests filed 
against procurements of other agencies is double the number of the protests filed against the Air 
Force procurements (there is no reason to believe that that is the case), it would still be true that 
99% of government procurements of these other agencies awarded without a bid protest.382 
These numbers are specific to the GAO because the RAND Corporation studied only bid protests 
submitted to the GAO, though there are two other fora that receive bid protests: the contracting 
agency and the COFC.  
Gorden suggests that even including the protests submitted to the COFC would not 
change the umbers substantially.383 The COFC only receives less than one-tenth the number of 
protests that the GAO receives each year.384 On the other hand, contractors can also file protests 
to the contracting agencies. According to Gorden, there are not accurate statistics on the number 
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of protests submitted directly to the Air Force in order to conduct a more correct data analysis.385 
Nevertheless, he does not believe that the number of agency protests would increase the total 
percentage of the protested Air Force procurements much above 0.5%.386 
Gorden then examines the allegation that the increase of the number of bid protests is a 
problem.387 He admits that it is true that the number of protests filed to the GAO has 
substantially increased over the past few years (2006-2011).388 However, even if the numbers 
doubled, from 0.5% of protested procurements to 1%, it would still mean that approximately 
99% of procurements are processed without being protested.389 In numbers, the number of 
protests received by the GAO has increased from 1327 in Fiscal Year 2006 to 2353 in Fiscal 
Year 2011, which is more than 70% increase.390  
Adjusting the number of protests according to the ratio of the actual number of protests 
filed with the GAO to the number of protests the GAO routinely reports which is mentioned 
above, the increase in protests is approximately from 830 in 2006 to 1470 in 2011.391 
Nonetheless, Federal procurement spending also increased during the same period from $432 
billion in 2006 to $537 billion in 2011.392 In other words, in 2006 there were approximately 1.92 
protests for each billion in federal procurement spending, while in 2011, there were 2.74 protests 
per billion.393  
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These assessments, 1.92% and 2.74% protests per billion dollars, match those numbers 
that the GAO provided in a report to congress in 2009.394 In that congressional report, the GAO 
stated that the number of protested procurements in the Department of Defense procurement 
spending ranged from 1.4 to 1.9 per billion dollars during 2004 to 2008.395 Although the figure 
has increased in Fiscal Year 2011, the number of protests per each billion dollars in federal 
spending is still extremely low.396 Even with considering the 2011 increase, the number is still 
fewer than three protests for each billion dollars spent by the Federal Government.397 
1.11.2 It Is Rare for a Protester to Win a Protest 
 Gorden states that the GAO also utilizes a misleading methodology for counting the 
success rate of protesters.398 The GAO uses the term “sustain rate” in its reports to indicate 
occasions when the GAO issues a decision in favor of the protester.399 The sustain rate between 
2007 and 2011 has ranged from 16% to 27% which shows that protesters have a great chance to 
win a protest.400 Nonetheless, the situation actually does not look that favorable to protesters.401 
First, the sustain rate has been decreasing nearly consistently from 27% in 2007 to 16% in 
2011.402 Second, the GAO’s annual report states that the sustain rate is only for those protests for 
which the GAO has issued a decision on the merits.403 According to this method, the GAO did 
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not sustain 19% of the 2299 cases received in 2010, rather it sustained 19% of 441 decisions on 
the merits.404 
 Third, the sustain rate is also distorted by the GAO’s methodology of counting multiple B 
numbers because protests that are sustained usually have more than one B number compared to 
protests denied.405 For instance, in 2010 the GAO issued 441 decisions on the merits of which 82 
were reported as sustained protests.406 However, counting the actual decisions, counting every 
decision as one even though it has received multiple B numbers, showed that there were only 
282 decisions on the merits rather than 441.407 In addition, form the 282 decisions, only 45 cases 
were sustained while the GAO reported that it sustained 82 protests.408 Thus, the sustain rate is 
16% rather than 19% as the GAO reported.409 
 The above data demonstrate that among the hundreds of thousands of contracts the 
Federal Government conducted in 2010, the GAO sustained only 45 bid protests.410 The 
interesting question Gorden triggers is what happened after the GAO sustained those 45 
protests.411 Did the protester that was successful in the GAO litigation succeed in obtaining the 
protest?412 The answer is rarely.413 Gorden uses the 2010 data to determine whether contractors 
that were successful in those 45 protests finally obtained the contract because sufficient time has 
passed for the final action that normally follow a protest.414 
404 Id. 
405 Id. 
406 Id. 
407 Id. 
408 Id., at 498-499. 
409 Id., at 499. 
410 Id. 
411 Id. 
412 Id. 
413 Id. 
414 Id. 
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 The GAO did not recommend any corrective action in four of the 45 decisions because 
the contract had already been performed or for other reasons.415 In another three decisions, the 
GAO recommended corrective actions, but the agency declined to follow the GAO’s 
recommendation.416 In another 23 cases, the GAO recommended corrective actions and the 
agency followed the GAO’s recommendation, but the agency did not award the contract to the 
protester as it awarded it to the initial winner or took some other actions such as cancelling the 
procurement entirely.417 In only eight cases did the protester obtain the contested procurement 
and in another case the agency did re-solicit the procurement using the size standard requested 
by the protester.418 Finally, the rest of the sustained protests, six decisions, have not yet been 
finalized.419  
 On the other hand, the GAO also reports a high “effectiveness rate” which demonstrates 
that protesters receive favorable result.420 The effectiveness rate was reported to be 42% for the 
Fiscal Year 2010, 2011, and 2012.421 However, this rate includes the sustained protests 
mentioned above as well as cases where agencies took voluntary corrective actions without 
intervention by the GAO so that the GAO closed the case without issuing a decision.422 In 
addition, the GAO reported that there is no publicly available information on those cases that the 
agency voluntarily awarded some form of relief to the protester.423  
415 Id., at 499-500.  
416 Id., at 500. 
417 Id. 
418 Id. 
419 Id. 
420 Id. 
421 Id. 
422 Id. 
423 Id. 
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In particular, it is more difficult to identify cases where the protesters obtained the 
contract at issue based on voluntary corrective actions form agencies.424 Further, determining the 
outcome of procurements protested in which the contracting agency voluntarily took corrective 
actions is not easy because the GAO does not disclose any information about such cases.425 
However, there is no reason to believe that an agency would be more likely to award a contested 
contract to a protester whose case resolves without a GAO’s intervention than after the GAO 
rules in a protesters favor.426       
1.12 What Really Works Best: More Discretion or More Oversight 
 The previous examination of the literature regarding the significance of both discretion 
and oversight is not conclusive in making simple statements of the suitability of one concept 
over the other in the public procurement process. The literature is divided between the supporters 
of more oversight which is conducted externally and internally. The bid protest process is one of 
the main internal methods of oversight that constrains the discretion of procurement officials in 
the administration of public procurement. However, discretion is also very important for 
procurement officials to obtain the best value from the procurement transactions. Thus, the main 
obstacle to the relationship between discretion and oversight is maintaining a balance between 
the two. 
 To create a balance between the discretionary powers and the bid protest system, there 
should be a specific study for identifying the level of discretion of procurement officials and the 
impact of the bid protest system on the efficiency of the procurement process in every 
jurisdiction. Such a study is in no way easy because it requires extensive theoretical and 
424 Id. 
425 Id., at 500-501. 
426 Id., at 501. 
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empirical studies to measure the discretion and the impacts of protests on the procurement 
activities. It also requires surveys among procurement officials, contractors, and even the public 
of how they see the problem.  
Studies such as the one Gorden conducted are quite helpful to examine the greater 
pictures of the situation of third party monitoring on the procurement process. In addition, 
examining the underlying procedures of the bid protest procedures provides further guidance for 
determining the restrictive impacts of the bid protest on the discretion of officials. In other 
words, designing the bid protest system should always be accompanied by the study of discretion 
of procurement officials and vice versa. Discretion should not come at the expense of integrity 
and oversight and the bid protest process should not squeeze the discretion of procurement 
officials. 
Regardless of the difficulties surrounding the issue of balancing the impact of discretion 
and oversight over public procurement, one of the concepts may be preferred over the other. 
Generally speaking, in developing countries where the level of corruption is unacceptablly high 
and more importantly the parliamentary, judicial, and administrative oversight is weak, 
increasing the level of oversight is always taken into consideration in reforming the public 
procurement system. On the other hand, developed countries are mostly concerned about the 
delay that the bid protest process causes and complicating the procurement procedures. 
In addition, this dissertation suggests the principle of oversight appropriateness. 
According to this principle, there should not be a single set of oversight mechanisms for all 
procurement activities. Instead, a separation between important, large, or complicated and simple 
contracts should be made. Such separation suggests exercising stricter scrutiny over large and 
complicated contracts. On the other hand, such separation suggests exercising less oversight on 
84 
 
 
 
the contracting agencies in awarding simple contracts and releasing their discretion in order to 
avoid burdening the procurement activities with delay and unnecessary constraints.  
Procurement transactions vary to a great extent because there are contracts that worth 
hundreds of millions of dollars, while there are other contracts that worth hundreds of thousands 
of dollars. Subjecting these different contracts to the same oversight mechanisms is not 
reasonable. Furthermore, the notion of procedural appropriateness is not in contrast to the 
principles governing public procurement activities. In fact, many procurement systems and 
regional and international agreements recognize simpler procedures for awarding contracts based 
on their monetary values.427 For instance, contracts below certain dollar value are subject to 
simplified acquisition procedures under the US procurement law.428 Under the Iraqi procurement 
laws, contracts below ID 100,000,000 are under complete discretion of contracting agencies to 
427 See for instance, the WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Article 1 (4), which states that “this Agreement applies to any 
procurement contract of a value of not less than the relevant threshold specified in Appendix I.” The threshold is 
specified in each Party's Appendix I Annexes. For a number of Parties, the thresholds are set at 130.000 SDR 
(Special Drawing Rights) for goods and services procured by central government (Annex 1) entities. Higher 
thresholds are applicable in respect of sub-central (Annex 2) and “other” (Annex 3) entities. A separate threshold 
which, for some Parties, is set at 5,000,000 SDR is applicable to construction services procured by all entities. In 
addition, see the EC Directive 2004/18/EC, supra note 92, Article 7 of, states that “this Directive shall apply to 
public contracts which are not excluded in accordance with the exceptions provided for in Articles 10 and 11 and 
Articles 12 to 18 and which have a value exclusive of value-added tax (VAT) estimated to be equal to or greater 
than the following thresholds: 
(a) EUR 162000 for public supply and service contracts……… (b) EUR 249000 
- for public supply and service contracts awarded by contracting authorities other than those listed in Annex IV, 
- for public supply contracts awarded by contracting authorities which are listed in Annex IV and operate in the field 
of defense, where these contracts involve products not covered by Annex V, 
- for public service contracts awarded by any contracting authority in respect of the services listed in Category 8 of 
Annex IIA, Category 5 telecommunications services the positions of which in the CPV are equivalent to CPC 
reference Nos 7524, 7525 and 7526 and/or the services listed in Annex II B; (c) EUR 6242000 for public works 
contracts.” 
428 See FAR 13.000, supra note 144, which states that “this part prescribes policies and procedures for the 
acquisition of supplies and services, including construction, research and development, and commercial items, the 
aggregate amount of which does not exceed the simplified acquisition threshold (see 2.101). Subpart 13.5 provides 
special authority for acquisitions of commercial items exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold but not 
exceeding $6.5 million ($12 million for acquisitions as described in 13.500(e)), including options. See Part 12 for 
policies applicable to the acquisition of commercial items exceeding the micro-purchase threshold. See 36.602-5 for 
simplified procedures to be used when acquiring architect-engineer services.” 
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award it with or without competition.429 In addition, there are some exceptions in many 
procurement systems regarding the applicability of procurement rules with respect to contracts 
related to defense and security.430  
The question is on what bases should the procurement laws and regulations identify large 
and simple contracts. The bases on which contracts can be classified could be the sensitivity of 
service or goods that the contract is about to acquire or the total price of the contract. This 
dissertation suggests that the best standard to be utilized for classifying contracts is the monetary 
value. Many of public contracts that involve large amounts of money are related to sensitive 
services such as health or irritation. Accordingly, the discretion of contracting agencies in 
contracts worth large amounts of money should be subject to stricter oversight in all stages of the 
award process, while oversight over the discretion of contracting agencies could be reduced in 
contracts involve small amounts of money.  
What this dissertation means by introducing stricter oversight mechanisms with respect to 
contracts with high monetary value is adding previous oversight measures to the current 
subsequent oversight process. Previous oversight may include an extra review or scrutiny on the 
award of public contracts before they are conducted. The bid protest process, subsequent 
oversight, exercises scrutiny mostly after the award of a contract and only when a unsatisfied 
protester challenges the award decision. However, there are several important stages precede the 
award of a public contract including the need base assessment, selection of contracting methods, 
writing provisions of a tender document, evaluation and selection of tenders, and the award 
decision.  
429 The IRGC, supra note 97, at Art. 4 (6). 
430 See for instance UNCITRAL, supra note 39, Art 1 (2)(a), the EC Directive 2004/18/EC, supra note 92, Art. 14. 
In addition, the US also has specific rules for defense contracts see U.S. Department Of Defense, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/landing/contract_resources.aspx.    
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This extra review should be automatic and without requiring a bidder to initiate a claim. 
Such review can be conducted internally by the OGPCP, which is the major institution 
responsible for organizing public procurement activities in Iraq.431 It can also be conducted by an 
external institution such as the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), which is the highest independent 
auditing agency in Iraq,432 or by the Commission on Public Committee (CPI), which is the major 
anti-corruption institution in Iraq.433 In addition, it can be conducted by a committee that consists 
of several members selected from the above institutions. The involvement of other institutions in 
the oversight process will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  
For contracts with a low-monetary value, the regular protest mechanisms, subsequent 
oversight, with the improvements that are suggested in this dissertation should be sufficient. The 
point is not to leave simple contracts without oversight, but it is to prevent burdening the 
procurement process with complicated scrutiny procedures that causes delay in providing 
services to the public. Examples of the improvements that we will suggest in subsequent chapters 
is broadening the right of challenging the decisions of contracting agencies to include not only 
participant bidders in a specific tender but also other competent contractors in that sector as 
interested parties. In addition, considering some institutions as interested parties to challenge 
award-related decisions such as a consumer protection agency or anti-corruption agencies will be 
helpful. Further, Allowing interested parties to challenge the provisions of a tender because 
contracting agencies may limit competition by the terms they use in the solicitation document.  
431 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2. 
432 Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 77: Board of Supreme Audit, Sec. 2, CPA/ORD/18 April 2004/77, 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-
iraq/regulations/20040425_CPAORD_77_Board_of_Supreme_Audit.pdf.   
433 Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 55: Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public 
Integrity, Sec 1, CPA/ORD/27 January 2004/55, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-
iraq/regulations/20040204_CPAORD55.pdf.  
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In addition to the previous oversight mechanisms, the subsequent oversight, regular bid 
protest mechanisms, should also be available for large and complicated contracts. Thus, by 
distributing the rigidity of oversight according to large and simple contracts, the procurement 
process will be released from unnecessary burdens associated with the oversight process and 
corrupt opportunities will be reduced in large public contracts if applied properly. The previous 
oversight mechanism might create some difficulties to the public procurement activities 
including delay and routine. Nonetheless, these difficulties can be mitigated, for instance, by 
introducing strict time limits or using electronic means for communication.  
1.13 Challenges in establishing an effective bid-protest system 
 Generally “reforming public procurement systems have proven to be quite difficult”.434 
This proposition is true, too, for establishing an effective bid-protest system regardless of the 
level of a country’s political and economic development.435  Even some developed nations have 
not been quite successful in having a competent bid-protest process.436  For instance, the national 
protest review system in Canada known as the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) has 
been regularly criticized by contractors and government agencies for its failure to resolve bid 
protest cases.437   
Reforming or improving bid-protest mechanisms in developing countries is more 
challenging. Practical and political constraints may often prevent the creation of a protest review 
mechanism which is truly effective.438 The major challenge with respect to developing countries 
is the lack of traditions of respect for the rule of law and transparency in government decision-
434 Robert R. Hunja, Obstacles to Public Procurement Reform in Developing Countries, 1, WTO Website, available 
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/wkshop_tanz_jan03/hunja2a2_e.doc.  
435 Supra note 90, at 126. 
436 Id., at124-125. 
437 Id. 
438 Supra note 13, at 757. 
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making.439 Another obstacle is the deeply vested interests of the participants in the public 
procurement process including public and private sectors in keeping the status quo.440    
Further, lack of competent staff to undertake the process is another major problem 
because procuring officials have to pose “a combination of good legal skills and substantial 
knowledge of good procurement practices and procedures.”441 Enforcement of procurement laws 
and regulations is also one of the major impediments to establishing an effective bid-protest 
system.442 Incentives should be offered to officials involved in the review of the bid protests in 
the form of protection from retaliation, financial credits, promotion, and many others.  
These challenges are all present in the case of Iraq. However, there are other challenges 
such as the lack of culture of challenging the decisions of contracting agencies by bidders, 
mostly because of fear of retaliation. The bid protest system is not effective enough to deter 
corruption and mismanagement by procurement officials. Reasons of this problem could be the 
political intervention in the procurement process as government contract sometime involves 
large amounts of money. Furthermore, many public officials view their public duties as an 
extension of their personal privilege or property. If they are challenged, they may regard such a 
challenge as a personal attack. These issues and proposed solutions will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters.                  
439 Supra note 90, at 125. 
440 Supra note 434, at 4. 
441 Id., at 5. 
442 Id., at 7. 
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1.14 The Bid Protest System under International and Regional Instruments; WTO/GPA, 
UNCITRAL, and EU Directives 
 One might ask why these agreements and model laws on public procurement are 
important for the case of Iraq. They are important because many bid challenge procedures all 
over the world are based on these legal instruments. Further, Order 87 states that the OGPCP 
shall be guided by international standards and best practices in preparing the implementing 
regulations especially those adopted by the UNCITRAL Model Law, Procurement Directives of 
the European Union, and the WTO/GPA.443 Finally, these legal instruments affect each other. 
For instance, the WTO/GPA bid challenge system is modeled on the EC Remedies Directives.444    
 With respect to the WTO, government procurement was excluded from the scope of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).445 Since government procurement constitutes 
a considerable percentage (10-15%) of the GDP of many countries, the exclusion represented a 
significant gap in the GATT.446 Furthermore, public procurement has been used as a 
discriminatory measure favoring domestic contractors and has ultimately become a barrier to 
international trade among the members.447 Consequently, the first GPA was signed in 1979 and 
entered into force in 1981.448 However, this earlier version of the agreement did not obligate 
member states to establish bid protest mechanisms through which contractors or suppliers can 
directly protest against violations of WTO/GPA provisions.449  
443 Supra note 5, at Sec. 6 (2). 
444 SUE ARROWSMITH & ROBERT D. ANDERSON, THE WTO REGIME ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, 485 (2011). 
445 World Trade Organization Website, Overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_overview_e.htm.  
446 Id. 
447 Id. 
448 Id. 
449 Supra note 95, at 131. 
90 
 
                                                          
 
 
Before the 1994 GPA, suppliers or contractors were forced to recourse to the ordinary 
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms (DSM) of the WTO to enforce the GPA rules.450 Under the 
DSM, only WTO members, not private parties, may raise complaints regarding the application 
by other members of the WTO.451 This approach was considered ineffective because of the 
limited functionality of the DSM in dealing with individual breaches of the GPA.452 Thus, the 
current GPA included a requirement for states to provide for national bid-protest mechanisms to 
bidders.453     
Article XX.2 GPA states that “each Party shall provide non-discriminatory, timely, 
transparent and effective procedures.”454 This provision mandates four principles for national bid 
challenge mechanisms; non-discrimination, timely resolution, transparency, and effectiveness.455 
The GPA requires only one forum to be available to unsatisfied suppliers for reviewing bid 
protests.456 Article XX.6 requires that protests be heard by a court or by an independent review 
body.457 Nevertheless, “the GPA allows a party to establish a tiered national review system.”458 
Multiple forums permit unsatisfied bidders to choose the forum for potential protests.459  
 Several model laws on public procurement have been issued by UNCITRAL in the last 
two decades. The most important ones on public procurement are the 1994 and the 2011 models. 
Both models emphasize the importance of bid protest mechanisms through requiring states to 
450 Sue Arrowsmith, The character and role of national challenge procedures under the Government Procurement 
Agreement, P.P.L.R. 2002, 4, 235-260, 237. 
451 Id. 
452 Id. 
453 Id. 
454 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX.2.  
455 Supra note 444, at 486. 
456 Id., at 487. 
457 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX.6. 
458 Supra note 444, at 487. 
459 Id. 
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provide for bid protest review procedures.460 Under the models, three various forums might be 
available, according to the legal structure of the enacting state, to contractors or suppliers to 
challenge the decisions of the procuring agencies. These forums are agency-level protest review, 
an independent administrative body, or the regular courts.461 However, UNCITRAL does not 
impose this three-tiered protest system on enacting states because states have different legal and 
administrative structure. Unlike the WTO/GPA agreement, neither model identifies major 
principles that should govern the bid protest process. 
 The EU public procurement system has two different Remedies Directives which govern 
the bid protest process: Remedies Directive for the utilities sector, Remedies Directive for the 
public sector.462 These directives coordinate national protest review systems by incorporating a 
set of common standards to ensure availability of rapid and effective review procedures in all EU 
countries for the violations of EU procurement directives.463 The EU Commission justifies the 
existence of two directives by the fact that the rules governing the utilities sector are more 
flexible.464  
“The Remedies Directives are based on three Fundamental principles: the principle of 
effectiveness, the principle of non-discrimination and the principle of procedural autonomy.”465 
Since the EC directives on public procurement have a regional application, there are two 
460 See UNCITRAL Model Law 1994, supra note 39, Art. 52-57, and UNCITRAL Model Law 2011, supra note 19, 
Art. 64-69. 
461 Id. 
462 See EU Remedies Directive 89/665/EEC, supra note 38, and see the EU Directive 92/13/EEC, Coordinating The 
Laws, Regulations And Administrative Provisions Relating To The Application Of Community Rules On The 
Procurement Procedures Of Entities Operating In The Water, Energy, Transport And Telecommunications Sector, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1992L0013:20080109:EN:PDF.  
463 Id. 
464 Id. 
465 Supra note 18, at 481. 
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arrangements under the Remedies Directives for ensuring compliance with procurement 
directives; national arrangement and community level arrangement.466  
The Remedies Directives do not require specific forums to be used by member states 
nationally to implement the community law.467 It states that member countries shall take 
measures necessary to ensure that decisions of contracting agencies are reviewed effectively and 
rapidly in case of violations of EC procurement directives.468 The directive stipulates only 
necessary measures be taken to ensure compliance. On the other hand, the bid protest review on 
the community level is vested to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).  
Furthermore, other regional agreements also require the existence of national review 
procedures to facilitate the implementation of procurement rules, such as the North American 
Free Trade Agreement of 1992 (NAFTA). Under Article 1017, each party is required to adopt 
and maintain bid challenge procedures through a review body with no substantial interest in the 
outcome of the procurement process.469 In contrast to the EU, the decisions of the review body 
under NAFTA are not binding because it can only issue recommendations.470      
1.15 Prerequisites or Elements of a Successful Bid Protest System 
 It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of a bid protest system adequately or identify 
precisely elements or principles that make a protest process successful. However, one of the 
measures might be the confidence of unsatisfied bidders that their protests to decisions of the 
contracting officers will be worthwhile.471 In other words, the bid protest process should create 
466 CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, EU PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LAW 371 (2007). 
467 Supra note 13, at 755. 
468 Supra notes 38 and 462, Art. 1,(1). 
469 Supra note 13, at 755. 
470 Id. 
471 Supra note 95, at 121. 
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an environment of trust among contractors or suppliers that their protests will receive reasonable 
review resulting in meaningful remedies in case of meritorious protests.472 An effective bid 
challenge process also helps foster public confidence in the procurement system as a whole.473 
 WTO/GPA and the EU Directives indicate some fundamental requirements for the bid 
protest mechanisms. The WTO/GPA requires all member states to provide for “non-
discriminatory, timely, transparent, and effective review procedures to suppliers.”474 The EC 
Remedies Directives require that national review systems provide for the requirement of 
effective and rapid review, ensure the independence of the reviewing body, and empower the 
reviewing body to make specific remedies available to unsatisfied contractors or suppliers.475 
Similarly, the UNCITRAL Model 2011Guide (2011 Guide) identifies almost the same elements 
as requirements for the bid protest system of the enacting states.476 
On the other hand, under Order 87, the requirements of the bid protest system in Iraq are: 
rapid resolution of protests and availability of effective remedies to unsatisfied bidders or 
contractors.477 Based on the above review, every effective bid protest mechanisms should have 
these fundamental elements or requirements in order to be effective: effective and speedy review, 
independent review, and finally meaningful remedies. Accordingly, the following chapters 
examine the underlying procedures of the bid protest process in achieving the elements of an 
effective bid protest system.      
 
 
472 Id. 
473 Supra note 177, at 36. 
474 Supra note 444, at 485-486. 
475 Supra note 13, at 755. 
476 Supra note 177. 
477 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12, (1)(a)(ii).  
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Chapter II 
2. The Reflection of the Principle of Transparency in the Procedures Used in the Resolution 
of Bid Protests by Review Forums 
2.1.1 A General Overview about the Principle of Transparency 
The concept of transparency has been considered in recent decades as an essential 
element in the efforts of combating organizational and individual irregularities such as corruption 
and fraud and in promoting good governance in organizations, whether public or private.478 
Transparency has a broad meaning which covers many fields including; organizational 
transparency, accounting and budgetary transparency, administrative transparency, and 
documentary transparency.479 “Transparency rests upon a non-negotiable right to know made 
explicit in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”480 It has been defined in 
various ways, the most common definition being “opening up of the internal organizational 
processes and decisions to third parties, whether or not these third parties are involved in the 
organization.”481 Or “it is defined as the open flow of information.”482 
Transparency is a weapon against secrecy regarding how officials administer public 
agencies. According to the New Economics of Organizations (NEO), “governmental actors take 
advantage of information asymmetries.”483 In other words, government organizations are 
478 Martial Pasquier & Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, Organizational Barriers to Transparency: A Typology And Analysis 
Of Organizational Behaviour Tending To Prevent Or Restrict Access To Information, International Review of 
Administrative Sciences 2007 73: 147, 148. 
479 Id. 
480 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
Art. 19 which states “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to 
hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.” 
481 Supra note 478. 
482 Heungisk Park & John Blenkinsopp, the Roles Of Transparency And Trust In The Relationship Between 
Corruption And Citizen Satisfaction, International Review of Administrative Sciences 2011 77: 254-274, 256.  
483 David Arellano-Gault & Walter Lepore, Transparency Reforms in the Public Sector: Beyond the New Economics 
of Organization, Organization Studies 2011 32:1029-1050, 1030. 
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monopolies with respect to information because the execution of policies through civil service 
creates spaces that are protected from political oversight.484 In the NEO’s view, public agencies 
that provide services monopolistically have little interest in responding to the people 
concerned.485 More importantly, bureaucrats and politicians view secrecy not only as a way to 
escape from accountability and punishment but also as an opportunity to serve their private 
interests.486   
The NEO examines this asymmetry of information in organizations under the principal-
agent theory, which has been the most widely used economic model for the analysis of 
transparency.487 In the public procurement area, the principal-agent theory treats the procuring 
official as the agent who supposedly works for the principal.488 The principal may change from a 
country to another; in the United States, taxpayers, the executive, or Congress may be viewed as 
the principal, while in a monarchy the principal is probably the king.489  
Thus, transparency can be understood as the ability of the principal to observe how the 
agent behaves and the consequences of that behavior.490 This interpretation or understanding of 
transparency brings the concept of accountability into the relationship between the principal and 
the agent. The purpose of demanding transparency is to hold institutions, even markets, 
484 Id., at 1032. 
485 Id., at 1033. 
486 Id. 
487 Id., at 1035. 
488 Christopher R. Yukins, A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through The Principal-Agent model, 40 
Pub. Cont. L.J. 63, 67-68 (2010). 
489 Id., at 68. 
490 Supra note 483, at 1035. 
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accountable for their policies and performance.491 This strong correlation between transparency 
and accountability is likely the reason that they are often considered together.          
 On the other hand, this concept of openness has also been emphasized in the relationship 
between governments and citizens.492 In other words, widespread transparency in the 
performance of public agencies strengthens the trust of the citizens towards such agencies’ 
honesty.493 Trust has been defined in numerous ways by scholars. From an organizational 
perspective, “trust is a collective judgment of one group that another group will be honest, meet 
commitments, and will not take advantage of others.”494 Another definition of trust is “one 
party’s willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on the confidence that the latter party 
is (a) benevolent, (b) reliable, (c) competent, (d) honest, and (e) open.”495  
Other scholars argue that “trust in public institutions is enhanced through their 
administrative rules, standards, laws, and regulations relating to provision of services and 
information.”496 However, secrecy is a norm in government agencies that makes it difficult for 
the people concerned to have information regarding how power is exercised by public officials. 
Thus, trust and transparency is an essential indicator for constituents’ satisfaction in the 
relationship between citizens and government.497   
The above definitions and explanations indicate that transparency has been mostly 
defined to mean the availability of information to the citizens regarding the functions and 
491 Ana Bellver & Daniel Kaufmann, ‘Transparenting Transparency’  Initial Empirics and Policy Applications, The 
World Bank Institute: Discussion Paper, 4, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPRURDEV/Resources/573691-
1175901454225/seminar1_background_reading.pdf.  
492 Supra note 482, a 256. 
493 Id., at 257. 
494 Id. 
495 Id. 
496 Id. 
497 Id., at 258. 
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performance of public agencies. However, the scope of transparency has been expanded by some 
scholars and international organizations to include issues other than the flow of information or 
availability of information to the people.  
2.1.2 The Principle of Transparency and its Impact on the Decision-Making Process of 
Administrative Agencies 
Oliver R.W. argues that “transparency in an organization is not only about what is 
communicated externally, but about what is right on the inside.”498 This definition covers also 
the impact of transparency on the internal procedures and structures of organizations. He, further, 
argues that organizations are under huge pressure to respond to the demand of disclosure of 
information which makes them changes the way they operate.499 As a study about access to 
information by the public in Uganda shows, citizens were able to demand certain standards from 
officials.500 
In the same context, the NEO suggests a specific strategy to assist in achieving better 
transparency in organizations and agencies. First, introducing exogenous motivations for 
enhancing transparency, and second, initiation of reforms and improvements in the procedures 
and structures of organizations involved in providing services.501 Finally, the NEA suggests 
changing the organizational behaviors in a way that promotes transparency.502 Their suggestions 
require working on the structures and behavior of organizations too, rather than relying only on 
the public’s demand for information. 
498 Id., at 256. 
499 Id. 
500 Supra note 491, at 11. 
501 Supra note 483, at 1033. 
502 Id. 
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In other words, they suggest that for transparency to be promoted, an external 
mechanisms requiring availability of information to the public when requested is not sufficient, if 
there are not some internal organizational measures in the operation of agencies that translate the 
elements of transparency to reality. Although one of the natural consequences of following the 
requirement of providing information to the public is perhaps making organizations or agencies 
change their behaviors in the long-term, introducing transparency-prone measures internally is 
crucial.  
Furthermore, international organizations also expand the scope of the concept of 
transparency. The WTO adds the enforcement element of laws and regulations to the meaning of 
transparency. It stipulates that ensuring transparency in international business agreements 
includes three fundamental requirements: (1) availability of information about laws, regulations, 
and other policies to the public; (2) notification to interested parties about the changes that occur 
to laws and regulations; and (3) ensuring that laws and regulations are administered in a uniform, 
impartial, and reasonable manner.503  
Furthermore, the ADB defines transparency as “the availability of information to the 
general public and clarity about government rules, regulations, and decisions.”504 This definition 
adds an important element to the concept of transparency which is clarity of the functions and 
rules of the public agencies. In addition, according to the IMF, transparency in monetary and 
fiscal policy is the “environment in which the objectives of the policy, its legal, institutional and 
economic framework, policy decisions and their rationale, data and information related to 
503 Supra note 491, at 4. 
504 Supra note 482, at 256. 
99 
 
                                                          
 
 
monetary and financial policies and the accountability of the policymaking body are provided to 
the public in an understandable, accessible and timely basis.”505 
2.1.3 The Meaning of Transparency in the Field of Public Procurement 
Since transparency has generally several various definitions and meanings, it has also 
different meanings and an ambiguous scope in the public procurement field. A scholar describes 
transparency in public procurement as “the general idea that procurement should be conducted in 
accordance with clear rules which are known to interested parties, and some means of 
verification of those rules should be provided.”506 Transparency under the European Union 
procurement regime, the WTO/GPA, and the NAFTA generally means adopting measures to 
eliminate discrimination in awarding government contracts through restricting the broad 
discretion of procuring officials in a way that prevents discriminatory practices.507 Under these 
treaties, elimination of discrimination is achieved through opening the procurement market by 
maximizing competition to allow foreign bidders to participate.508On the other hand, 
transparency under national procurement systems means ensuring fulfilment of core objectives, 
including value for money and probity.509  
Although it seems that transparency has different meanings from the perspectives of 
national and international procurement systems, the goal is the same to a certain extent, which is 
establishing an efficient and clean procurement system. Both systems require competition in 
505 Supra note 491, at 4. 
506 Sue Arrowsmith, The Apec Document On Principles Of Transparency In Government Procurement, 
P.P.L.R. 1998, 2, CS38-49, 38. 
507 Supra note 13, at 38.  
508 For instance, Article III of the WTO/GPA, supra note 38, states that “With respect to all laws, regulations, 
procedures and practices regarding government procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall provide 
immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or services 
of the Parties, treatment no less favorable than: 
(a) that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers; and 
(b) that accorded to products, services and suppliers of any other Party.” 
509 Supra note 13, at 73. 
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awarding public contracts as a requirement of transparency. More importantly, public 
procurement rules have become almost unified because of the WTO/GPA, the EU Directives, 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law. Various countries have adopted these three agreements into 
their national procurement law. In addition, these agreements also affect each other making them 
similar in some major issues.  
Thus, as can be seen from this brief overview, the meaning and scope of transparency 
means different things in different contexts. However, such ambiguity is more obvious in the 
area of public procurement system. Transparency in other fields has been mostly interpreted to 
mean the availability of information about the functions of organizations. However, in the public 
procurement area it has been interpreted to mean the availability of clear rules and regulations 
that govern the procurement sector including some enforcement mechanisms to ensure the 
implementation of such rules.  
The point of the above discussion regarding the meaning and scope of transparency is to 
limit the ambiguities surrounding this term among academics and professionals. When there is a 
debate about reducing corruption not only in the public procurement systems but also in the 
entire public sector, the first solution is strengthening transparency. However, one cannot easily 
determine what kinds of reform and solutions are meant by strengthening transparency. The 
academic literature should be more specific about the meaning and scope of this term.  
If transparency and rule of law are designed to engender clear rules and regulations for 
procurement process, it is necessary to examine the underlying procedures governing public 
procurement. There is a widespread consensus among academics and professionals that 
enhancing the efficiency and integrity of a procurement system requires increased transparency. 
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What has not been examined extensively in the literature is the reflection of the elements of the 
principle of transparency and rule of law in the bid protest procedures. In other words, what does 
constitute a transparent bid protest system?  
The dissertation covers this important issue through examining the underlying procedures 
of the Iraqi bid protest system. There are many details involved in the procedures available in the 
process of reviewing bid protests that need particular attention because they have an impact on 
the effectiveness of the protest mechanism. Most international agreements and model laws leave 
detailed rules regarding the national procedures to be supplemented by members according to 
their legal traditions and policies.510 Examples of these details include the discretion of officials 
involved in the review process, time limit for submitting and settling a protest, ease of access to 
the reviewing bodies, access to documents related to the procurement activity in question, and 
the quality of the review. The procedures of reviewing protests by the contracting agency and the 
IAT in Iraq will be considered in this dissertation. It will also examine shortages in these 
procedures and recommend solutions based on the experience of the United Sates and other 
countries.     
 As discussed in the first chapter, a major requirement of a successful bid protest system 
is a speedy and meaningful review of protests. There are two major types of problems with 
respect to the bid protest process in Iraq that affect the quality and speediness of the system: 
structural problems and procedural problems. Some of the problems are related to the structure 
and composition of bodies responsible for reviewing the protests of interested parties. Others are 
associated with the procedures that are used in the review process. We will discuss these 
problems in the following parts of this chapter. 
510 Supra note 444, at 497. 
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2.2.1 Structural Problems of the Bid Protest Forums 
 Structural obstacles are meant that bid protest forums, the CRC, which is widely known 
as the agency-level, and the IAT, which is the judicial mechanism for the settlement of bid 
protests, are largely centralized because they are all available in the capital city of Baghdad.511 
There are two mechanisms for protest review; one is internal to the procurement system, agency-
level, and the other is external, judicial review and/or independent body. Interestingly, Order 87 
does not require the existence of any type of an agency-level bid protest system as it only 
requires the establishment of the IAT, the judicial forum, by the OGPCP.512  
The IRGC, however, requires that there should be an agency-level mechanism to accept 
protests from unsatisfied bidders.513 The dissertation analyzes the structural problem in two 
separate parts. The first part examines advantages and disadvantages of having multiple protest 
forums and the structure and composition of each protest mechanisms in Iraq. The second part 
examines the centralization of the bid protest review systems and its potential impact on the 
effectiveness of the review process.    
2.2.2 Multiple Forums for the Resolution of Bid Protests 
 The structure of the forum review to determine where to locate the review and whether to 
establish a tiered review system or a main forum has a great impact on the function of the system 
because different options have different advantages and disadvantages.514 Many jurisdictions 
511 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art 10 (3), which states that the IAT is established in the Ministry of Planning to 
receive and review bid protests. In addition, Art 10 (1)(a) states that a Central Review Committee is established in 
every ministry to resolve bid protest. In fact, Order 87 is silent on the location of the IAT.  
512 Order 87, Supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1)(b)(ii). 
513 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art 10 (1)(a). 
514 Zhang Xinglin, Forum For Review By Suppliers In Public Procurement: An Analysis And Assessment Of The 
Models In International Instruments, P.P.L.R. 2009, 5, 201-226, 201. 
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recognize the existence of multiple forums for reviewing bid protests.515 Generally speaking, 
there are three major forums for the resolution of bid protests; agency-level, independent 
administrative review, and judicial review.  
In addition, regional and international organizations that deal with the public procurement 
issues also recognize the multiple review forums. The UNCITRAL Model Law suggests a three-
tiered review system, while the WTO/GPA and the EU require only one level of review, but they 
allow member states to have additional forums.516 The availability of multiple protest review has 
been debated in the literature of public procurement studies. There are advantages and 
disadvantages of the multiple protest forums.  
Several advantages of having multiple protest forums can be identified. First, it is 
creating competition between various forums in reviewing bid protests.517 Each forum tries to 
resolve the protest in the best way it can in terms of ease of access, providing for cheap and 
simple procedures, quality of review, and rapid issuance of protest decisions. Second, the 
suggested competition among rival forums might engender innovation in the procedures used in 
the resolution of the protests in order to make each forum more attractive to protesters.518  
Third, multiple forums provide choices to protesters to seek review from the forum that 
best suits its need. If protesters do not feel that the agency-level, for instance, is independent 
enough and they want to avoid a lengthy and costly judicial review, they have an option to file 
515 For instance, the US bid-protest system has three mechanisms for resolving bid protests: the agency-level, the 
GAO (an independent body), and the COFC (judicial review). See for more information JOHN CIBINIC, ET AL, 
FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, 1674 (4th Ed. 2011). In addition, Finland has two protest 
mechanisms; the first one is the Competition Council and the second one is the County Administrative courts, see 
supra note 18, at 492-493. In Spain, unsatisfied bidders must first seek the procuring agency itself or to the authority 
that supervises such an agency. If protesters were not satisfied with the decision of the procuring agency, they can 
lodge a complaint before administrative courts; see supra note 18, at 501-502.   
516 Supra note 14, at 201. 
517 Supra note 1, at 494. 
518 Id., at 495. 
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their protest to the independent administrative body. In contrast, when protesters believe that 
their protest might get an answer from the contracting agency, they can file their protest to the 
agency especially the agency review is very simple and quick. In addition, if they want an 
independent review with an enforceable decision, they can seek the courts for review.  
 There are, however, three basic disadvantages to the availability of multiple protest 
forums. First, it leads to an increase in government’s spending for administering and maintaining 
these forums, including hiring staff and buildings for offices.519 Second, “maintaining numerous 
dispute venues increases the possibilities for confusion among offerors and government 
purchasing agencies as multiple forums apply differing jurisdictional standards.”520 For instance, 
there will be various time limits, different rules for the review, and different time frame for 
making decisions on the protest. Finally, the possibilities of issuing conflicting decisions on the 
same issues would be much higher than in a one-forum jurisdiction.521  
2.2.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Each Forum 
 Several important advantages can be identified for the agency-level protest mechanism. 
First, as the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL points out, the agency level provides an 
opportunity to the procuring entity to correct its wrongful decision with minimum disruption of 
the procurement process.522 In some instances, the contracting agency may be quite willing to 
correct a defect because it might not have been aware of the problem in the first place, especially 
519 Id., at 499-500. 
520 Id., at 500-501. 
521 Id., at 501. 
522 Supra note 514, at 210. 
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before the award of the contract.523 For instance, the contracting agency can correct a problem in 
the technical specifications that resulted in wrongfully excluding some bidders.524   
 Second, informal procedures for the resolution of protests and ease of access by 
protesters do not require specific forms and paying fees as in the case of the judicial forum. 
Third, the non-adversarial character of the agency level mechanism is the basis for its 
efficiencies and carries the capability of circumventing concerns of potential suppliers about 
taking on their governments in litigation.525 This character is very helpful for the unsatisfied 
supplier because if a problem can be fixed in a simple and quick way, the contractor may 
continue to participate in the competition.526 “It is also helpful for the contracting agency to 
create images of open, responsive, and accountable government by remedying its mistakes by 
itself as quickly as possible.”527 Further, both protesters and the government save resources, 
including both time and money.528  
 The agency-level mechanism has some disadvantages, however. First, the fundamental 
criticism of the agency-level mechanism is lack of independence and impartiality of the review 
process, which is quasi-judicial.529 Unsatisfied bidders may believe that it is difficult for the 
contracting agency to admit that there were improprieties in the procurement,530 “either to keep 
prestige or authority or because of [the] procurement officer’s corruption.”531 Second, the 
523 Id. 
524 Id. 
525 Supra note 95, at 151. 
526 Supra note 514, at 210.  
527 Id. 
528 Id., at 211. 
529 Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The Choices That Every Procurement Challenge System 
Must Make, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 427, 433 (2006). 
530 Id. 
531 Supra note 514, at 211. 
106 
 
                                                          
 
 
procuring agency acts like a judge and interested party at the same time.532 Thus, this practice 
could constitute a breach of the duties of avoiding conflicts of interest. 
 On the other hand, the advantages of an independent administrative body are 
multifaceted. First, such a body enjoys a much higher degree of independence and impartiality 
which can be reassuring for bidder’s intent on filing a protest.533 Second, if the potential 
administrative body has no responsibilities except for procurement matters, it may bring 
expertise to the bid protest review process making its decisions be efficient and respected by the 
parties.534 In contrast, the disadvantage of an independent review body is additional cost to the 
government and the possibility that the administrative body might be weaker than the contracting 
agency it is meant to supervise.535 This could make it difficult for the administrative body to 
collect the documents and facts necessary to resolve the protest or to enforce its decision.536   
 Advantages of the judicial review are both independence and ability of enforcing its 
decisions.537 The judicial review involves extensive procedural rules and guarantees, including 
access to all proceedings, both sides being heard, publicity of the review, and the ability of both 
parties to present witnesses.538 In addition, there is also a requirement for the submission of 
evidence which allows the court to compel the contracting agency to provide relevant 
documents.539 This power is essential in resolving procurement disputes because contracting 
532 Id. 
533 Supra note 529, at 434. 
534 Id. 
535 Id. 
536 Id. 
537 Id. 
538 Supra note 514, at 224. 
539 Id. 
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agencies usually possess important documents and sometimes decline to provide them to the 
review body.540        
 Yet, the judicial forum has its own problems or disadvantages. First, although the 
procedural requirements or guarantees required in resolving cases enhance the independence of 
judicial review, such elaborate and complicated procedures make the review costly, slow, and 
time-consuming.541 Second, a court with general jurisdiction may have little experience in public 
procurement matters which can slow down the resolution of protests.542 Finally, the 
confrontational nature of judicial review may lead to sensitivities in the relationship of the 
parties.543   
2.3.1 Centralization of the Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism in Iraq  
Under the IRGC, there is in every ministry, non-cabinet agency, provincial councils, or 
regions544 a CRC granted the power to receive and review bid protests.545 This central committee 
reports directly to the minister concerned, the head of the agency which is not a cabinet 
department, or the governor.546 Indeed all Iraqi ministries along with major agencies that are not 
part of the cabinet are headquartered in the capital city of Baghdad. This means that there are 
several CRCs according to the number of the ministries, other non-cabinet agencies, and 
provinces in Iraq.  
The agency-level bid protest mechanisms available to interested parties are all in 
Baghdad, except for the existence of a CRC in every province. This centralized bid protest 
540 Id. 
541 Id. 
542 Supra note 529, at 434. 
543 Supra note 514, at 224. 
544 It is worth mentioning that the IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(a), mentions “regions” which is not correct because 
there is only one region in Iraq; the Kurdistan Region. 
545 Id. 
546 Id. 
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system might be explained by the fact that Iraq was historically a highly centralized state, 
notwithstanding the administrative decentralization and self-governing for the Kurds that were 
adopted since the 1970 Interim Constitution.547 Without regard to this theoretical 
decentralization, all the powers were entirely in the hands of the officials in Baghdad. These 
provincial units and the self-governing administrations were in fact merely an image of the 
central government, despite the constitutional provisions regarding the political and 
administrative systems. 
Although the 2005 Constitution replaced the centralization with a federal and 
decentralized system, the influence of actual centralization for decades is still widespread in the 
day-to-day activities of government institutions. In other words, federalism and decentralization 
has been adopted formally by the constitution, but centralization is still highly practiced on the 
ground. Officials in all Iraqi ministries and government agencies do not have sufficient 
experience with a federal and decentralized system and how it really works.  
Nonetheless, not all of the CRCs are centralized according to the IRGC. As discussed 
above, there are other CRCs formed in the offices of Provincial Councils in every province.548 
These CRCs are decentralized and deal with protests that are brought to the council regarding 
government contracts awarded by such councils under their special budgets. The Provincial 
Councils in Iraq have their own budget which is different from the budget that is spent by 
547 Iraqi Interim Constitution of 1970, Art. 8, which states that “Iraq is divided into administrative units which are to 
be organized based on administrative decentralization.” Further, according to the Order No. 247 of the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) published in the Official Gazette No. 2327 on 03/11/1974 “in those areas 
that the majority of population is Kurdish a self-government shall be introduced.” In addition, there was a 
Governorate Law No. 159 (1969) to organize in detail the function and powers of administrative units. Article 2 of 
the Governorate Law states that the Republic of Iraq is divided into provinces which are also divided into districts, 
and districts are also divided into townships and they all have juridical personality in exercising their duties. The 
Governorate Law has been abolished and replaced with the Law of Provinces not Governed in a Region No. 21 
(2008) of Iraq (Provincial Law).   
548 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(a). 
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ministries of the federal government.549 Thus, for the contract award controversies conducted by 
the Provincial Councils, the agency-level bid protest system is decentralized because unsatisfied 
bidders do not need to submit their protests to the CRCs at the headquarters of various ministries 
in Baghdad. However, unsatisfied bidders protesting to procurement activities conducted by 
Provincial Councils still need to seek the capital for submitting protests to the IAT.   
2.3.2 Problems Associated with Centralization of the Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism      
The centralized system of protest review creates a couple of problems that discourages 
unsatisfied bidders from filing protests by ignoring meritorious protests. The centralized system 
makes access to protest review mechanism difficult. If a contractor decides to challenge an 
award decision of a government contract in Basra, it has to go to Baghdad, almost 600 km from 
Basra, to the ministry responsible for the award to submit its protest. Although one might argue 
that submission of protests can be performed through mail or electronic means such as email and 
fax to mitigate the access problem, in person submission of protests is highly likely because of 
three major reasons. 
First, Iraq does not currently have an efficient and active postal service that can be relied 
upon, especially for sensitive issues and documents like bid protests. The postal system suffers 
from chronic delays and inaccessibility and lost packages are quite common. Sending packages 
from one city to another can take from 10 days to three weeks, if they arrive at all. While the 
time limit for submitting protests to the CRCs is only 7 days from the date of the award 
decision.550 On the other hand, there is a special communication method usually used in Iraqi 
549 Provincial Law, supra note 547, Art.44 stipulating that each province has its own budget which consists of the 
fund awarded to the province by the federal government according to constitutional standards prepared by the 
Ministry of Finance and approved by the Parliament. In addition, the income that the province can obtain from 
services provided, investment projects, fees and fines collected locally, donations obtained in accordance with the 
constitution and other federal laws, and finally income obtained from leasing government properties.  
550 The IRGC,supra note 97, Art. 10(b). 
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public institutions to contact other agencies or the private sector when it is necessary. This 
method is a formal postage system in which a specific official is being appointed as the postman 
for the agency (Agency Postman).551  
Government agencies dispatch their formal letters to other public institutions or private 
sector through the Agency Postman. Formal letters are not sent immediately after they have been 
prepared. Instead, a government agency awaits until it collects enough letters and then sends 
them all together. This is true especially when the parties concerned in those letters are in 
another city. Yet, even this mechanism has proven to be inefficient because there are always 
problems with it, including denial of the concerned agency named of receiving the letter. 
However, the Agency Postman system is better than the government postal service. There are a 
few private postal companies, but their capacities are still very limited and expensive.  
Second, little reliance on technology for communication is one of the major reasons that 
exacerbate the issue of accessibility. The method of communications among agencies in Iraq is 
still traditional. Receiving the actual official letterhead is a requirement for someone or agencies 
to pursue their regular works before a public agency. Even sending official letterhead through 
emails or fax will not be accepted by public agencies in Iraq. Formalities are still strictly allowed 
to. Nevertheless, sometimes in some agencies electronic communications are accepted among 
their branches but they reject to accept that from a different agency or from individuals and 
551 Although almost all government agencies currently have the Agency Postman, it is difficult to access agency 
regulations that organize the appointment and duties of the Agency Postman. In addition, the author has experienced 
the function of this mechanism in several government agencies. In fact, it is still the main communication method 
among government agencies.     
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firms. However, even in the case that formal letters have been sent electronically to a particular 
agency, an actual original letter is still required later on.552  
Reasons for little reliance on electronic communications could include the lack of 
availability of good internet services except for ministries and other major agencies that have 
reliable connections to electricity. There are several internet providers in the country, but speed 
and performance is really poor. Another reason is that most high level officials are unaccustomed 
to internet and other modern electronic equipment. The only way of formal communications for 
them is through formal letterhead. In addition, the government has not passed comprehensive 
laws and regulations requiring government agencies to use electronic means in formal 
communications. Thus, in the absence of a legal framework for utilizing electronic 
communications in the official arena, the binding effect of those communications is questionable. 
Thus, agencies are reluctant in relying on them. Finally, corruption and abuse of power are of the 
reasons that make it difficult to rely on postal services and electronic means for submitting 
protests. Even assuming that government agencies accept protests submitted by emails or postal 
services, one needs to pursue a personal follow-up for each stages of the process of transferring 
the protest to the right committee. The majority of government officials do not perform their 
duties with loyalty and seriousness.  
Though beyond the scope of this dissertation, it should be noted that many officials are 
not motivated to work properly for several reasons. These include poor salary, lack of 
accountability, and/or intervention of politicians and senior officials in the day-to-day work of 
agencies. In addition, officials prefer direct contact with visitors in order to have a chance to 
552 Issues related to the rules on electronic communications and reliance on official letterhead is a personal 
experience of the author in many government agencies.   
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obtain bribes, gifts, or any other benefits or favors from contractors. Even if officials are honest, 
they still have no motivation to be efficient. Thus, personal intervention is required from 
interested parties to government agencies to finish their paper works. This phenomenon is true 
almost for all public institutions in Iraq. 
2.3.3 The Relationship between Centralization and the Distribution of Procurement Powers 
The reason that lawmakers adopted a centralized bid protest system is probably related to 
the structure of the distribution of administrative powers generally and public procurement 
powers specifically. Order 87 states that the power to “obligate government funds, award and 
sign contracts shall be vested either with a qualified government agency or a committee within 
each governmental unit or agency duly appointed under the authority of this order.”553 In fact, 
the IRGC implements the requirement of Order 87 as every contracting agency is required to 
establish a procurement department called the Public Contract Division (PCD).554  
The PCDs, according to an administrative order from the OGPCP, are responsible for the 
implementation and follow-up of public contracts awarded by government agencies.555 The 
PCDs consist of two major committees: the Tender-Opening Committee (TOC) and the 
Evaluation and Analysis Committee (EAC).556 The TOC’s role is to publicly open the tenders 
submitted after the deadline for submitting tenders is passed in the presence of the offerors that 
competed for the contract.557 In addition, the TOC is required to prepare a comprehensive report 
to the EAC. Such a report includes, for instance, ensuring that the deposit has been paid for every 
tender submitted and checking the numbers of papers of each tender. It also ensures that each 
553 Order 87, supra note 5, at Sec. 3(1). 
554 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 11. 
555 The Office of Government Public Contract Policy (OGPCP), the Administrative Order No. 4/7/3182 issued on 
May, 21, 2007, Section 4, available (in Arabic) at http://www.mop.gov.iq/mop/resources/GCD/23.pdf.  
556 Id. 
557 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 6. 
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page of the tender is signed by the offeror as required by the procurement law and regulations, 
and stamps all pages of the tenders.558 Finally, it forwards the comprehensive report to the EAC 
to select the winner.559  
On the other hand, the role of the EAC is crucial because it has the power to remove 
tenders from the competition that do not meet the requirements and excludes contractors with 
bad performance based on previous experience.560 It can also determine the financial and 
technical capacity of the offeror, and identify the best tenders submitted as well as the contractor 
that should be awarded the contract.561 As mentioned above, the EAC only has the power to 
recommend which contractor should be awarded the contract.562 The final decision to select the 
winner is vested with the head of the agency concerned such as ministers, heads of non-cabinet 
agencies, or governors.563 
 The IRGC is silent on the details of the duties of the PCDs and does not grant the PCD 
the power to enter into contractual relationship. Nevertheless, the PCDs are allowed to sign 
contracts, but only after the head of the agency approves the award of such a contract selected by 
the EAC.564 This process is problematic and delays the contracting procedures because 
sometimes it takes a long time to get the approval of the head of the agency: ministers, heads of 
independent agencies, governors and so on. It is an unnecessary step that undermines the efforts 
of the EAC to examine all tenders and evaluate them. 
558 Id. 
559 Id. 
560 Id., Art. 7. 
561 Id. 
562 Id., Art. 7(19). 
563 Id. 
564 Supra note 555. 
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For example, a contractor who submitted a tender to a contract with the Ministry of 
Industry and Minerals and won the competition still had to challenge the decision of the Ministry 
to force the contractor to sign the contract through a judicial decision.565 The contractor refused 
to sign the contract because under Provision 19 of the solicitation, the offer was to be valid at 
least until after three months from the date the agency was supposed to close the competition 
which was 04/26/2010.566 Indeed, the agency closed the competition on 04/26/2010 and the EAC 
recommended on 05/30/2010 that the contact be awarded to the current protesting contractor.567  
The reason behind the refusal of the protesting contractor was that the agency received 
the approval of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals on 09/21/2010 and then the agency 
notified the contractor about the award decision and asked it to come forward to sign the 
contract.568 The contractor rejected to sign the contract based on Provision 19, mentioned above, 
because the notification came late.569 Accordingly, the agency imposed some severe sanctions on 
the contractor including blacklisting, which prevent the contractor from participating in any 
procurement.570 As a result, the contractor brought a lawsuit against the agency before the IAT. 
The IAT agreed with the contractor, but decided that the court cannot demand the 
contractor to come forward and sign the contract.571 It stated that the agency should have 
contacted the contractor by no later than 07/26/2010 based on the provisions of the tender.572 
Furthermore, the court stated that after the date 07/26/2010, the contractor is not bound by its 
offer even though the award was issued to it and it cannot also be forced to sign the contract 
565 Khalil Ibrahim & Shahab Ahmad: Judicial Implementation of the Public Contract Tendering, 20 (2012) (In 
Arabic). 
566 Id. 
567 Id., at 21. 
568 Id. 
569 Id. 
570 Id., at 20-21. 
571 Id., at 21. 
572 Id. 
115 
 
                                                          
 
 
except voluntarily.573 In addition, the IAT disagreed with the agency that the delay of having the 
approval decision of the head of the agency is common.574 The court stated that such delay 
should not affect the right of the contractor under the tender provisions.575 The Federal Supreme 
Court (FSC) sustained the decision of the IAT.576         
 The IRGC does not rely on Order 87 in determining which official or committees have 
the contracting power. Instead, it relies on the Implementing Regulations of the Iraqi Budget 
Law of 2013 (IRIBL) which is usually issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the 
MOP.577 The IRIBL identifies the rules and procedures of public spending that all public 
institutions must follow. Article 3 of the IRGC requires every agency to follow the financial 
powers set forth in the IRIBL when they decide to contract for the procurement of goods and 
services.578 Further, it states that the head of the agency’s approval is subject to the financial 
power set forth in relevant regulation.579 Although the IRGC does not mention the IRIBL 
specifically, it is clear that these financial powers are solely mentioned in the IRIBL as 
complementary or interpreting regulations for the annual budget law.  
The IRBIL states that relevant ministers, heads of non-cabinet agencies or region, 
governors, or presidents of provincial councils have the power to authorize spending public 
funds from the budget, including, among other things, the purchase of goods and services.580 
Although the text does not mention the contracting authority clearly, the purchase of goods and 
services always conducted by government agencies through public contracts. In other words, 
573 Id., at 22.  
574 Id. 
575 Id., at 21. 
576 Id., at 23. 
577 The Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of Planning (MOP) rely on the Iraq Federal Budget Law (IFBL) 
for the Fiscal Year of 2013.   
578 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 3(1)(d)(1). 
579 Id, Art 7. 
580 The Implementing Regulations of the Iraqi Budget Law of 2013 (IRIBL) 2(a). 
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entering into contractual relationships to obtain goods or services is a form of spending public 
fund. 
The IRGC, by implementing the provisions of the IRIBL with respect to awarding 
contracting authority, contradicts Order 87. Thus, the IRGC violates the major principle of 
hierarchy of the legislative sources which are: (a) constitution, (b) treaties, (c) parliamentary 
statues, (d) government regulations.581 The principle of hierarchy, which is an important aspect 
of the French civil law system adopted by many countries, including Iraq, dictates that a norm 
lower in the hierarchy must comply with the higher norms.582  
In other words, parliamentary statues cannot contradict a provision of the constitution or 
government regulations cannot contradict with parliamentary statues. In the case of the IRGC, 
the IRGC, which is considered government regulations, contradicted Order 87, which has been 
enforced as a parliamentary statue. The IRGC complied with the IRIBL which is considered 
government regulations instead of Order 87. This contradiction should automatically make the 
IRGC’s provisions granting contracting power to the head of the agencies void.   
The IRGC by contradicting Order 87 strengthens the centralization of powers in public 
procurement activities especially in the bid protest procedures. Order 87 intends to decentralize 
the power to enter into contracts by vesting it “solely with a qualified government agency or a 
committee within each governmental unit or agency.”583 Furthermore, Order 87 does not 
mention heads of the agencies to be granted the power to conclude public contracts. The IRGC 
plainly centralizes the process. Order 87 cannot be a mistake on part of the CPA.    
581 Supra note 41, at 4. 
582 Id., at 5. 
583 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 3(1). 
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In compliance with the centralized pattern of distribution of bureaucratic powers, the 
decisions of the CRCs formed in every ministry under the authority of Order 87 to settle protests 
filed by unsatisfied bidders are not binding. Such decisions are recommendations subject to the 
approval of the “head of the agency.”584 Consequently, the agency-level bid protest mechanism 
is also centralized in its structure and function. Considering the way procurement powers are 
distributed, centralization might be the only logical consequence.  
As long as the lower-level officials are not allowed to enter into or conclude public 
contracts, they cannot make a decision about a protest. In other words, the authority allowing 
rejection or approval of a protest is probably considered to be subsidiary to the power to enter 
into contractual relationships. Thus, the official who has the power to conclude public contracts, 
she or he presumably has the power to decide bid protests unless there is delegation.        
On the other hand, the officials of the OGPCP might have been influenced by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law in making the agency-level bid protest system centralized. Order 87 
states that the OGPCP is to be guided by the recognized principles and practices adopted in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, the EU Directives, and WTO/GPA in preparing the IRGC.585 Under 
the UNCITRAL Model Law 1994, a bid protest must be submitted to the head of the procuring 
entity at the first instance.586 However, if the complaint is based on an act or decision that is 
subject to approval by another authority, the protest must be submitted to that approving 
authority as the case may be.587 It seems that the UNCITRAL Model Law intends to embrace 
this process as an acknowledgement of the phenomenon of centralized distribution of power in 
some member countries.    
584 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 7(19). 
585 Order 87, supra note 5, Sect. 6(2). 
586 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 39, Art. 53(1). 
587 Id. 
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2.4 The Structure of the Agency-Level Bid Protest under International and Regional 
Agreements 
 None of the WTO/GPA and the EU Directives covers in detail the underlying structure 
and procedures of the agency-level bid protest system. Article XX of the WTO/GPA stipulates 
that, in the event of a protest raised because of a breach of the agreement, the contractor is 
encouraged to seek first resolution of the problem through consultation with the procuring 
agency.588 Thus, there is no requirement for the existence of an agency-level bid protest 
mechanism as a complete system with detailed procedures. Instead, the GPA just encourages 
recourse to the procuring agency and leaves the existence of the agency-level protest mechanism 
to the discretion of member countries. In addition, it does not define what “the procuring 
agency” is in order to give some guidance in this regard.    
 With respect to the EU rules, there are two EC Remedies Directives: (1) Directive 89/665 
on the coordination of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to the 
application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, and 
(2) Directive 92/13 coordinating the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions relating to 
the application of Union rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport, and telecommunications sectors (EU Remedies Directives).  
Similar to the WTO/GPA, both of the Remedies Directives require member states to 
“ensure that the review procedures are available, under detailed rules which the Member States 
may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular 
contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.”589 As seen from 
588 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX1. 
589 EC Remedies Directives, supra notes 38 & 462, Chapter I, Art. 1(3). 
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the text neither of the Directives requires the existence of an agency-level bid protest mechanism 
in the member states. Instead, they leave the form of domestic review procedures, including the 
agency-level, to the legal and administrative systems of the member states. What is required 
under the two Directives is the existence of a review system that is based on three fundamental 
principles; the principle of effectiveness, the principle of non-discrimination, and the principle of 
procedural autonomy.590 The last principle leaves member states with wide discretion as to the 
creation of appropriate forum to receive complaints against the decisions of procuring agencies 
that violate the Union laws on procurement.     
2.5.1 Delegation of Contracting Authority    
FAR33.103 states that “contracting officers shall consider all protests and seek legal 
advice, whether protests are submitted before or after award or whether filed directly with the 
agency or the GAO.”591 In addition, FAR stipulates that all protests submitted directly with the 
agency shall be addressed to the contracting officer or other officials designated to receive 
protests.592 Nonetheless, protests are mostly submitted to the contracting officer.593 Who a 
contracting officer is under the United States law must be defined. Under the FAR “contracting 
officers have authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related 
determinations and findings.”594 The contracting officers are to be determined to the public based 
on the fundamental rule that the United States government is not bound by unauthorized acts of 
its officers or agents.595   
590 Supra note 18, at 481. 
591 FAR, supra note 144, § 33.102.  
592 Id., § 33.133. 
593 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1683. 
594 FAR, supra note 144, § 1.602-1(a). 
595 Wilber Nat’l Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120 (1935).  
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Similar to Iraq, the power to enter into contractual relationships is mainly vested to the 
head of the agency. The FAR 1.601 states that “unless specifically prohibited by another 
provision of law, authority and responsibility to contract for authorized supplies and services are 
vested in the agency head.”596 However, the agency head may establish contracting activities or 
sections and delegate broad authority to heads of these contracting units.”597 Thus, contracting 
officers may bind the Government only to the extent of the authority delegated to them.”598  
As a result, “contracts may be entered into and signed on behalf of the Government only 
by contracting officers.”599 In some agencies, a relatively small number of high level officials are 
designated contracting officers solely by virtue of their positions.600 Nevertheless, contracting 
officers below the level of a head of a contracting unit may be selected and appointed 
under 1.603.601 Thus, there are two groups of officials with the power to enter into contractual 
relationships. At the upper level of the agency, in secretarial positions or as heads of the 
contracting units, officials have contracting authority by virtue of their positions.602 Although 
these high-ranking officials have full contracting authority, they do not exercise it themselves 
except on special circumstances.603 Other contracting officers are called designated contracting 
officers that are lower-level officials appointed under 1.603.604 
596 FAR, supra note 144, § 1.601(a). 
597 Id. 
598 FAR, supra note 144, § 1.602-1. 
599 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 85. 
600 Id., at 84. 
601 Id. 
602 Id. 
603 Id. 
604 Id. 
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2.5.2 Delegation of Contracting Authority and the Power to Receive Bid Protests under the 
Iraqi Procurement Law 
In general, the distribution of administrative power in Iraq is still centralized. The 
majority of administrative authorities is in the hand of the Ministers or Heads of non-cabinet 
agencies. This fact is one of the reasons of the delay that the public suffer when they seek 
services from the government. For instance, often an appointment application will not be 
answered for months simply because the minister is on vacation or there are so many 
applications that she/he cannot finish them on time. Every ministry has, at least, one or several 
general directorates in every province to perform the works of the ministry in these cities and 
each directorate is headed by a director general.605 Similarly, non-cabinet agencies have a major 
office in every province and headed by a director.606   
Directors general are usually authorized by ministries or heads of non-cabinet agencies to 
make decisions regarding certain matters whether substantial, such as in administrative routines, 
or insignificant, with respect to financial matters. Since the re-delegation is subject to the sole 
discretion of the officials holding power, there are great disparities in the power each director 
general possesses. In other words, it is not clear to what extent senior officials re-delegate their 
powers to directors general especially the power to authorize spending from public funds through 
contracting. 
605 See for example the Law of Ministry of Education, Art. 5, which states that the Ministry consists of several 
central directorates and other general directorates in Iraqi provinces. In addition, Article 6 states that each general 
directorate is headed by a director-general that has, at least, a bachelor degree with 15 years of experience, available, 
in Arabic, at, http://www.moedu.gov.iq/ar/.      
606 See the Independent High Electoral Commission Law, Art. 5 which states that the Electoral Administration, 
which is the executive branch of the Commission, consists of the National Office and Electoral Offices in provinces 
and the Region, available at, http://www.ihec.iq/ftpar/english-page/laws/ihec-law.pdf.     
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Contracting authorities under the procurement system of the United States and Iraq are 
vested in the first place with the head of the agency.607 In the case of the Iraqi system, Order 87 
does not mention “agency head”, “head of the contracting agency”, or any other words indicating 
the same meaning in any of its provisions. The reason for the absence of these terms is related to 
the fact that Order 87 does not grant contracting power to the head of the agencies. Instead, 
Order 87 grants such power to the “contracting authority” that is to be a specially-qualified 
government agency or a committee within every government agency.608 Nonetheless, the 
situation under Order 87 and the IRGC is complicated and confusing.609 
The confusion is caused by the conflict mentioned above between Order 87 and the IRGC 
in awarding contracting powers.610 Although the IRGC mentions the term “head of the 
contracting agency” on several occasions, there is no specific definition of this term in the IRGC 
in its provisions. In order to identify the officials that have contracting power, the IRGC adopts 
the provisions of the IRIBL to determine which officials can authorize spending from public 
fund including through contracting activities. Under the IRIBL, the agency head is defined to 
mean exclusively high-ranking officials including; ministers, governors, heads of non-cabinet 
agencies, and heads of Provincial Councils.611  
On the other hand, “agency head” or “head of the agency” has been defined, under the 
FAR and it includes not only the top high-ranking officials such as secretaries, heads of 
607 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 84 & the IRIBL, supra note 580, Art. 2(a). 
608 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 3(1). 
609 Under the IRGC, although there should be a Public Contract Division (PCD) in every government agency and a 
CRC to receive and review bid protests, the heads of agencies, including ministers, governors, head of independent 
agencies, have always the final say in awarding a contract or approving or rejecting a decision made on a protest by 
the CRC. The decisions of the PCD and the CRC are all recommendation pending the approval of the heads of 
relevant agencies. See the IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 11, & Ministry of Planning (MOP), Administrative Order No. 
4/7/4632 (July/5/2007).      
610 See P. 65-70 of this dissertation. 
611 The IRIBL, supra note 580, Art. 2(a). 
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independent agencies, or governors but also other senior officials working under the supervision 
of these senior officials.612 Furthermore, the principle under the FAR is delegation of broad 
contracting authority from the head of the agency to other officials.613 Thus, the United States’ 
procurement system distributes contracting powers through the provisions of the FAR as a broad 
range of officials have been included in the definition of the head of the agency. In other words, 
the FAR distributes or decentralizes contracting powers through delegation by force of law and 
does not leave it with the sole discretion of the senior officials originally granted the power as in 
the case of Iraq.614  
A general rule under the Iraqi administrative law system is that delegation is accepted 
only where a relevant law or regulation allows the person holding the power originally to 
delegate it to another official.615 Any delegation that is not based on a law or regulation is void. 
The IRIBL allows senior officials to delegate the power of spending public funds through 
contracting to other officials. Nevertheless, the power to receive and review protests under the 
IRGC is vested to the CRC without mentioning anything about delegation.616  
The IRGC is silent on the delegation of the power to receive and review protests by 
CRCs. Thus, the CRC, according to the requirement of the existence of a law or regulation 
allowing delegation, is not allowed to delegate its power to other officials. In addition, there is 
another obstacle that does not permit delegation. The CRC is allowed only to review protests and 
make recommendations to the head of the agency. Thus, the final decision to sustain or reject the 
612 FAR, supra note 144, § 2.101. 
613 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 84. 
614 Article 2(a) of the IRBIL states that the relevant Minister, Head of a non-cabinet agency, the head of the region, 
Governors, or the head of Provincial Councils has the power to spend public fund through, among other things, 
contracts of procuring goods and services. It also states that such officials are allowed to delegate partially or wholly 
their power to heads of subsidiary branch agencies, see the IRIBL, supra note 580, Art. 2(a).     
615 See Razi, supra note 71, at 63. 
616 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10.  
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protest is in the hands of heads of agencies. No official may delegate a power that he does not 
have it in the first place.   
There is another argument against the delegation of the power to review bid protests by 
senior officials. The IRIBL allows senior officials to delegate only contracting authority to 
lower-level officials. It is silent about delegation of the power to review bid protests. Thus, it is 
not safe to assume that the delegation of contracting authority according to the IRIBL includes 
delegation of the power to review bid protests from unsatisfied bidders. There is no specific way 
to interpret this silence as permitting the delegation. It is safe to assume the contrary. 
2.6.1 Centralization of the IAT or the Judicial Forums  
Both Order 87 and the IRGC cover the procedures of how to submit bid protests to the 
IAT. The IAT is also centralized as there is one IAT located in the capital. Order 87 is silent on 
the issue of where the IAT is to be located and the possibility of having several IATs in the 
country. However, there is, according to the IRGC, in fact only one administrative court for 
reviewing bid protests which is the IAT.617 In addition, the IRGC requires the IAT to be housed 
in the building of the MOP in Baghdad.618  
 In addition, the centralized bid protest system is more damaging to the protests 
potentially brought to the IAT because the IAT is a judicial forum in the bid protest system that 
must follow, according to the IRGC, strict procedures of the LCP in settling protests. Article 10 
states that the IAT is to be guided by the LCP in any matter that has not been covered by the 
617 Id., Art. 10.(3). 
618 Id. 
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IRGC.619 Except for the timeliness for the IAT to decide the protests, the IRGC is silent on all 
other procedures the IAT must follow in settling a protest.620    
If a potential unsatisfied bidder files a protest to the IAT from another city, it will be very 
difficult for such bidder to follow the case. It has to travel to Baghdad every time the IAT needs 
a document, testimony, or any other request necessary for resolving the case. This difficulty can 
be reduced through hiring a lawyer. Nevertheless, the way lawyers work in Iraq is very different 
in terms of resolving disputes. In addition, relying on lawyers obviously increases costs, 
especially for small businesses which do not have adequate resources. 
2.6.2 Constitutional Problems in the Establishment of the IAT 
Order 87 created the IAT as the sole judicial forum for protests raised by unsatisfied 
offerors. The establishment of the IAT by Order 87 contradicts the Constitution and the laws 
regulating the judicial branch. Under Article 90 of the Constitution, the federal judicial power is 
comprised of the Higher Juridical Council (HJC), the FSC, the Federal Court of Cassation 
(FCC), the Public Prosecution Department (PPD), the Judiciary Oversight Commission (JOC), 
and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance with the law.621 
The HJC is responsible for the organization of the judicial bodies and a special law 
regulates its composition, jurisdictions, and the rules of its operation.622 Parliament enacted the 
Higher Juridical Council Law (HJCL) in 2012 which emphasized the supervisory role of the HJC 
over the judicial bodies in Iraq from the administrative point of view. Thus, the HJC does not 
619 Id., Art. 10(6). 
620 Id. Art. 10(4). 
621 The Iraqi Constituion, supra note 114, Art. 89. 
622 Id., Art. 90. 
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intervene in the decision-making process by the courts except administratively.623 Its role is to 
supervise the appointment, promotion, and suspension of judges, public prosecutors, officials of 
the various courts, as well as establishment of the buildings and facilities of the judicial 
institutions.624     
Finally, the tradition based on the constitutional and the HJC provisions in Iraq was that 
that the HJC is to be responsible for the establishment of any judicial institutions including 
courts.625 The mechanism is that the relevant body or agency must submit a request explaining 
the purposes behind establishing a judicial body based on a relevant law that requires such an 
establishment and the HJC decides on the matter.626 Consequently, the establishment of a court 
by the OGPCP, according to Order 87 and by the Minister of Planning under the IRGC, was 
neither legal nor acceptable.627 
On the other hand, the establishment of a court by the OGPCP which is a department of a 
specific ministry could jeopardize the principle of separation of powers. If the executive branch 
is allowed to establish a body that has a judicial character, this step might be considered an 
intervention in the affairs of the judicial branch. Although the IRGC determines that the judge of 
the IAT shall be appointed by the HJC, the entire establishment of the tribunal vested with the 
Minister of Planning.  
623 See Luqman, supra note 127.  
624 The Higher Juridical Council Law (HJCL) of 2012, available at 
http://www.parliament.iq/Iraqi_Council_of_Representatives.php?name=articles_ajsdyawqwqdjasdba46s7a98das6da
sda7das4da6sd8asdsawewqeqw465e4qweq4wq6e4qw8eqwe4qw6eqwe4sadkj&file=showdetails&sid=8696.  
625 See Luqman,, supra note 127.  
626 Id.  
627 Id. In fact the IRGC contradicts, as usual, with Order 87 in determining a body or official with the power to 
establish the IAT. Order 87 states clearly in Section 2, 1(b-ii), that the establishment of the IAT is one of the major 
duties of the OGPCP, Order 87, supra note 5. In contrast to the order, the IRGC, supra note 97, states in Article 
10,(3), that the IAT shall be established by the decision of the Minister of Planning.        
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The only reasonable explanation as to why this power is vested with the OGPCP by 
Order 87 is again the major problem that accompanied all Orders, Regulations, or Memorandums 
issued by the CPA. This problem is lack of knowledge regarding the Iraqi legal and 
administrative system on part of the CPA. Further, legal scholars, judges, law practitioners have 
not been involved by the CPA in the enactment of its orders and regulations. However, the IRGC 
exacerbated the problem by depriving the OGPCP from the power to create the IAT as Order 87 
dictates and granting this power to the Minister of Planning.628 
2.6.3 What the CPA Should Have Done to Avoid a Conflict with Iraqi Legal System  
It should not have been difficult or complicated for the CPA to decentralize the judicial 
mechanism for bid protest settlements, in compliance with the existing judicial structure of Iraq. 
The structure of the judicial system for the most part is decentralized. Under the Law of Judicial 
Organization (LJO), there is one or more civil court for the first instance in every province or 
town.629 In fact, the Ministry of Justice has discretion to place a civil court in a district.630 In 
addition, one or more criminal court, again based on the minister’s discretion, can be established 
in the center of each province.631  
Consequently, it was possible and more compatible with the Iraqi judicial system for 
Order 87 to require the existence of an administrative tribunal in every province to review bid 
protests. This solution conforms well to the new political system of the country as it adopted 
federalism and decentralization.632 Under the federalism and decentralization, a considerable 
amount of public fund is spent through the provincial councils. Under the Iraqi constitution, 
628 See Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2.1(B) (ii). 
629 The Law of Judicial Organization (LJO) No. 60 (1979) of Iraq, Art. 21(1). 
630 Id. 
631 Id., Art. 29(1 & 2).  
632 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114,  Art. 1, 116 & 122. 
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every provincial council has its own budget for providing services to the public within the 
boundary of the province.633 
On the other hand, if the CPA had proper knowledge of the Iraqi legal and administrative 
structure, it would have avoided establishing the IAT. The Council of State Law No. 65 (1979) 
(CSL) established for the first time in Iraq the administrative court. The council of state has 
several major functions such as administrative adjudication, checking the wordings, preparing, 
analyzing and reviewing bills, and issuing opinions regarding legal issues facing public 
institutions.634 Thus, the Council of State is the major administrative consultation and 
adjudication forum for the state of Iraq since 1979, and could have been used in the bid protest 
system.  
Under Article 7 of the CSL, there are two separate courts in the Council of State: first, the 
Court of Administrative Adjudication (CAA); second, the Court for Public Officials’ 
Adjudication (COA).635 The jurisdiction of the CAA is to review administrative decisions and 
orders issued by government agencies where a party to which the complaint is directed has not 
been identified by any law or regulations.636 In other words, if a relevant law or regulations 
determines specific procedures for challenging a government decision, the interested party must 
follow these procedures and the CAA cannot decide such a complaint.  
For instance, Order 87 and the IRGC set the procedures of filing a bid protest where an 
interested party is not satisfied with a decision of a contracting agency. If an interested party files 
633 Provincial Law, supra note 547,, Art. 44. 
634 The Council of State Law (CSL) No. 65 (1979) of Iraq, Art. 4 & 5. Available at http://www.iraq-lg-
law.org/en/node/520.  
635 Id., Art. 7(1). In fact the existence of the two separate courts is new and it has been introduced through the fifth 
amendments of the CSL enacted in 2013. Under the old law there was only one administrative court that dealt with 
the complaints of people and government officials against the government.  
636 Id., Art. 7(4). 
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a complaint to the CAA regarding a decision related to the public procurement activity, the CAA 
must refuse to decide the complaint because a particular law, Order 87 and the IRGC, determines 
the party or body that can receive these kinds of complaints. On the other hand, the COA’s 
jurisdiction covers only claims made by government officials against public agencies based on 
the Civil Service Act (CSA) or any other laws that govern the relationship between a government 
official and the agency working for.637       
Under Article 7, an administrative decision is void if it contains one of the following 
problems: 
(i) If the order or decision violates laws, regulations, or bylaws of the agency, 
(ii) If the order or decision under question is issued in violation of the rules of 
competence, defective in its form or procedures, or based on a defective reason or 
subject, 
(iii) If the order or decision contains a mistake in implementing laws, regulations, 
or bylaws, or there is a wrongful interpretation of such laws or regulations.  
(iv) If the order or decision is abusive or arbitrary.638 
  
The CSL does not mention government contracts as one of the bases of challenging 
administrative decisions or orders issued by government agencies. This statement, however, does 
not mean that all aspects of government contracts are beyond the jurisdiction of the CAA. There 
are some preliminary steps in the formation of public contracts that are considered administrative 
decisions. For instance, decisions disqualifying contractors from participating in tender 
procedures, provisions specifying time limits for submitting tenders, the decision of selecting the 
winning contractor, are some examples.639  
637Id., Art. 7(9). 
638Id., Art. 7(5).  
639 ASHRAF MUHAMMED HAMMAD, THE THEORY OF SEPARABLE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 
IN THE FIELD OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, 98-102 (2010). 
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In other words, the jurisdiction of the council or the CAA does not include in any way 
disputes arising out of a public contract. Nonetheless, other disputes that do not arise from the 
contract, which are mostly conducted unilaterally by the agency and before the conclusion of the 
contract, is subject to the administrative court in both France and Egypt.639F640 This approach is 
called “the doctrine of separate administrative actions.”640F641 Since a bid protest is mostly related to 
the preliminary steps of awarding a public contract not the actual contract, it falls under the 
category of administrative decisions and is thus properly subject to the jurisdiction of the 
administrative court.  
The point is that the CPA could have avoided establishing the IAT, if it had studied 
carefully the legal and administrative system of the state of Iraq. The purpose of establishing the 
IAT under the CPA was solely to receive and review bid protests made by unsatisfied bidders. 
Unsatisfied bidders submit bid protests based on a decision of an agency regarding some steps 
that occurs before the conclusion of the contract. Thus, the CAA that was already well-
established in Iraq under the CSL in 1979 was a perfect vehicle as the judicial forum for the bid 
protest review. Further, the CAA gained some good experience settling complains from 
individuals and government officials against the government since 1979.  
2.7 Procedural Problems 
 The theme of this dissertation is the role of procedures followed by government agencies 
and courts for the resolution of bid protests in achieving the major requirements of successful bid 
protest mechanisms. This part of the dissertation is dedicated to the examination of several major 
procedures such as the form of bid protests, the parties that are allowed to submit protests, time 
640 Id., at 88-92. 
641 Id. 
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limit for filing protests, and remedies available for unsatisfied bidders. By improving the 
procedures of submitting and reviewing protests, the bid protest system can be more effective in 
tackling corruption and abuse. However, it would be more logical to start with the issue of 
alternative dispute resolution before involving in the details of bid protest forums. 
2.8 The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Bid Protest System   
 In some jurisdictions, before the initiation of a bid protest, contractors are required to 
seek first a solution to the problem from the contracting agencies. According to the US system, 
“prior to submission of an agency protest, all parties shall use their best efforts to resolve 
concerns raised by an interested party at the contracting officer level through open and frank 
discussions.”642 The UNCITRAL Model Law provides for a similar approach stipulating that 
“unless the complaint is resolved by mutual agreement of the supplier or contractor that 
submitted it, the procuring entity shall within 30 days after the submission of the complaint issue 
a written decision.”643  
Thus, the Law Model points out that if the problem raised by the protester can be 
resolved through mutual agreement between the parties, the agency does not need to go further 
with the protest. Order 87 states that “in resolving all disputes (i.e., whether they are tender 
protests or claims during administration of a public contract), principles of alternative dispute 
resolution shall be used to the maximum extent possible, so long as both parties agree.”644 The 
IRGC, on the other hand, provides for alternative dispute resolution only for claims or disputes 
642 FAR, supra note 144, § 33.103(b). 
643 The UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 39, Art. 53(4). 
644 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12(2)(e).  
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that arise in the administration of a public contract and is silent on the issue of resolution bid 
protests through alternative dispute resolution.645   
This approach is helpful to avoid delay and costs associated with the formal resolution of 
protests, but at the same time it seems problematic. What if the issue that has been raised by a 
contractor relates to the integrity of the procurement system? The agency might seek to protect 
itself by resolving the particular dispute informally, thus avoiding public disclosure of wrong 
doing, since the resolution occurs only between the contracting agency and the protesting 
contractors. Yet, in most procurement activities, it is not only the contractor that raised the issue 
who has an interest in the procurement, but also all other competitive contractors.  
Thus, ADR is helpful only when it is conducted in a transparent way, requiring informing 
other contractors about the issue that has been raised and the content of the solution or agreement 
that the agency and the protesting contractor are about to reach. Generally when there is a protest 
agencies are required to inform other contractors about it. Thus, for this step to work, agencies 
should be required to adhere to certain transparency measures such as informing other 
contractors and providing for open and frank discussions to reach an agreement. Otherwise ADR 
mechanisms might actually contribute to bidding corrupt practices.  
2.9 The Form of Bid Protests 
 Since there are two different forums for reviewing bid protests under the Iraqi 
procurement laws and regulations, the coverage of the procedures involved would be more 
reasonable to be separate. The agency-level is a much simpler, cheaper, and faster process than 
the judicial review conducted by the IAT. The IRGC does not require conditions for the form 
645 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(8). 
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and content of the bid protest except that it should be in writing.646 In addition, it requires that in 
order for the protest to be accepted, the protester must not withdraw the deposit submitted as a 
requirement to participate in the bidding process.647 On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law only requires the protest to be in writing without setting forth other conditions.648 The law 
in the United States law requires that the agency protest shall include the following information: 
(i) Name, address, and fax and telephone numbers of the protester. 
(ii) Solicitation or contract number. 
(iii) Detailed statement of the legal and factual grounds for the protest, to include 
a description of resulting prejudice to the protester. 
(iv) Copies of relevant documents. 
(v) Request for a ruling by the agency. 
(vi) Statement as to the form of relief requested. 
(vii) All information establishing that the protester is an interested party for the 
purpose of filing a protest. 
(viii) All information establishing the timeliness of the protest.649 
 
The reason for not having complex and detailed requirements is the nature and design of the 
agency-level bid protest mechanism. Under the FAR, “the agency should provide for 
inexpensive, informal, procedurally simple, and expeditious resolution of protests.”650 The 
agency-level mechanism is essential for an effective bid protest system. Having some detailed 
requirements for the form and content of the protest would not be unreasonable, especially since 
the protest can be about a complex contract.  
Excessive simplicity might impede an effective review, for example, in the case where a 
protester fails to provide clearly the bases of the claim. In addition, lack of requirements of the 
form and content of the protest increases the discretion of officials and allow them to introduce 
unreasonable conditions. This proposition is very important especially in the case of Iraq and 
646 Id., Art. 10(b). 
647 Id. 
648 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 39, Art. 53(1). 
649 FAR, § 33.103.d. 
650 Id., 33.103.c. 
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other developing countries because abuse of discretion is quite common. Sometimes petitions 
have been refused because they were not typed on a computer, even though there was nothing in 
the law requiring that.651  
On the other hand, to avoid uncertainty and confusion, bidders also need to know what 
they should include in the protest. The agency-level mechanism is quite time-sensitive. Thus, 
some requirements about the protest form would help the timelines and simplicity of the process, 
especially in countries where access to, and communication with, administrative agencies is 
difficult. Finally, considering the centralized structure of the agency-level of Iraq, lack of such 
requirements impose an additional financial burden on bidders as they need to be in contact with 
the agency to correct potential mistakes or shortages in their protests.            
 With respect to the IAT, Order 87 is silent on the form and content of the protest that is to 
be submitted to the IAT. As discussed earlier, the IAT is required to follow the CPL for anything 
that is not covered in Order 87 or the IRGC. The IRGC requires that the protest be registered and 
the required fee be paid.652 There are several other requirements under the CPL for registering a 
complaint for review by a relevant court. First, every claim must be in writing. Second, the claim 
must also include the following information: 
(i) the name of the court that is to receive the complaint; 
(ii) the date of the complaint; 
(iii) the names of both the defendant and the complainant, their jobs, and their addresses. If there 
is not a known address, the last address the defendant resided in is considered sufficient;  
651 This is another personal experience of acts practiced by agencies while they are illegal. 
652 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(4). 
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(vi) the location that the complainant prefers to receive notification; 
(v) explaining the subject of the complaint, if it is tangible the category, type, value, and 
descriptions shall be stated and if it is intangible or real property, the location, boundary, 
number, and its order must be stated;  
(vi) the facts of the complaint, its evidence, and the relief requested by the complainant;  
(vii) the signature of the complainant or her/his agent provided that the agent is authorized 
through a formal documents certified by a specialized agency.653 
(ix) payment of a fee based on the financial value of the subject of the complaint.654 
In addition, the complainant must attach as many copies as the number of the 
defendants.655 The claimant must provide a list of all documents that are relied upon including 
copies with her/his signature or the signature of her/his agent confirming its compatibility with 
the original copies on every single page of such documents.656 The court then sends them to the 
defendant.657 Further, no complaint is accepted if it does not follow the previous requirements 
unless the compliant is one that has to be submitted within a specific period of time and that time 
is about to expire.658  
It seems that there are many prerequisites for a protest to be accepted by the IAT. The 
effort that is required to meet these requirements by a protester would be difficult, expensive, 
and time-consuming. However, there are almost no requirements to submit a protest to the 
653 The Civil Procedure Law (CPL) No. 83 (1969) of Iraq,  Art 46.  
654 Id., Art. 48(2). 
655 Id., Art. 47(1). 
656 Id. 
657 Id. 
658 Id., Art. 47(2). 
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CRCs, agency-level, except that the protest be in writing. The foregoing explains the difference 
between the judicial review and the agency-level bid protest mechanism. Nevertheless, the 
author suggests that some of the requirements of the CPL be added to the agency-level 
mechanism such as the subject bases of the complaint.          
2.10.1 The Jurisdiction of Iraqi Bid Protest Forums 
 First it is important to determine which agencies are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
CRCs and the IAT. According to its own terms, Order 87 applies to all procurements of goods, 
services, and construction services conducted by the state of Iraq through federal ministries, 
regions, and provinces that commit public funds.659 Thus, the jurisdiction of the IAT covers all 
disputes related to the award of public contracts by the Iraqi government. In other words, Order 
87 does not provide for any exception with respect to its application on procurements by the 
government of Iraq.  
However, in a decision by the IAT that was sustained by the Federal Supreme Court, the 
procurements awarded by the Prime Minister’s Office have been excluded from the review by 
the IAT. A unsatisfied bidder won a contract for the protection of the Baghdad International 
Airport and the award was approved by the Ministry of Transportation and the Director of the 
Civil Aviation Authority.660 Nonetheless, the Prime Minister’s Office cancelled the award 
decision and awarded the contract to another company.661 The unsatisfied bidder filed a protest 
to the IAT, but the IAT refused to review the complaint.662  
659 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 1(1). 
660 Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 123-124. 
661 Id. 
662 Id., at 124. 
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As a result, the unsatisfied protester appealed the decision of the IAT to the Federal 
Supreme Court. The FSC sustained the decision of the IAT based on non-applicability of the 
jurisdiction of the IAT to the award decisions of contracts issued by the Office of the Prime 
Minister.663 The Court stated that the Office of the Prime Minister is an exception to the IRGC 
because the jurisdiction of the IAT, according to the IRGC, is limited only to the award decisions 
that are issued by ministries, non-cabinet agencies, regions, and provincial councils.664  
Thus, the court emphasized that the Office of the Prime Minister is not one of the 
agencies mentioned as those that are subject to the IRGC.665 The IAT also refused to review 
another protest of a bidder who won the contract but the Prime Minister’s Office cancelled the 
award and granted the contract to a firm whose tender has been rated below the winning 
bidder.666 The FSC also sustained the IAT’s decision based on the same reasoning as the above 
decision discussed.667 There are, however, problems with the analysis of the FSC in these two 
decisions.  
First, this reasoning of the court contradicts a constitutional principle, which states that 
“It is prohibited to stipulate in law the immunization from appeal of any administrative work or 
decision.”668 Although the court did not state that the award decision is protected from the 
appeal, it implied the existence of such immunity. If an unsatisfied contractor wants to challenge 
an award decision of the Prime Minister’s Office, it has to seek review from regular courts 
because the IAT does not review such an award decision. The regular courts in turn will transfer 
663 Id. 
664 Id., based on Article 2 of the IRGC, supra note 97, which states that “the provisions of this regulations apply to 
contracts conducted by the contracting agencies, government and public sector agencies, represented through 
ministries, non-cabinet agencies, regions, and governorates, with other parties Iraqis or non-Iraqis for the execution 
of construction projects of the government, consultation services, or procurement of goods or services.”  
665 Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 124. 
666 Id., at 78-80. 
667 Id., at 80.   
668 The Constitution of Iraq, supra note 114, Art. 100. 
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the complaint to the IAT, as it is required by the CPL, because it is the specialized court for 
reviewing award decisions of public contracts. As a result, there is no review of the award 
decisions of the Prime Minister’s Office.   
Second, the court in its analysis relied on the provisions of the IRGC rather than Order 87 
which is higher in terms of the legislative hierarchy. Order 87 clearly states that the Order 
applies to all procurements of the state of Iraq and it does not expressly or impliedly exclude the 
procurements of the Prime Minister’s Office.669 Consequently, the IRGC should not under any 
circumstances contradict the Order. If the IRGC mistakenly failed to mention the award 
decisions of the Office of the Prime Minister, the court should have nonetheless relied on Order 
87 and applied its provisions.  
Under the IRGC, the jurisdiction of the CRCs is solely to receive bid protests with 
respect to award decisions of public contracts issued by ministries, non-cabinet agencies, 
governorates, and regions.670 Accordingly, the CRCs cannot review the award decisions of the 
Prime Minister’s Office because the text does not mention the Office. The IRGC violates Order 
87 because it does not mention all award decisions of the state or government of Iraq as the 
Order does. The role of the IRGC is supposed to be interpretive and explanatory or 
complementary to, not deviates from, the text and spirit of the Order.   
669 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 1(1), which states “This Order applies to all procurements of goods, services, and 
construction services by the State of Iraq acting through Ministries or other federal agencies (collectively 
“agencies”); or governmental units including Regions; Governorates; and all other  subdivisions of the State of Iraq 
(collectively “governmental units”) that may commit public funds.” 
670 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10, which states that CRCs shall “review written protests submitted by unsatisfied 
participant bidders or their certified agents to contracting agencies within seven working days from the date the 
award decision has been made and communicated to bidders and such CRCs shall make a recommendation to the 
minister, the head of non-cabinet agencies, governorate, within 15 days from the date the protest has been launched 
before the contracting agency.” 
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2.10.2 Contract-Award Versus Contract-Performance Controversies 
It is appropriate to begin with the jurisdiction of the CRCs because they are mandatory 
before seeking review from the IAT. The jurisdiction of the CRCs according to the IRGC is to 
receive protests from participant bidders on the award decisions of public contracts. Thus, the 
CRCs may only deal with protests that are related to the formation of a public contract or what is 
known as contract-award controversies. With respect to the jurisdiction of the IAT, Order 87 
states that the IAT has “jurisdiction over complaints and disputes arising under or relating to the 
award of public contracts by the government.”671 The power of the IAT is also limited to 
contract-award controversies. 
Thus, any dispute that arises after the award of the contract or disputes based on a 
contract between a bidder and the government is beyond the scope of the power of the CRCs and 
the IAT. Although Iraq is a civil law country and has had an administrative court (CAA) since 
1979, public contract disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the regular civil courts. Public 
contracts in Iraq are beyond the jurisdiction of the administrative court, the CAA, which is rather 
unusual for a civil law country, as seen below.  
In contrast, the forum for the resolution of public procurement disputes in France relies 
on the distinction between whether the contract is administrative or not.672 If the contract is 
concluded by a government agency, the subject of the contract is related to the provision of 
public service, and the contract contains unusual clauses that cannot be found in regular contracts 
between private parties, the contract is considered administrative.673 The majority of public 
671 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2.(1)(b)(ii). 
672 Bovis, supra note 18, at 493. 
673 Id. 
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contracts fall under the jurisdiction of the administrative courts.674 Nevertheless, a significant 
proportion of contracts covered by the public procurement rules falls within the jurisdiction of 
the French civil courts.675       
 Generally, there is a fundamental difference between contract-award controversies and 
disputes that arise under a public contract or controversies based on an awarded contract. 
Contract performance controversies occur only between the parties to a contract.676 
Consequently, third parties must not challenge actions that happen during the performance of a 
contract.677 In Gull Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, the court denied a bidder the right 
to obtain an injunction requiring the contracting officer to terminate the contract for default 
because the contractor failed to perform what has been proposed.678 This principle has been 
incorporated into the GAO’s bid protest regulations which states “the administration of an 
existing contract is within the discretion of the contracting agency.”679   
2.10.3 Compulsory versus Voluntary Agency-Level Bid Protest Mechanism 
 Under the IRGC, a protester first submits its protest to the agency responsible for the 
award of the contract in question. In other word, the review of the contracting agency in the first 
place is mandatory. Although the IRGC does not specifically mention that the agency review is 
mandatory, it implies it by its procedures because the IAT can only accept protests that have 
been already decided by the CRCs. Protesters must not seek review of bid protests directly from 
the IAT. The mandatory agency review is not a mechanism specific to Iraq. There are many 
674 Id. 
675 Id. 
676 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1675. 
677 Id. 
678 Gull Airborne Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, 694 F.2d 838 (D. C. Cir. 1982). 
679 Cibinc, supra note 515, at 1675. 
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countries around the globe, such as Spain and Portugal,680 and some regional and international 
agreements that require or, at least, allow the mandatory agency review, such as the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, WTO/GPA, and the EU Directives respectively.681 However, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law (2011) does not require a mandatory agency review as it is optional for the protester 
to choose to seek review from the agency, the administrative body, or courts.682  
Furthermore, the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law states that the 
purpose of such an approach is to enable the contracting agency to correct defective procurement 
decisions.683 This method helps to “avoid unnecessarily burdening higher levels of review and 
the judiciary with cases that might have been resolved by the parties at an earlier, less disruptive 
stage.”684 Finally, the contracting agency possesses more information about the procurement 
activity than any other parties.685 
The dissertation suggests that the agency review should be made optional in Iraq because 
some protesters are not satisfied with the fact that the agency itself has issued the decision and is 
now judging its rationality and legality. The independence of the review is one of the major 
criticisms directed to the agency-level bid protest mechanism.686 In addition, bid protest 
mechanisms should decide protests in the shortest period of time possible to avoid disruption of 
the supply of goods or services to the public and agencies. Thus, requiring a review by the 
680 Bovis, supra note 18, at 499 & 501. 
681 See Xinglin, supra note 96, at 206 & 207.  
682 Article 64 of the UNCITRAL Model Law (2011), supra note 19, states that “challenge proceeding may be made 
by way of [an application for reconsideration to the procuring entity under article 66 of this law, an application for 
review to the [name of the independent body] under article 67 of this law or an application or appeal to the [name of 
the curt or courts]]. While the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 39, states in Article 53 that “unless the 
procurement contract has already entered into force, a complaint shall, in the first instance, be submitted in writing 
to the head of the procuring entity.”  
683 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 208. 
684 The Guide to Enactment of the 2011 UNCITRAL, supra note 177, Art. 53.  
685 Gorden, supra note 529, at 433. 
686 See Xinglin, supra note 96, at 208. 
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agency extends the suspension of award procedures mandated while protests are in progress 
because protesters unsatisfied with the agency review usually seek the IAT for the final 
review.687 In such a case there will be two suspension periods to the contract award procedures.  
In contrast, if the agency review is optional, protesters could have recourse directly to the 
IAT without delaying the award procedures for the time period consumed by the CRCs. 
Furthermore, the optional review saves some time and resources for the government that can be 
used in an area of need of such resources. It saves time and resources for the bidders or 
contractors as well because preparing a protest takes considerable financial and human resources 
and that can be a problem especially for small local businesses with limited resources and 
experience.  
2.10.4 Types of Actions of Contracting Agencies that May Be Protested  
 Under Order 87, the IAT has the power to receive protests from an interested party “that 
believes it has not received fair treatment in the award of a government public contract, or 
believes that the provisions of a tender unfairly restrict full and open competition in a manner 
that inappropriately excludes it from competing.”688 There are two types of claims that can be 
raised against contracting agencies. The first one is claims against the contract-award decision or 
the decision of determining the winning contractor, also called post-award protests. The second 
one is claims against the solicitation or the tender documents itself that are usually written by the 
contracting agencies, also called pre-award protests. 
 In contrast, the IRGC does not mention that bidders may challenge the solicitation terms 
or provisions of a tender issued by contracting agencies. Instead, it states that the CRC must 
687 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(3). 
688 Order 87, supra note 5 Sec. 12(1)(a). 
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receive written protests from unsatisfied bidders who participate in a tender and do not withdraw 
the required deposit after 7 working days from the date the agency issues the award decision and 
notifies tenderers.689 Thus, there is no indication in the IRGC that bidders can protest the terms 
of a tender.  
More importantly, the IRGC eliminated the opportunity of bidders to challenge the 
solicitation terms of a tender issued by contracting agencies under Order 87. Unsatisfied bidders 
are required, under the IRGC, to first seek review from the CRC to challenge the award decision 
and then if they are not satisfied with the decision of the CRC, they have the right to submit their 
protests to the IAT.690 Furthermore, the right to protest according to the IRGC starts only after 
the contracting agency issues the award decision. There are no opportunities for bidders to raise 
issues that affect their rights in obtaining a government contracts.  
Only award decisions are reviewable and this approach contradicts with Order 87 because 
the Order is clear that unsatisfied bidders have the right to challenge the terms of a tender. Thus, 
the question is whether unsatisfied contractors have the right to file in the IAT directly to 
challenge terms of a solicitation of a public contract without going back to the relevant CRC. 
The answer is yes, because Order 87 expressly allows such a challenge.691 But would the IAT 
accept such a challenge? The problem is that the IAT might require the protester to first seek 
review from the CRC, as required by the IRGC.  
If the IAT refers a protester to the CRC concerned, the CRC might reject the protest 
based on the IRGC because the IRGC allows only protests to the contract-award decisions and 
not solicitation terms of a tender. Even in this scenario, the potential protester might seek an 
689 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(1)(b). 
690 Id. 
691 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12(1)(a). 
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opinion from the Federal Supreme Court. Nevertheless, an unsatisfied bidder should initiate a 
challenge of this type in order to make the IAT issue a clear opinion regarding protesting 
provisions of a tender. 
An important question emerges from the process of challenging the provisions of a tender 
which is whether it includes protesting the decision of contracting agencies to choose a particular 
procurement method. There are several contracting methods in every procurement system which 
are public or open tendering, restricted tendering, tendering through negotiation, and sole source 
method.692 The most competition-friendly method is the public tendering and the least 
competition-friendly is contracting through the sole source. Generally speaking, jurisdictions 
require certain limitations in using the least competitive methods. Although contracting agencies 
are restricted by some rules in selecting the contracting methods, they still have great discretion 
to choose the method they prefer.  
The purpose of challenging the terms of a tender under Order 87 is whether such terms 
“unfairly restrict full and open competition in a manner that inappropriately excludes [an offeror] 
from competing.”693 Full and open competition is defined by Section 4 of Order 87 which states 
“to the maximum extent practicable, government public contracts shall be awarded on a 
competitive basis.”694 It seems that the Order means by competitive basis public tendering or 
sealed bidding according to which the tender is open to all offerors to submit a bid and the 
government award the contract to the lowest price tender.  
692 See for more information, Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 4 & 5, and the IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 4. 
693 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12(1)(a). 
694 Id., Sec. 4.  
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Furthermore, Order 87 states that awarding a contract by using other than full and open 
competition is an exception.695 Thus, it appears from the Order that the intention is to allow 
challenging the decision of contracting agencies to select the method of contracting before the 
IAT. An offeror can make an argument against agencies that a proposed contracting method, for 
instance, the sole source, unfairly restricts full and open competition in a manner that 
inappropriately excludes the protester from competing.  
The IRGC eliminated that right when it limited the right to protest solely to the award 
decision. Providing immunity to decisions of contracting agencies about selecting the method of 
contracting, limits the rights of protesters to challenge important actions of the procurement 
process. Under Article 52 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, offerors cannot challenge the 
decisions on choice of contracting methods.696 “Article 52 was based on a blunt conceptual 
distinction between discretionary decisions and duties, which had the laudable aim of preventing 
review bodies from second guessing entities’ commercial judgments, but it is too broad.”697 It is 
possible, therefore, that the IRGC was influenced by the UNCITRAL Model Law.   
Since the public procurement system in Iraq was designed after the US model, examining 
the experience of the US in this area provides us with an answer. Under the US system, protests 
to solicitation improprieties are very common and there is a fair amount of administrative and 
judicial experience dealing with this issue.698 With respect to the question of whether bidders 
may challenge the choice of contracting agencies to choose the contracting method they prefer, 
695 Id., Sec. 4(1). 
696 Sue Arrowsmith, Public Procurement: an Appraisal of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a Global Standard, (2004) 
53 I.C.L.Q. 17, 42. 
697 Id., at 42 & 43. 
698 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1701, and see also Mark A. Riordan, Federal Court Actions Challenging Agency 
Overrides of the CICA Stay, 23 Pub. Cont. L.J. 397 (1994). 
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the US system allows such a challenge as long as it is related to a procurement of goods and 
services. 
Under the US law, 
Both the Unites States Court of Federal Claims and the district courts of 
the United States shall have jurisdiction to render judgment on an action by an 
interested party objecting to a solicitation by a Federal agency for bids or 
proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a 
contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a 
procurement or a proposed procurement. Both the United States Court of Federal 
Claims and the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to 
entertain such an action without regard to whether suit is instituted before or after 
the contract is awarded.699 
  
The scope of the right to protest is very broad as it includes the entire procurement cycle and not 
only the award decision. In the interpretation of “in connection with a procurement”, the Federal 
Circuit held that “even though the protest did not involve review of a solicitation or award, it 
involved a government decision not to conduct a solicitation and thus was a challenge to an 
alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement.”700 Furthermore, any 
alleged violation of statute or regulation suffices for submitting protests as long as it is related to 
a procurement activity.701 The Federal Circuit held that “court does not lose jurisdiction over a 
protest because an agency allegedly violated an APA, not a procurement statute.”702 
Thus, procurement has been interpreted very broadly in the American system by courts 
that relied on a definition from 41 U.S.C. § 403 (2).703 Procurement is defined, under this 
section, as including “all stages of the process of acquiring property or services, beginning with 
the process for determining a need for property or services and ending with contract completion 
699 28 U.S.C. §149 (b), and see for more information, Frederick W. Claybrook, Jr., The Initial Experience Of The 
Court Of Federal Claims In Applying the Administrative Procedure Act In Bid Protest Actions-Learning Lessons All 
Over Again, 10, 29 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1, (1999). 
700 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1764 & 1765. 
701 Id., at 1764. 
702 Id., at 1765. 
703 Id. 
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and closeout.”704 Based on this definition, the Federal Circuit ruled that “when the government 
issued an RFI to solicit information to determine the scope of services it required, there was 
jurisdiction to review such pre-procurement decisions.”705 Consequently, “the existence of an 
actual procurement is not a prerequisite”706 for filing a protest.      
There are several examples that the GAO deals with protests that challenge the decision 
of contracting agencies in determining the method of contracting. For instance, in Northeast 
Constr., Co., the protester challenges the decision of the Department of the Air Force using 
competitive negotiation rather than sealed bidding for construction work.707 The contractor 
argued that the Air Force is required to use sealed bidding method for this procurement.708 The 
GAO sustained the protest and recommended that the procurement be conducted through sealed 
bidding procedures.709  
Challenging the contracting method selected by contracting agencies is not always 
sustained. “Generally, we [the GAO] will not question the contracting agency's determination of 
its minimum needs and the best method of accommodating those needs unless it has no 
reasonable basis.”710 In Eagle Fire Inc., the protester claimed that technical specifications and 
discussions were necessary; accordingly, the contracting agency should have selected 
704 Gabriel D. Soll, Tara L. Ward, “IN- OR OUT-”: The Jurisdictional Confusion Over Challenges To Agency 
Decisions To In-Source Contracted Work, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 583, 608 (2012).  
705 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1765. 
706 Robert A. Caplen, Turning Esch To Dust? The State Of Supplementation Of The Administrative Record In Bid 
Protests Before The Court Of Federal Claims, 32 Whittier L. Rev. 197, 207 (2011). 
707 Northeast Constr., Co., 68 Comp. Gen. 406 (B-234323), 89-1.  
708 Id. 
709 Id. 
710 Eagle Fire Inc., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-257951, 94-2. 
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competitive procedures rather than sealed bidding for the protested contract.711 However, the 
GAO refused such an argument and upheld the agency’s decision.712  
The point from the above examples is that the US system allows to a reasonable extent 
contractors to challenge the decision of contracting agencies determining the method of 
contracting. In fact, protests to methods of contracting are usually dealt with as protests to 
provisions of  tender documents713 because provisions of tender documents identify the method 
that has been selected for contracting. Since the Iraqi procurement system has been designed 
after the US model, the US system is the best place to seek guidance on details of challenging 
procurement methods determined by contracting agencies. Allowing protesters in Iraq to 
challenge selection of contracting methods by agencies is crucial for limiting corruption in public 
procurement.           
2.11.1 Who May Initiate a Protest? Or Who Is an Interested Party? 
 Standing is an essential issue in the bid protest system because it determines who has the 
right to request a review of the contracting agency decision from either the relevant 
administrative agencies or the court.714 Standing differs from jurisdictions according to their 
legal and administrative structures. In addition, the level of transparency or corruption affects 
standing. For instance, countries that enjoy a fair level of transparency define standing broadly to 
include more parties that are able to challenge the decisions of contracting agencies. In contrast, 
some jurisdictions limit that right through allowing only specific contractors to submit bid 
protests.  
711 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 333. 
712 Id. 
713 Id., at 1701. 
714 See Gorden, supra note 529, at 436.  
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 2.11.2 Interested Party under Order 87 
 One of the major questions of the entire bid protest process is who can or who has the 
right to initiate a bid protest? Order 87 states that “an interested party is an actual or prospective 
bidder or offeror that has a reasonable chance for award and whose direct economic interest 
would be affected by the award of a public contract or by the failure to award such a contract.”715 
The definition of the interested party is almost the same as that of the United States procurement 
system.  
Under the US system, an interested party is “an actual or prospective bidder or offeror 
whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the contract or by failure to 
award the contract.”716 The definition, under Order 87, includes an additional phrase which is 
“….that has a reasonable chance for award ……”717 Except for that additional part, the CPA 
borrowed exactly the definition of the US procurement system. Even that part is taken from the 
case experience of the US as will be discussed below. 
The definition is ambiguous and there is no guidance or explanation in Order 87 and the 
IRGC about the meaning of some of the phrases used. For instance, “actual or prospective 
bidder”, “reasonable chance for award”, and “direct economic interest” are among those vague 
phrases. Considering a number of the decisions of the IAT is available, none of these cases can 
provide a clear answer as to how the IAT interpreted them. The IRGC should have provided 
some guidance as one of the major roles of a regulation is to interpret terms and phrases of 
relevant statutes.  
715 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12, (1)(a)(i). 
716 Far. Supra note 144, § 33.101. 
717 Order 87, Supra note 5, Sec. 12(1)(a)(i). 
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Nonetheless, since Order 87 is designed after the American procurement system, going 
back to the experience of the various forums, agency-level, the GAO, and the COFC, might 
provide some guidance with respect to the meaning of “interested party.” All of the forums 
mentioned use the same definition to identify who can challenge an action of a procurement 
activity.718 According to the American system, a bidder seeks to challenge a decision of a 
procuring agency has to show that; (1) he is an actual or prospective bidder, (2) he has a direct 
economic interest.719 
2.11.3 Actual or Prospective Bidder 
 It is easy to determine actual bidders as they are those who submitted bids or proposals to 
a tender by the government, but the problem is in determining whether a potential bidder is 
considered a prospective bidder.720 Under the GAO’s case-law experience, the term means “a 
potential competitor for the type of work being procured.”721 For instance, GAO decided that the 
“protester did not bid but would have if specifications were not defective.”722 In addition, parties 
are not potential competitors, and, thus, are not interested parties, if they do not participate, or do 
not have the capacity to participate in the market involved.”723  
In another case the GAO held that the protester is considered an interested party to 
challenge a modification of the awarded contract that allowed the contractor to provide a product 
that the protester is qualified to provide.724 In contrast, prospective suppliers or subcontractors 
718 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1682, 1693 & 1767. 
719 Id., at 1693. 
720 Id., at 1694. 
721 Id. 
722 Id. 
723 Id. 
724 Id. 
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are not considered interested parties.725 In U.S. Polycon Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec., the GAO 
stated that “protester was only a potential supplier to the ultimate awardee” or the main 
contractor.726 The United States’ courts have also ruled on who is a prospective offeror or 
bidder?  
In Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, the court held that where the 
claim is that the government should have used a competitive method for a particular contract, the 
protester need not show that it would have won the contract, but rather it would have been a 
qualified bidder.727 In Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States, the court stated that “plaintiff 
currently supplied a competitive financial management system to DHS and clearly could have 
competed for the contract if DHS had bid it out.”728 In contrast, in Space Exploration Techs. 
Corp. v. United States, the court stated that “plaintiff is not an actual or prospective bidder and 
cannot qualify as an interested party with standing because it did not anticipate having full 
launch capability until the following fiscal year.”729  
2.11.4 Direct Economic Interest  
 In order to have a direct economic interest, an actual or prospective bidder is required to 
be in line for award or be able to compete for award if its position in the protest is 
upheld.730  The Federal Circuit reversed a decision of the General Services Board declaring that 
the fourth lowest bidder in a sealed bid tender had a sufficient economic interest to protest.731 
The court held in United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp. that "Congress intended the 
725 Id. 
726 U.S. Polycon Corp., Comp. Gen. Dec. B-254655.3, 94-2. 
727 Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
728 Savantage Fin. Servs. v. United States , 81 Fed. CI. 300 (2008). 
729 Space Exploration Techs. Corp. v. United States, 68 Fed. CI. 1 (2005). 
730 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1696.  
731 Id. 
152 
 
                                                          
 
 
phrase ‘interested party’ to be a meaningful limitation on the authority of the board to 
entertain" a protest.732 It further stated that: 
The board was troubled by the "logic" that would allow the award of a 
questionable procurement to go unchallenged if the second-lowest bidder did not 
file a protest. It believed this result would be "contrary to the notions of full and 
open and fair and equal competition and would significantly undermine the 
integrity of the procurement and protest processes." [Internal citation omitted]. 
But, as the Supreme Court has said in an analogous context, the requirement that a 
party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely 
affected does not insulate executive action from judicial review, nor does it 
prevent any public interests from being protected through the judicial process. It 
does serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to whether review will 
be sought in the hands of those who have a direct stake in the outcome. [Internal 
citation omitted]. Congress has decided that the coincidence of a disappointed 
bidder's "direct economic" interest with the public interest adequately 
accommodates both. By striking a different balance more solicitous of the latter, 
the board has upset this congressional scheme. Congress simply did not intend for 
the board to entertain the protests of innumerable disappointed bidders who have 
little or no chance of receiving the contract.733 
 
Determination of direct economic interest can be much more difficult especially in a negotiated 
tendering procurement.734 The GAO examined this problem and stated that “Determining 
whether a party is interested involves consideration of a variety of factors, including the nature of 
the issue raised, the benefit of relief sought by the protester, and the party's status in relation to 
the procurement.”735 However, a protester is considered an interested party if it claims that its 
proposal was improperly assessed and that proper evaluation would put it in line for award.736 
 Contractors that are ineligible for award are not interested parties unless they challenge 
their ineligibility.737 The GAO stated that “protester's drug had not been shown to be effective in 
732 United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp.892 F.2d 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
733 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1696. 
734 Id. 
735 Id., at 1696-1697. 
736 Id., at 1697. 
737 Id., at 1699. 
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the treatment of either of the two medical conditions identified in the solicitations.”738 Such a 
bidder, therefore, is ineligible to protest.739 In addition, GAO stated that a potential competitor 
has a direct economic interest in challenging the appropriateness of a sole source procurement.740 
However, once the sole source contracting is deemed to be proper, the potential competitor is no 
longer an interested party.741  
 The Federal Circuit uses the same test for direct economic interest as the one used by 
GAO. In PGBA, LLC. V. United States,742 the court stated that “proposal was fully within the 
zone of consideration for a contractual award, and agency’s handling of the data- access element 
showed unequal and unfair treatment.”743 In contrast, the Federal Circuit in Homesource Real 
Estate Asset Servs., v. United States,744 stated that even if the protest of the plaintiff were 
sustained there were eight vendors that did not receive any award and had higher technical 
ratings than the plaintiff. Therefore, there was not a substantial chance that the plaintiff would 
have received the contract.745  
 In addition to these two phrases, Order 87 states that the offeror has to show a 
“reasonable chance for award” in order to be considered interested party. There is also no 
guidance in the Order or the IRGC to describe what a reasonable chance for award is. 
Nevertheless, it seems that the drafter of Order 87 transferred this phrase form the case law of the 
US procurement system so that the application of the definition to real cases would be easier. In 
738 Id. 
739 Id. 
740 Id., at 1700. 
741 Id. 
742 PGBA, LLC. V. United States , 60 Fed. Cl. 196 (2004). 
743 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1768. 
744 Homesource Real Estate Asset Servs., v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 466 (2010). 
745 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1768. 
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other words, this phrase implies that an interested party is the one that has a reasonable chance to 
win the contract.  
As mentioned above, having a reasonable chance to win the award is the same as having 
a direct economic interest under the US system. Although the word reasonable is still 
ambiguous, bringing the phrase into Order 87 provides some clarity to the definition of an 
interested party in the Iraqi case. This proposition is based on the fact that the experience of the 
Iraqi public procurement sector is quite different and modest especially with these kinds of tests. 
There is no further guidance in the cases of the IAT available that helps us identify how the court 
interpreted these phrases.  
On the other hand, interested party is not totally new to the Iraqi judicial process and it is 
close to a term used under Iraqi administrative-law principles to provide the same meaning, i.e., 
determining who has the right to bring a complaint. The word in Arabic is “ةحلصملا بحاص” or the 
party or person who has an interest in a disputed matter. Every individual or legal person that 
wants to challenge a decision of a government agency must have an interest. 745F746 The interest may 
be certain or probable and it can be in a form of a benefit obtained by the complainant or 
damages that may be prevented by the complaint.746F747 
There are several characteristics for interest under the administrative law of the civil-law 
countries. First, there should be a direct personal relation between the interest asked to be 
746 For details of the requirement of having an interest in order for the applicant to be eligible for challenging 
administrative decisions of government agencies see ABDUL-GHANI BASYONI ABDULLA, 
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION, 483-502 (2006).  
747 JORGY SHAFEEQ SARI, RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY TO THE PRINCIPLES AND THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ADJUDICATION OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE IN FRANCE AND EGYPT, 362 (2002-2003). 
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protected and the person requesting it.748 In other words, the complainant must have suffered 
harm because of the government’s action. Second, the interest could be material or immaterial, 
incorporeal.749 Third, the interest could be actual, the harm having already occurred, or probable, 
the harm has not yet occurred but possible to be inflicted.750  
The content of this term and its specifications is similar to the content of the definition of 
interested parties under Order 87. It would have been more understandable if Order 87 used the 
Iraqi test for determining who may initiate a claim because there are already legal principles that 
govern this issue. It is not clear whether the IAT uses the concept of the interested party under 
the Iraqi administrative law explained above because judges relied on this test in either civil and 
administrative adjudications, or whether it follows Order 87 definition.            
2.11.5 Interested Party under the IRGC 
Not surprisingly the IRGC introduced a different definition of “interested party” than that 
of Order 87. Interested party under the IRGC is a bidder or offeror that submitted a bid in a 
tender and did not withdraw the deposit paid previously as a requirement for such 
participation.751 The IRGC does not recognize the definition of Order 87 with respect to who is 
an interested party. This is not the first time that provisions of the IRGC contradicts with Order 
87. 
Thus, bidders that do not participate in a tender or withdraw the deposit they have paid to 
be qualified to submit bids may not challenge the decisions of the procuring agency. The IRGC 
should have interpreted the definition of interested parties of Order 87 to provide some guidance 
748 Id., at 356. 
749 Id., at 368. 
750 Id., at 362. 
751 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(1)(b). 
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based on the experience of the US system and other regional and international agreement as 
required by the Order. Besides that this approach contradicts Order 87, which is higher than the 
IRGC in legislative hierarchy, it limited the scope of the term interested party.  
2.11.6 Interested Party under Regional and International Agreements  
Article XX of the WTO/GPA states that “each party shall provide non-discriminatory, 
timely, transparent and effective procedures enabling suppliers to challenge alleged breaches of 
the Agreement arising in the context of procurements in which they have, or have had, an 
interest.”752 Neither the word “supplier” nor the term “interest” is defined by the Agreement.753 
Some might limit the meaning of “supplier” to a bidder that wants to be party to a government 
contract.754  
However, Arrowsmith believes that the term in Article XX has a broader meaning and 
includes any contractor supplying works, or services, whether as a main contractor, 
subcontractor, or to any firm in the supply chain.755 She further argues that Article XX aims to 
ensure that the rules of the WTO/GPA are enforced.756 In addition, this interpretation extends 
enforcement rights to all those in the supply chain to ensure enforcement of some of the GPA 
non-discrimination rules.757 The US system, which is known for its generous authorization of 
protests, does not allow sub-contractors to file bid protests. 
752 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX 2. 
753 Arrowsmith, supra note 450, at 7. 
754 Id.. 
755 Id.  
756 Id. 
757 Id. 
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With respect to the term “interest”, parties are required to grant standing to those firms or 
suppliers that have, or have had, an interest in the procurement.758 According to Arrosmith, 
parties are afforded great discretion in determining the meaning of the term.759 However, since 
the principle of effectiveness under Article XX is relevant in the definition of “interest”, 
restrictions that make invoking the challenge procedures unduly difficult should not be 
acceptable.760 For instance, it would be considered a violation to Article XX to make standing to 
suspend a procurement action conditional on the suppliers’ showing that it would definitely, or 
even probably, have won the contract.761 
Article 52 of the UNCITRAL states that “Subject to paragraph (2) of this article, any 
supplier or contractor that claims to have suffered, or that may suffer, loss or injury due to a 
breach of a duty imposed on the procuring entity by this law may seek review in accordance with 
articles 53 to 57.”762 The Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), hereinafter 
the Guide to Enactment (1994), states that the purpose of this article is to establish basic rights to 
obtain review.763 It also states that only suppliers and contractors, and not members of the public, 
have the right to seek review of the decisions of contracting agencies.764  
Subcontractors have intentionally not been granted the power to seek review under the 
Guide to Enactment.765 The purpose behind this restriction is to prevent excessive degree of 
disruption that might influence negatively the economy and efficiency of the public procurement 
758 Id., at 8. 
759 Id., at 9.  
760 Id. 
761 Id. 
762 United Nation Commission on International Trade Law, The Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
(1994), Art. 52, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/procurem/ml-procurement/ml-procure.pdf.  
763 Id.   
764 Id. 
765 Id. 
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process.766 In addition, the UNCITRAL does not cover the capacity of contractors or the nature 
or degree of interest that the potential contractor must have in order to be able to challenge 
procurement actions. It left these issues to be dealt with in accordance with the legal and 
administrative structure of the enacting members.767  
Regarding the EU procurement regime, “member States shall ensure that the review 
procedures are available, under detailed rules which the Member States may establish, at least to 
any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been 
or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement.”768 The Remedies Directives do not provide 
for detailed procedures defining who may challenge procurement decisions and the meaning of 
interest. They left that to the member states to establish who has standing according to their 
domestic legal and administrative traditions.769  
However, member states do not have unfettered discretion to determine strictly who has 
standing and what interest is for the purposes of implementing the Remedies Directives. The 
discretion of the members is always restricted by the general principles of speediness and 
effectiveness.770 The application of these general principles provides effective methods for 
limiting the discretion of member states even in those areas that the Directives grant a 
considerable degree of discretion to the states.771   
766 Id. 
767 Id. 
768 See both EU Remedies Directives, 89/665/EEC, supra note 38, and 92/13/EEC, supra note 462,  Art. 1(3). 
769 Sue Arrowsmith, The Past And Future Evolution Of EC Procurement Law: From Framework To 
common Code?, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 337, 376 (2006). 
770 Id., at 377. 
771 Id. 
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2.11.7 Third Parties or Specific Agencies as Interested Parties  
 One of the fundamental questions in establishing a bid protest system is limitation on the 
right to challenge contracting agencies’ decisions.772 Allowing only the bidder that claims it 
should have received the contract seems in the first place reasonable.773 Nevertheless, this 
limitation allows only contractors to challenge decisions of contracting agencies. The limitation 
in Iraq is stricter as it allows only contractors who submitted bids to challenge procurement 
decisions, but not all contractors that might have an interest in the procurement that involve 
illegal acts. This approach is problematic because if the agency decides to conduct a contract on 
the sole source basis, no contractors except the one who has been selected has the right to 
challenge procurement-related decisions.   
On the other hand, the purpose of bid protest is to protect the integrity of the procurement 
system and holding agencies accountable for their actions.774 If that is the case, one might argue 
that allowing anyone who alleges that the agency acted improperly should be taken into 
consideration whether it be a potential contractor or subcontractor, a trade union, a member of 
the press, a legislator, or a civil servant.775 Yet, opening the door for anyone to protest the 
decisions of the contracting agencies delays the procurement process because resolving a protest 
takes time.  
This dissertation suggests that there is not a single solution that fits all countries with 
respect to the limitations that should be in place or to what extent standing should include 
various elements from the business environment, the media, or the public. The expansion or 
limitation of the right to protest should be determined according to the administrative and 
772 See Gorden, supra note 529, at 436. 
773 Id.. 
774 Id. 
775 Id. 
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judicial traditions and the level of integrity of the procurement system in a particular state. 
However, it seems logical that developing countries reduce the limitation on standing to include 
parties other than contractors. Interestingly, many developed countries allow certain institutions 
to challenge the decisions of contracting agencies. The nature and type of these bodies vary from 
one jurisdiction to another. For example, the Chambers of Commerce in Austria may initiate a 
challenge before the Control Commission, and trade organizations and public bodies listed to the 
Annex of the Complaints Board in Denmark may initiate a challenge without showing a specific 
legal interest.776 Austria and Denmark are among the most transparent governments under the 
CPI issued by the TI.777 
In Morocco, the General Federation of Moroccan Business may initiate the challenge on 
behalf of companies or bidders that are unsatisfied with the decision of the contracting agency, 
but that cannot initiate a challenge because of fear of retaliation by the agency.778 Thus, the 
identity of the bidder challenging a procurement-related action is not disclosed to the agency that 
issued the decision.779 Again, the major purpose behind broadening or expanding standing is 
mostly increased oversight over the actions of contracting agencies with respect to public 
procurement.  
This dissertation suggests that this method be introduced to the bid protest system in Iraq. 
Several reasons justify such an approach. First, the level of corruption in Iraq is one of the 
highest among all countries of the globe,780 and one of the most vulnerable sectors to corruption 
776 Bovis, supra note 18, at 484 & 492. 
777 Transparency international, supra note 27. 
778 OECD, supra note 8, at 158. 
779 Id.. 
780 See the Transparency International, supra note 27. 
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is public procurement.781 Second, retaliation from an offeror that challenges the decision of 
contracting agencies is quite common, especially through blacklisting.782 Third, many officials 
perceive their position as a personal sinecure. They view any challenge from bidders or 
individuals as an attack on them personally.  
Fourth, the culture of suing or complaining about the actions of government by bidders or 
even by individuals for one’s rights is not widespread. People typically prefer to resolve their 
disputes through informal means such as mediation or through social and religious traditions. 
The length, complexity, and cost of formal mechanisms for resolving disputes are among the 
reasons that people prefer not to utilize them. Fifth, the reputation of the effectiveness of formal 
dispute resolutions, whether administrative or judicial, is not quite impressive in the eye of the 
public, especially administrative processes.  
In the Iraqi context, several questions arise. As in the Moroccan example, should some 
agency be allowed to bring complaints that challenge the decisions of contracting agencies? 
Would this potential agency be allowed to intervene when a bidder seeks assistance or it is to be 
empowered to challenge every procurement decisions on behalf of the public? Considering the 
practical and cultural issues mentioned above accompanying a challenge to government 
decisions, the dissertation suggests that empowering an ant-corruption agency as an interested 
party might help reduce the rampant corruption. There are agencies in Iraq that have gained 
experience in the fight against corruption.   
There are several watchdog agencies in Iraq under the anti-corruption system including 
the Integrity Commission (IC), the Board of Supreme Audit (BSA), and the Inspectors General 
781 OECD, supra note 3, at 9. 
782 OECD, supra note 8, at 158. 
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(IG).783 Such agencies could act on behalf of complainants in order to avoid the deterrence of 
retaliation on challenging decisions of procuring agencies. The best agency among those 
mentioned to be given the status of interested party in contract-award controversies is the CPI. 
The CPI is the major anti-corruption agency with general jurisdiction to investigate corrupt 
practices in the actions of the government of Iraq.  
The IC should be allowed to challenge the decisions of contracting agencies on behalf of 
the public and contractors. The public has a large stake in the integrity of the public procurement 
system. In addition, fighting corruption in public institutions is the major duty of the IC and it is 
granted significant investigative powers to conduct such duty. If contractors and members of the 
public are aware of corruption in a public contract, they might not have the courage to reveal that 
formally, but they could seek to inform the IC anonymously about that potential corruption.784 
2.12.1 The Time Limit for Filing Protests by Protesters and the Resolution of Them by 
Review Forums 
 A timely resolution of the bid protest is an essential element of an effective bid protest 
system whether it be agency-level, independent administrative review, or judicial forum.785 
Although all regional and international procurement agreements leave many details of the rules 
of bid protests to the domestic legal jurisdictions of the members, they all have specific 
provisions for the regulation of the time limit. Under the WTO/GPA, “each party shall provide 
non-discriminatory, timely, and effective procedures.”786 The EU Remedies Directives requires 
that member states shall ensure that the decision of contracting agencies “may be reviewed 
783 CPA Order 55, supra note 33 and Order 77, supra note 432. See also Coalition Provisional Authority: Iraqi 
Inspectors General, 57, CPA/ORD/5 February 2004/57, available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040212_CPAORD57.pdf.  
784 Order 55, supra note 5 Sec. 4. 
785 Supra note 95, at 122. 
786 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX.2. 
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effectively and as rapidly as possible…”787 still, timely and as rapidly as possible are at best 
ambiguous, especially as there are different views among those involved in the procurement 
activities about the time limit according to their interests.  
 The most important time limits in the bid protest procedures are the time period for filing 
a bid protest and the time that the review body has to issue a decision on the protest.788 Timely 
resolution is important because the contract will be awarded and the contractor will start working 
quickly following the conclusion of the contract, making it difficult to correct the breach once 
the review forum has heard the case.789 What constitutes timeliness varies considerably from 
country to country and the types of forums available even in a single jurisdiction. There are 
significant consequences, advantages and disadvantages, to a long time period for filing a 
protest.790 The advantage of a generous time limit is that it provides contractors with more time 
to prepare and submit their protests.791 In contrast, if the time limit is strict or short, significant 
procurement violations might escape scrutiny so that the transparency and accountability of the 
system are compromised.792  
 Protesters generally prefer generous time limit, but this generosity also has costs.793 
Protests delay the award of the protested contract, adding a cost to the contracting agency.794 In 
addition, expanding the time limit by allowing protests to be filed months after a bidder is aware 
of defects extends the disruption that protests inevitably bring.795 On the other hand, short time 
limits may damage protesters because preparing a protest consumes considerable amount of time 
787 See EU Remedies Directive 89/665/EEC, supra note 38, Art. 1.(1). 
788 See Gorden, supra note 529, at 437. 
789 See Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 761. 
790 See Gorden, supra note 529, at 437. 
791 Id. 
792 Id. 
793 Id. 
794 Id. 
795 Id. 
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especially when the contract in question is complicated. Thus, protesters might need more time 
to file an effective protest.  
2.12.2 Time Limit for Filing a Bid Protest  
 Generally speaking, jurisdictions specify the time limit for submitting a protest. Order 87 
requires the IAT to rule on the protest within the shortest period of time practicable.796 However, 
the Order does not specify what constitutes the shortest period of time, leaving that to the 
IRGC.797 The IRGC requires the unsatisfied bidder to submit its protest to the CRC within 7 
working days from the date of issuance of the award decision and notification of such a decision 
by the agency to contractors concerned.798   
This provision might cause problems in terms of when the limitations period starts to run. 
There could be several various start dates of the deadline because the time limit starts from the 
moment the contractor receives the award-decision notification. Except for sole source 
contracting, public contracting always includes tens of bidders, as in public tendering method, or 
at least several bidders, as in restricted tendering procedures. Since the use of electronic means is 
very limited in Iraq and the presence of controversies about the legal effect of electronic 
communications is still an issue, it is possible that contractors will not receive the award 
notification at the same time. Proving when such a decision was received can also be quite 
problematic in Iraq. 
Furthermore, since filing a protest to the CRC is mandatory, the failure to file with the 
CRC within the time period prohibits the unsatisfied bidder from accessing the judicial forum. If 
there is no protest within the 7 working days, the agency may start executing the contract. When 
796 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(a)(ii). 
797 Id., Sec. 12 (1)(e). 
798 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (2).  
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the contract is concluded, the remedies for a procurement violation would be limited to damages 
in the form of bid preparation costs. Thus, a meritorious protest might not get the chance to be 
checked by the IAT, a judicial forum, which has a stronger independence status than the CRC.  
On the other hand, the excuse of receiving the notification of the award decision after the 
time limit has passed can easily be used by unsatisfied bidders as a trick to delay the conclusion 
of public contracts. It is not difficult for a contractor to deny that the notification has reached its 
office in the absence of an effective electronic means or delivery verification by postal services 
or by the Agency Postman. Thus, the consequences of running the time limit from the date the 
contractor receives the agency’s decision will dramatically affect the predictability of the public 
procurement process.            
The solution for this problem is to remove the requirement that the commencement of the 
deadline from the time the contractor receives the award notification with the extension of the 
deadline as discussed below. According to this solution, the running of the time limit should start 
from the time the agency issues the award decision provided that the contracting agency ensures 
that the contractors receive the notification through electronic means and the postal services. The 
IRGC can also require confirmation from bidders that they have received the award notification.  
However, this solution could create problems considering the difficulties associated with 
communication between contractors and government agencies. Regardless of the reality of this 
concern, contractors have an interest in potential procurement activities that is sufficient for them 
to follow the award decision attentively. In addition, this approach has the advantage of 
strengthening the use of electronic means through which agencies and contractors can ensure 
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they have effective communications. This proposed solution also provides some predictability in 
terms of the running of the time limit.  
With respect to the IAT, since the agency-level or protesting to the CRC is  mandatory, 
protesters unsatisfied with the decision of the CRC must submit their protest to the IAT within 7 
working days from the date the head of the relevant agency approves or rejects the 
recommendation of the CRC. The deadline here will not start running from the date the 
contractor receives the decision of the head of the agency that rejects the recommendation of the 
CRC. Instead, it starts from the date the agency head issues the decision. Consequently, 
contractors must ensure they know when the head of the agency issued the decision. In two 
decisions, the IAT rejected protests because they were submitted after the seven working days 
required for filing a protest and the FSC sustained it.799    
 The dissertation suggests that 7 working days is not a sufficient time for preparing a 
protest by the unsatisfied bidder, especially if the tender procedures are for a complicated 
contract. In addition, protesting to the contracting agencies and the IAT in this current form is 
new to Iraqi contractors that have poor experience with the bid protest process. Finally, since the 
agency-level is compulsory and centralized, except for contracting activities of provincial 
councils, protesters likely lose precious time in traveling to reach the CRC. It is suggested that 
15-20 days is a much better choice than 7 working days considering the functionality of the 
public procurement process in Iraq and the potential difficulties of life there. 
 Another solution would be to allow some exception to accept protests submitted after the 
deadline considering some issues that are not the fault of the contractors or when the protest 
799 See Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 107-109. 
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raises corruption issues. Such an exception should be very limited and strictly applied. The US 
system might provide another solution which is also an exception from the general time limit 
requirement. Contracting agencies can still accept a protest that has been filed after the 10 days 
specified has passed for good cause shown or where the protest raises issues significant to the 
agency’s acquisition system.800 Again the terms good cause shown and the protest raises issues 
significant to the agency’s acquisition system are too broad, especially in Iraq’s positivist system.  
 Besides the time limit of submitting a bid protest to the CRCs and the IAT, there are 
other time limits according to the IRGC and the Iraqi CPL. Under the IRGC, decisions of the 
IAT is subject to appeal before the FSC within 30 days from the notification date of the IAT 
decision.801 On the other hand, there is another appeal according to the CPL which is known as 
the rectification of the cassation decision.802 Under this procedure, the decisions of the Cassation 
Court and the Appellate Court acting as Cassation Court cannot be appealed except through the 
procedures of the rectification of the cassation decision before the court that issued the decision 
intended to be rectified.803  
Rectification of an appealed decision is only allowed when: (1) there is a legal reason that 
affects the approval or rejection of the decision, but the court failed to examine it in its initial 
decision; (2) the appealed decision expressly contradicts a provision of law; (3) the appealed 
decision contradicts itself in some of its parts or a previous decision of the Cassation Court 
issued in the same case without any change in the parties involved.804 However, the rectifying 
800 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1682. 
801 IRGC, supra note 97, Art, 10 (5). 
802 See the CPL, supra note 653, Art. 219-223. 
803 Id., Art. 219(a). 
804 Id. 
168 
 
                                                          
 
 
court may not examine legal issues other than those requested by the party seeking the 
rectification in its complaint.805  
The request for rectification is only accepted once from one of the parties and there is no 
rectification available for a decision issued on a previous rectification request.806 More 
importantly, the time limit for filing a rectification request is seven days following the 
notification date of the appellate decision.807 In all other cases the time limit lapses after six 
months from the date the decision intended to be rectified has been issued.808 Request for 
rectification is common, with approximately 25% of the decisions of the FSC are subject to the 
rectification procedures.809 These figures demonstrate that rectification requests under the Iraqi 
CPL increase the delay of the procurement process.    
In some jurisdictions and under some agreements, the time limit starts running not from 
the date the agency issued the award decision or the date the contractor receives the decision, but 
it relies on the knowledge of the protester of the problem. Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
the protester is required to file a protest in 20 days of when the supplier became aware of the 
violation or defect giving rise to the complaint or of when the contractor should have become 
aware of those violations, whichever is earlier.810  
The WTO/GPA and the EU procurement regime leave the details of the time limit to the 
member states to specify. The WTO/GPA states that the time limit may specify the time from 
when the protester is aware or should have been aware of the basis of the complaint, but the time 
805 Id., Art. 219 (b). 
806 Id., Art. 220. 
807 Id., Art. 221. 
808 Id. 
809 See supra note 565. 
810 See Uncitral Model Law (1994), supra note 39, Art. 53 (2). 
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limit should not be less than 10 days.811 The US system takes a similar approach as “protests on 
any other ground, other than protests against solicitation terms, are required to be filed at GAO 
within ten calendar days after the basis of the protest is known or should have been known, 
whichever is earlier.”812 In addition, there is a different time limit in the US for filing pre-award 
protests or protests challenging the terms of a solicitation. Protests that challenge alleged 
improprieties in a solicitation must be submitted before the bid opening or the closing date for 
receipt of proposals.813 
In contrast to the UNCITRAL Model Law and the WTO/GPA, the EU Directives take an 
approach similar to the IRGC. The EU regime requires that the protest be filed before the expiry 
of the time specified by a member.814 However, it requires that this time limit not be less than 10 
calendar days from the date on which the decision of the contracting agency is sent to the 
contractor if fax or electronic means are used.815 If other means of communications are used, the 
time limit must not be less than 15 calendar days or 10 days from the date the contractor receives 
the decisions of the contracting agency.816  
2.12.3 Time Limit for Resolving a Protest by the Review Bodies 
 There are also two other important deadlines other than those related to filing a protest. 
They are the time limit under which the CRC and the IAT must make a decision on the protest.  
Order 87 does not specify a time limit for the IAT except by stating that it should decide within 
the shortest period of time. Thus, the time limit is left to the IRGC.817 The time period for the 
811 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX. 5. 
812 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1705. 
813 Id., at 1682. 
814 EC Remedies Directives 89/655/EEC, supra note  38, Art 2©. 
815 Id. 
816 Id. 
817 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(a)(ii). 
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CRC to make a recommendation on the protest is 15 days from the time the protest has been 
submitted to the contracting agency.818 The head of the agency is also required to make a 
decision whether approving or rejecting the recommendation of the CRC in seven days.819 It is 
not clear when the seven-day time limit starts running.  
There should be some clarification regarding the start date of the time limit for the head 
of the agency to decide on the recommendation of the CRC, otherwise bidders will be confused. 
It can mean that it starts from the date the CRC issues its recommendation or it can mean it starts 
from the date the head of the agency receives the recommendation of the CRC. Furthermore, in 
case the head of the agency fails to make a decision on the CRC recommendation, the IRGC 
states that this failure is tantamount to a rejection of the recommendation.820 The IRGC was right 
in providing for the presumption of rejection of the CRC recommendation by the head of the 
agency in case of no decision in 7 days.  
After the passage of the seven days, the unsatisfied bidder may start filing the protest 
before the IAT without waiting for the decision of the head of the agency. If there were not such 
a presumption, the bidders could have had to wait a long time as it is usually not possible to 
receive a decision by heads of agencies in such a short time period. In a centralized system, 
heads of agencies are overwhelmed by thousands of petitions from individuals and affiliated 
agencies. Getting a response form the agency heads takes, at least, more than a month or, 
sometimes, up to 3-4 months.  The case works confirms such delay in obtaining a decision from 
agency heads.  
818 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (1)(b). 
819 Id. 
820 Id. 
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In one decision by the IAT, the contracting agency announced in a tender solicitation that 
the offer of the agency is valid for three months after 04/26/2010, which was the tender closing 
date.821 The protester in this procurement won the award, but refused to sign the contract because 
the approval of the award reached it on 09/21/2010 or after the validity of the offer.822 Although 
the Evaluation Committee evaluates tenders and determines winning contractors, the approval of 
the award decision is solely in the hand of the agency head. The agency tried to make the 
protester agree to sign the contract and imposed some penalties on it such as blacklisting.823 The 
protester filed a complaint in order to get a decision declaring that the award was not 
enforceable.  
In this case, the head of the agency approved the award recommendation on 09/21/2010 
whereas the Evaluation Committee issued its recommendation on 05/30/2010.824  Accordingly, 
the approval of the Minister of Industry and Minerals took three months and 22 days to reach the 
Ministry’s subdivision. The agency argued that getting the approval of the heads of agencies on 
the recommendations of the Evaluation Committee is common and the protester should have 
known that.825 However, the court disagreed with the contracting agency and declared the award 
decision void.826 Obviously, this presumption provided by the IRGC encourages the head of the 
agency to make a decision sooner.  
The IAT is required to make a decision on the protest no later than 120 days starting from 
the time the complaint is registered and the appropriate fees paid.827 The 120-day time limit is 
821 See Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 20. 
822 Id., at 21. 
823 Id., at 20. 
824 Id., at 21. 
825 Id. 
826 Id., at 22. 
827 The IRGC, supra note 97, at Art. 10 (4). 
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reasonable for a protest decision to be made in a judicial forum because generally judicial 
resolution is lengthy and can take more than a year in some countries. However, even 120 days is 
a little long considering the consequence of the suspension of the award and conclusion of the 
procurement required by Order 87 while a protest is in progress.828 The following chapters will 
consider the suspension of the award in detail. 
The decisions of the IAT are reviewable, according to the IRGC, before the Federal 
Supreme Court. There is no time limit according to the CPL for the FSC to issue its decision. In 
other words, contractors and procuring agencies might face more delay in case an unsatisfied 
bidder appeals the decision of the IAT. In fact, the numbers demonstrate that appealing the 
decisions of the IAT is very common in procurement complaints. From the 41 cases available to 
this author, 28 of them have been appealed to the FSC which is approximately 70% of the IAT’s 
decisions.829 
2.12.4 The Time Period Needed in Total for Bid-Protest Resolution 
 This dissertation demonstrates the actual length that resolving a bid protest takes from the 
point the unsatisfied bidder files the protest to the agency, or the CRCs, through the appeal 
process. The majority of the cases available do not provide clearly all the dates for filing a 
protest to the CRC, the date the CRC made its decision, the date the protester registered its 
complaint to the IAT, or the date the FSC received the appellate petition. Still, it is possible to 
estimate based on the time of the cases that do mention such dates. In addition, the estimate is 
also based on the time limit required by the IRGC for filing and resolving a protest. Obviously, 
828 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(b). 
829 See Ibrahim, supra note 565.  
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this does not mean that all protests require the same time period for resolution in the various 
forums. However, it does provide a clearer illustration of the length of a bid protest process.  
 The cases available for review involve only the decisions of the IAT and sometimes the 
FSC. Decisions of the CRCs resolving protests are not available. The cases examined for the 
purpose of this section are those that mention most of the relevant dates. Most of the times, the 
Courts, the IAT and the FSC, do not determine the exact dates the protester filed its complaint. 
However, it is easy to specify approximate date on which, for example, the protest was filed or 
the forums issued their decisions because there is a time limit for every procedure and the court 
states in the decisions that the complaint has been filed within the specified deadline.  
 In one of the cases, the agency issued the award decision on 09/21/2010, but there is no 
indication of the date of filing the protest by the bidder to the CRC.830 The CRC, according to the 
IAT case, issued its decision on 12/06/2010.831 The decision does not mention the date the 
protester filed the complaint to the IAT, but it states that the protester filed within the time limit, 
which is seven days from the date the head of the agency issued its decision on the 
recommendation of the CRC. Otherwise the protest would have been rejected by the IAT. For 
the sake of the analysis, it is assumed that the protester filed its complaint to the IAT on 
12/13/2010.  
The IAT has 120 days to resolve the protest, but in this case the decision was made on 
02/02/2011, less than two months.832 Then the protester filed an appellate petition to the FSC.833 
Although the FSC does not mention in its decision the date on which the protester filed its 
830 Id., at 21. 
831 Id., at 20. 
832 Id., at 23. 
833 Id. 
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appellate petition, it does state that the petition has been submitted within the time limit.834 The 
time limit for submitting the appellate petition is 30 days from the date the IAT issued its 
decision and the parties has been notified of that decision. It can beassumed again that the 
protester filed the petition on 03/01/2011. Considering that the FSC issued its decision on 
03/27/2011,835 the overall time period of the resolution of this bid protest took more than six 
months. 
In another case, the unsatisfied bidder filed a protest to the CRC on 02/21/2011 
challenging an award decision of an agency.836 Again, the case does not specify the date of the 
award decision. The protester has to file its protest within 7 working days from the date the 
award decision has been issued and communicated to the parties. Accordingly, the date the 
agency issued the award decision, was no later than 02/14/2011. The head of the agency failed to 
decide on the recommendation of the CRC within seven days.837 In such cases, the IRGC 
provides for a presumption of rejection by the agency head.  
Since the protest was presumed rejected by the provision of law, the protester then sought 
review from the IAT.838 The IAT does not typically mention the date of filing the complaint, but 
it always determines the date it has issued a decision on the protest, which was 04/13/2011 in this 
case.839 Finally, the bidder appealed the decision of the IAT and the FSC, which issued its 
decision on the appeal on 05/15/2011.840 Thus, working backwards, the contracting agency 
issued the award decision on 02/14/2011, and the protest was resolved on 05/15/2011. The 
834 Id. 
835 Id. 
836 Id., at 43. 
837 Id. 
838 Id. 
839 Id., at 44. 
840 Id., at 45. 
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protest resolution, in this case, took much shorter time, to be settled, approximately three 
months.  
On the other hand, the majority of the cases take much more than three months to be 
settled. There are cases that took from nine months to one year to be resolved. For instance, in 
one of the cases, the protest resolution took approximately six months,841 and in another the 
resolution took approximately nine months.842 The protest resolution in one of the cases reached 
all the various forums and appeals and took approximately one year to be settled.843 Other than 
the first appeal, there is a second appeal available, the Rectification of the Appellate decision 
mentioned above. As a result, it can be concluded that the average time period necessary to 
resolve a protest is from four to seven months. This period is long considering the delicacy of the 
public procurement process especially budget issues.                    
2.13 Standards of Review and the Enforcement of the Decisions of Review Bodies 
 Under Order 87, the standards of review varies according to whether the protest 
challenges the terms of a solicitation, pre-award protests, or whether it challenges the award 
decision, post-award protests. The standard for pre-award protests is whether the terms of a 
solicitation “unfairly restrict full and open competition in a manner that inappropriately excludes 
it from competing.”844 However, there is no guidance with respect either to what is unfair, or 
what is inappropriate.  Full and open competition is defined as contracting through the open 
tendering procedures as a general rule and, as an exception, provided that certain restrictions 
applied, through other restricted tendering.845 More importantly, the burden of proof is always on 
841 Id., at 47-50. 
842 Id., at 56-60. 
843 Id., at 69-72. 
844 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec, 12 (1)(a). 
845 Id., Sec. 4. 
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the protester to show that a particular method of contracting restricts unfairly open and full 
competition, although it is not mentioned in the Order because this issue is subject to the Iraqi 
Evidence Law (IEL).846  
For instance, when a contracting agency decides to award a contract through a restricted 
contracting method, such a decision is more vulnerable to be reversed than a decision to award a 
contract using public tendering. The burden of proof in this case would be easier for a protester 
to show that awarding contract through restricted procedures prevents full and open competition. 
Unfair can mean using restricted tendering that exclude automatically several contractors from 
competition. Unfair restriction of competition can occur when a contracting agency crafts the 
provisions of an open tender that is in favor of certain major bidders through requiring specific 
standards that can be found only in the products of those favored bidders. Although the 
contracting agency uses public tendering, which Order 87 considers as providing full and open 
competition, it restricts the competition through other means. Thus, the provisions of a tender 
may be unfair if they inappropriately excluded some bidders from competition. Moreover, it is 
still necessary for the issuance of standards on this issue by the IAT or the IRGC. 
With respect to post-award protests, the standard is that a potential protester “has not 
received fair treatment in the award of a government public contract.”847 Again the meaning of 
fair treatment is not clear and there is no guidance from the IAT or the IRGC explaining what 
constitutes fair treatment. This broadness might be seen useful from the perspective of the 
protester, but is a problem from the perspective of the contracting agencies or the awardees. 
846 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(6), and see The Evidence Law No. 107 (1979) of Iraq, Art 7, which states that 
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.  
847 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(a). 
177 
 
                                                          
 
 
Thus, there should be some judicial principles that explain these terms in order to provide for 
more certainty to the procurement process.     
Again the US experience is illuminating in determining the standards of review, though 
obviously US cases do not have a binding effect on the Iraqi courts. The standard of review of 
the agency-level is whether “a solicitation, proposed award, or award complies with the 
requirements of law and regulation.”848 This standard is not broad enough because the agency 
should also consider whether the actions of the contracting officer are reasonable. Thus, the latter 
standard has been developed by the GAO and the courts.849  
Indeed, the standard of review by the GAO is similar to the agency-level bid protest 
mechanism. “The protester must show that the contracting agency has prejudicially violated a 
statute or regulation or has taken a discretionary action without a rational basis.”850 The GAO, 
however, grants agencies considerable discretion in applying rational basis.851 The GAO in one 
of its decision stated that where “the Request for Proposal (RFP) provides that technical 
considerations will be more important than cost, source selection officials have broad discretion 
in determining the manner in which they will make use of the technical and cost evaluation 
results.”852 In another decision it allowed the “award to higher-priced offeror in order to obtain 
better staffing and lower risk of poor performance.”853 
848 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1686. 
849 Id. 
850 Id., at 1732. 
851 Id. 
852 Id., at 1732 & 1733. 
853 Id., at 1733. 
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Similarly, the standard of review of the COFC is provided by 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A),854 
which states that “the court shall set aside the agency action if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”855 Under this standard, an award may be 
set aside “if either (1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis, making it 
arbitrary or capricious, or (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of statute or 
regulation.”856 Of course, “the arbitrary and capricious standard is highly deferential.”857 
Examples of arbitrary and capricious decisions include where the government acts in bad 
faith or the decision of the contracting agency lacks a rational basis. To prove bad faith, the court 
requires the protester to show that “the agency acted with specific intent to injure it.”858 On the 
other hand, in a claim that agency decision is irrational, “the court will determine whether the 
contracting agency provided a coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion, 
and the bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no rational basis.”859  
Another test that is applied by both the GAO and the COFC is the prejudice test. 
According to this test, “the protester must establish that but for the agency’s action, it would 
have had a substantial chance of receiving the award.”860 In one decision, the GAO stated that 
“the protester did not demonstrate that it was prejudiced because the agency relaxed 
specifications for commercial flight services for one offeror.” The courts also applied the test as 
in Allied Tech. Group, Inc. v. United States,861 in which the court stated “assigning higher 
854 Id. at 1784. 
855 Supra note 706, at 208. 
856 Id., at 209, and see Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1784. 
857 Supra note 706, at 208. 
858 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1784. 
859 Id., at 1785. 
860 Id., at 1735. 
861 Allied Tech. Group, Inc. v. United States,  92 Fed. CI. 226 (2010). 
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technical rating would not have affected award as evaluated price was at least 218% higher than 
awardee’s.”862 
The arbitrary and capricious and the violation of law and regulation standards both exist 
in the general principles of administrative law of countries following the French legal traditions, 
including Iraq. Article 7 of the CSL determines the bases of challenging an administrative 
decision by affected persons, natural or legal. It identifies a broad range of issues that include 
whether an administrative decision violates a law or regulation, contradicts the rules of 
competence, is defective in its form, procedures, subject, or includes an error in applying or 
interpreting a law and regulation or is arbitrary and capricious in exercising powers.863  
Thus, if the IAT applied Article 7 of the CSL in reviewing protests, the standard of 
review would be very broad. However, based on the numbers of cases available, it is not clear if 
it uses the same bases of challenging administrative decisions in the resolution of bid protests. 
Even if it does use these bases in the review process, it is hard to see that in the reasoning of the 
decisions of the IAT to know how the court interprets arbitrary and capricious. In fact poor 
reasoning is one of the subjects to be covered below. 
2.14 The Enforcement of the Decisions of the Review Bodies  
 Under the IRGC, the decisions of the CRC have no binding effect on the contracting 
agencies.864 It states that the CRC decisions on bid protests are recommendations subject to the 
approval of the head of the agency concerned.865 As seen above, CRCs are in every ministry, 
every provincial council, and the main offices of independent bodies. The heads of agencies are 
862 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1789. 
863 The CSL, supra note 634, at Art. 7 (5). 
864 The IRGC, supra note 97, at Art. 10 (1)(b). 
865 Id. 
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ministers, governors, and heads of independent bodies, unless there is delegation of the approval 
power to one of the lower-level officials or possibly to the CRC itself. Only the decisions of the 
heads of the agencies are binding on the contracting agencies. There are, however, no guidelines 
as to how the head of the agency should use his or her discretionary power to approve or reject 
the decisions of the CRCs. This approval power is nearly unfettered, allowing the head of the 
agency to reject or approve it seemingly at will. The dissertation suggests that it was a mistake 
for the IRCG to consider the decisions of the CRCs as mere recommendations. This mistake 
should be corrected by making the decisions of these review bodies binding on the agencies.  
There is no basis to grant the heads of the agencies the power to approve or reverse the 
decisions of the CRCs. The CRCs are presumably more knowledgeable of the details of the 
protest, and reviewing protests is their only specialization. In addition, the head of the agency 
might review the protest again in order to obtain some information about it, meaning that the 
protest is reviewed twice. Further, this step strengthens the centralization of power in the hand of 
heads of the agencies which is in contradiction to the spirit of Order 87. Moreover, the approval 
of the heads of the agencies should be eliminated since granting his/her this power increases the 
likelihood of corruption in a country such as Iraq. 
The approach of granting the status of recommendation to the decisions of review bodies 
is known in the public procurement systems. For instance, decisions of the GAO have no binding 
effect on the contracting agencies,866 as are decisions of the Review Body of the Hong Kong.867 
Yet, there is deterrence for contracting agencies not following the decisions of the GAO. The 
GAO prepares a report every year to Congress making a summary of each instance in which a 
866 Robert S. Metzger & Daniel A. Lyons, A Critical Reassessment Of The Gao Bid-Protest Mechanism,  
Wis. L. Rev. 1225, 1248 (2007). 
867 See Gao, supra note 96, at 250-254.  
181 
 
                                                          
 
 
federal agency did not fully implement the GAO’s recommendation.868 Consequently, agencies 
are encouraged voluntarily to follow GAO’s recommendation and there are only a few instances 
of contracting agencies not following its recommendations.869  
Of course, the decisions of the IAT are binding on the contracting agencies and every 
other party because the IAT is a court. This means that the IAT’s decision can be enforced by 
law on the parties in a bid protest. In some countries administrative review bodies’ decisions are 
also binding as they function like a tribunal or court.870 However, protesters cannot directly seek 
review from the IAT. They have to submit their protest first to the CRCs and only if they are not 
satisfied with the decision of the CRC can submit their protest to the IAT.871  
2.15 Conclusions 
2.15.1 One Size Fits All, Does not Work 
 One of the major problems the dissertation examines is the importance of the underlying 
procedures involved in the organization of public procurement. However, the role of the 
underlying procedures has not been properly addressed in the literature and practice of public 
procurement. It seems that the literature fails to make a reasonable distinction among various 
types of contracts and provide a different set of procedures to organize them according to the size 
of the contract, its importance and price. It is not logical that a contract with a monetary value of 
hundreds of millions of dollars and another contract with a relatively nominal value should be 
dealt with under the same set of procedures.  
868 31 U.S.C. §3554 (e)(2).   
869 Raymond M. Saunders & Patrick Butler, A Timely Reform: Impose Timeliness Rules For Filing Bid Protests At 
The Courtof Federal Claims, 39 Pub. Cont. L.J. 539, 555 (2010). 
870 Bovis, supra note 18, at 547-549. 
871 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10. 
182 
 
                                                          
 
 
 The importance of a contract is also very crucial, which is often related to the types of the 
services or goods to be procured by the agency. It is not logical to apply the same set of 
procurement rules to solicit for a security contract and another contract for buying furniture. Or 
between two types of contracts one is to provide foods for the entire nation, such as the Oil-For-
Food Program, and another is to purchase decoration for the New Year celebration. Another 
example could be the complexity or the time span of a specific contract as some contracts are 
extremely complex and others are long-term.  
 The point is to advocate for tightening oversight on the public procurement process 
especially in developing countries where the integrity of the procurement system suffers from 
serious problems. There are several safeguards under the current procurement system in Iraq to 
enhance the integrity of the procurement system. The existence of the bid protest mechanism, 
including both the agency-level (CRC) and the judicial forum (IAT), is the most prominent 
example to detect violation of laws and regulations.  
The purpose behind the full and open competition requirement is to give the opportunity 
to any bidder who wants to participate in getting a public contract and simultaneously prevent 
the agency from abusing their contracting power. There are also restrictions with respect to 
reducing the organizational conflict-of-interest. Furthermore, there are also other criminal and 
disciplinary actions against public officials who are involved in the procurement process in case 
of violation of law and regulations with respect to their duties as officials.  
There are still many gaps in the above oversight mechanisms that can facilitate corruption 
and abuse. First, the most fundamental problem is that these mechanisms do not function 
properly in a country like Iraq. For instance, the bid protest system is subject to several shortages 
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explained throughout this dissertation. The bid protest mechanism works when an unsatisfied 
contractor initiates a protest, but it is useless where contracts are awarded without competition 
through corrupt practices without any protest. Examples of such practices are when the 
contracting agency awards the contract on a sole source basis or when the provisions of a tender 
favor one of the bidders. None of these instances can be challenged under the current 
procurement system. In addition, bid protest is only accepted within a very short time, while 
allegations of corruption are typically revealed after a much longer time period. It does not also 
function when protesters are hesitant to challenge procurement-related decisions because of 
agency retaliation. Thus, if there is previous oversight, corrupt opportunities might be reduced 
and revealed beforehand.  
Full and open competition through public tendering is not a strong strategy to tackle 
corruption and irregularity of the procurement system because it is easy for the agency to use its 
discretion to avoid this method and utilize other more restrictive contracting methods such as 
direct invitation or sole source. On the other hand, the criminal and administrative measures 
available for disciplining public officials when they violate law and regulation are strict under 
the Iraqi law. However, the application is limited because accountability is weak and riddled 
with favoritism and intervention from politicians and senior officials. Thus, based on the above 
assessment, the dissertation suggests that there should be different procedures for important, 
high-value, and/or sensitive contracts. 
This dissertation suggests incorporating proportionality of procedures in awarding 
contracts depending on the complexity and importance of projects or goods that are to be 
procured. The best mechanism to serve that purpose is previous oversight for future contracts, 
especially for complex and high-value contracts. Previous oversight is a preventive measure to 
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avoid an illegal act or procurement defects before it happens. One of the most successful 
strategies of fighting corruption is preventive measures.872 Still complex questions arise, such as 
which agency or officials should perform the previous oversight mechanism, what kinds of 
contracts should be subject to such oversight, and what kinds of measures should be successfully 
designed to achieve previous oversight.  
This dissertation suggests that two Iraqi independent bodies are qualified to perform this 
oversight: the CPI and the BSA. These bodies are the pillars of the anti-corruption system in 
Iraq. The applicability of previous oversight to particular contracts should be determined by law 
or regulation. It can be determined based on price of the contract or whether the contract is 
related to health, security, food or any other categories that is touching the life and security of the 
public. The details of how the process functions can be decided by experts in the field of public 
procurement from inside and outside the country. Previous oversight is preferred because it is 
more difficult to recover from the impact of corruption or defects in an awarded contract than the 
one that is not concluded.  
 There is, however, a cost to the proposal of previous oversight. This special oversight is 
an extra restriction on the discretion of the contracting agencies. In addition, it increases delays 
in the contracting process which is already a major problem to many procurement systems 
especially in developing countries. It would be an intervention in the bureaucracy by two bodies 
that are related to the legislative branch. Finally, it might create other corrupt opportunities if the 
people involved in the exercise of the oversight were captured by bidders. These problems can be 
fixed through strong and strict requirements including time limit and more transparency 
872 The majority of anti-corruption conventions consider availability of preventive measures as a fundamental 
principle of fighting corruption, see, for example, the UNCAC dedicates the entire chapter II to preventive 
measures. In addition, see Article III of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. 
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measures in their work, though ultimately no anti-corruption system can eliminate the human 
tendency toward corruption.     
2.15.2 Non-Availability of Information with Respect to the Works of Bid Protest Forums 
and Poor Reasoning in Their Decisions 
 One of the major problems of the bid protest mechanisms in Iraq is their opacity. Under 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, decisions of the contracting agency and decisions of the 
administrative body, as the case may be, are to be made available for inspection to the general 
public.873 However, there is one restriction on the publication requirement, namely that “no 
information shall be disclosed if its disclosure would be contrary to law, would impede law 
enforcement, would not be in the public interest, would prejudice commercial interests of the 
parties or would inhibit fair competition.”874 Such restriction is to protect the interests of all 
parties including the public. 
 On the other hand, the GAO makes a copy of protest decisions available to the public, 
unless the decision contains protected information.875 Furthermore, even if the decision contains 
protected information, a version of the decision is made available provided that the protected 
information is omitted.876 According to the Freedom of Information Act,877 agencies in the US 
are required to allow the public to have access to government documents when certain conditions 
applied. Thus, there is a general obligation on government agencies to allow access to documents 
regarding their work. Bid protest decisions are also subject to statutory requirements of being 
accessed.       
873 The UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), supra note 39, Art 55(3). 
874 Id. 
875 United States Government Accountability Office: Bid Protest Regulations, 4 CFR § 21.12. 
876 Id. 
877 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
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Although there is a section of the MOP website dedicated to the OGPCP, there is little 
information with respect to bid protest decisions. At the time of the writing of this dissertation, 
there is no access to the decisions of the CRCs and the IAT. Neither Order 87 nor the IRGC 
requires publication of the work of the CRCs or the IAT. In fact, the culture of transparency has 
not yet developed in the administrative system of Iraq. The lack of availability of the decisions of 
both forums creates unpredictability, lack of transparency, and difficulty to evaluate their works 
by experts, academics, interested parties, or the general public. 
 Another problem with the few IAT decisions that are available is poor reasoning. 
Providing adequate reasoning is an obligation of the protest forums under many jurisdictions and 
the agreements covered in this dissertation. The UNCITRAL Model Law requires the contracting 
agency and the administrative body reviewing bid protests to issue their decisions in writing 
including the reasons for the decision.878 The WTO/GPA states that “a review body that is not a 
court shall be subject to judicial review or shall have procedures which provide that, including 
others, opinions or decisions are given in writing with a statement describing the basis for the 
opinions or decisions.”879   
Poor reasoning is not only a problem to the decisions of the IAT but is also a problem for 
all judicial decisions in the country. The vast majority of the decisions of the judicial bodies 
including the IAT are actually without reasoning. They usually state something like that “as the 
facts in this case are compatible with the legal requirements and meet the elements of the crime, 
the plaintiff is correct in her/his allegations.” Further, court decisions are usually a page or two in 
length as judges rarely elaborate or explain how they applied the law to the facts of the case.  
878 The UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), Art. 53(4). & Art 54(4). 
879 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX.(6)(e). 
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Thus, it is very difficult to comment on the judicial decisions and to evaluate whether the 
court was successful or not in applying the law because there is no analytical information in such 
decisions. In addition, there are many terms, principles, and phrases that are vague or ambiguous 
in Order 87 and the IRGC such as “interested party”, “direct economic interest”, and “unfair 
treatment.” Judicial forums are the only authoritative party that can interpret these terms and 
develop some guidance and tests to aid in their application.   
Perhaps most importantly, adequately stating the court’s reasoning allows bidder’s to 
change their behaviors by the following the laws and regulations. Such guidance would facilitate 
understanding of how the procurement process works. Issuing IAT decisions and providing 
adequate reasoning would help in developing the public procurement process because experts, 
academics, and legal professionals could comment on them and enhance ability of the IAT 
members to make better protest decisions.  
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Chapter Three 
3. Remedies Available to Unsatisfied Bidders under Iraqi Public Procurement Laws and 
Regulations 
3.1 Introduction 
 One of the fundamental elements of a successful bid protest system is the availability of 
adequate remedies for unsatisfied bidders when challenging the decisions of contracting 
agencies.880 If a bid protest to agencies’ decisions does not introduce meaningful relief, 
unsatisfied bidders are discouraged from coming forward to reveal improper or illegal activities 
related to the process of awarding public contracts.881 As a result, most the procurement systems 
recognize various types of remedies available to protesters where their claims are sustained in 
protest fora.882 However, the nature and type of remedies available to protesters differ from on 
jurisdiction to another according to their legal principles.  
 International and regional procurement agreements emphasize the importance of 
existence of meaningful remedies to unsatisfied bidders.883 The most important interim measure 
available to protesters is suspension of contract award procedures.884 Another common remedy is 
the existence of corrective actions, which consist of cancelling the award decision and requiring 
the agency to re-solicit the tender, or award the contract to the protester.885 In addition, protesters 
are entitled to other remedies in the form of monetary compensation including bid preparation or 
protest costs.886  
880 Supra note 95, at 123-124. 
881 Id., at 124. 
882 See for more information regarding relief available to unsatisfied bidders in the US, See Cibinic, supra note 515, 
Chapter XII, and for remedies available in many European countries see Bovis, supra note 18, Chapter 11.   
883 See the WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX, the UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), Art. 54-56, and EC Remedies 
Directives 89/665/EEC, supra note 38, and Directive 92/13/EEC, supra note 462.  
884 See Troff , supra note 95, at 123-124, and Bovis, supra note 18, at 504 & 526. 
885 Id. 
886 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1686, 1740, 1790, & 1794.  
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 The award of remedies has its own rules and restrictions according to public procurement 
laws and regulations. Accordingly, this chapter examines the remedies available to unsatisfied 
protesters under Order 87 and the IRGC. It deals with the requirements and restrictions 
according to which these remedies may be granted. It mostly concentrates on examining two 
major remedies, suspension of procurement procedures until the procurement is resolved and 
corrective actions, because other types of remedies are subject to other laws such as contract and 
trot law.  
The suspension of the procurement award procedures during the protest proceeding is one 
of the remedies that triggers strong criticisms.887 Delaying the procurement process and abuse of 
this measure by some protesters are the essence of these criticisms.888 On the other hand, the 
suspension remedy is considered as one of the crucial measures for the effectiveness of a bid 
protest system889 as it encourages unsatisfied bidders to challenge contracting agencies’ 
decisions. Thus, we examine the importance of these remedies and problems they create to the 
procurement system. 
3.2.1 Suspension of the Procurement Process 
 Order 87 states “upon the filing of a tender protest after award, the governmental unit or 
agency that awarded the public contract shall immediately order the awarded contractor to cease 
working on the contract.”890 The Order does not set forth any other requirements for suspension 
of the award procedures. Thus, the suspension, according to the Order, is automatic because it 
does not need a court order to obligate the contracting agency to issue an administrative decision 
requiring the contractor to cease working on the contract. Also, there are no other requirements 
887 See Gorden, supra note 529, at 441-442, Hunja, supra note 434, at 481, and  Gorden, supra note 288, at 501-503. 
888 See Gorden, supra note 288, at 493 & 501-503. 
889 Supra note 13, at 773. 
890 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(b). 
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that protesters must meet to be eligible for suspension. The moment a unsatisfied bidder files its 
protest, the contracting agency must order the suspension. It does not even require a petition 
from the protester to demand suspension from contracting agencies or review bodies.    
On the other hand, the IRGC also emphasizes the suspension measure by requiring 
agencies not to sign the contract until the bid protest is resolved.891 Nonetheless, it imposed a 
condition on unsatisfied bidders for suspending the conclusion of the contract.892 Under such 
condition, the contracting agency is required to suspend procurement procedures only when the 
protester submits a formal undertaking to pay the contracting agency all the damages occasioned 
by such suspension in case the protest is frivolous or unjustified.893 The IAT also applies this 
condition to protesters requesting suspension.894    
The IRGC should not have introduced such a discouraging condition. The intention of the 
designers of Order 87 was to maximize oversight over the procurement activities. Order 87 states 
in the preamble that availability of dispute resolution mechanisms is one of the main reasons for 
the promulgation of the Order.895 In addition, Order 87 opened the door for challenging even 
solicitation provisions of a tender issued by contracting agencies, which was not common under 
the previous procurement law.896 Although the OGPCP has the power, under Order 87, to issue 
regulations to facilitate enforcement of the Order,897 it does not have the authority to promulgate 
a provision that contradicts with the main purpose of the Order by minimizing oversight and 
deterring unsatisfied bidders to protest.    
891 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art, 10 (1)(c).  
892 Id. 
893 Id. 
894 See Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 43. 
895 Order 87, supra note 5, the Preamble. 
896 Id., Sec. 12 (1)(a). 
897 Id., Sec. 2 (1)(b)(i). 
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Suspension measures were introduced as an incentive for unsatisfied bidders to exercise 
their oversight right over procurement activities. However, the condition discourages protesters 
from challenging award decisions due to fear of potentially requiring payment of damages that 
can be considerable. Further, the language of the provision is vague because it is not clear who 
decides that a protest is frivolous or unjustified, not it is clear who decides the amount of the 
damage that the agency will incur. Is a protest considered frivolous merely by the fact that it has 
been rejected by the CRC or by the IAT? This condition may be used by contracting agencies to 
deter bidders from filing protests. Instead, the OGPCP may issue regulations that provide for 
imposing fines on contractors that abuse suspension measures.  
In a protest before the IAT, the protester requested the suspension of procurement 
procedures and the court stated that “the court unanimously agreed to award the suspension of 
the contract award procedures.”898 It seems that even the IAT does not understand that the 
suspension is automatic. Thus, it does not need a request from the protester and it does not need 
a court order to be awarded.899 The automatic suspension being a privilege provided for by 
operation of law, courts and contracting agencies should not make it pending their consent. 
Another explanation for making the suspension subject to the approval of the IAT might be that 
the Court intended to ensure that the protester pledged an appropriate formal undertaking 
required by the IRGC.900 Yet, as discussed previously, this condition is not legally justified.  
Order 87 does not establish the time period during which the suspension of the 
contracting process should continue. The IRGC, however, states that the suspension shall 
continue until the protest is resolved.901 The question arises as to how long it takes for a protest 
898 See Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 43. 
899 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(b). 
900 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (1)(c).  
901 Id. 
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to be resolved before both the CRCs and the IAT. The time period for resolving a bid protest 
including the appellate process varies, but the shortest period of time is three months and the 
longest is six months to a year.902 Accordingly, the suspension period might be long which is not 
desirable considering the disruption of services that occurs because of bid protests. 
Although Order 87 and the IRGC state that the contracting agency shall immediately 
cease working on the contract upon the filing of a protest, they do not specifically determine the 
time that the suspension should start. The commencement of the suspension period is important 
because contracting agencies and winning contractors usually act quickly after the award 
decision to conclude and start executing the contract.903 Further, a contracting agency might 
prepare for the conclusion of a contact without knowing that the award decision has been 
challenged. This scenario is expected in Iraq because contracting agencies are not authorized to 
receive bid protests.904 Instead, there are central review bodies, CRCs, which are housed in the 
main offices of ministries and non-cabinet agencies.905 Thus, delays can easily be anticipated 
before CRCs notify the contracting agency of a protest.  
Order 87 should have introduced a short period of time within which the contracting 
agency is required not to conclude the contract awaiting potential protests by unsatisfied bidders. 
Terminating a concluded contract is more difficult than canceling an award decision in case a 
protest is sustained. This dissertation emphasizes the use of electronic means for 
communications between the parties involved in procurement activities. Sending a notification of 
a protest to a relevant contracting agency might take several days if it is sent through regular 
902 See Chapter II of this dissertation at 164-167. 
903 See Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 761. 
904 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (1)(a). 
905 Id. 
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mail or the Agency Postman, while dispatching such notification is nearly instantaneous through 
electronic means. 
3.2.2 Suspension of Procurement Procedures under the US Procurement Law  
The US system provides for an automatic suspension only when a protest is brought to 
the GAO.906 Suspension provisions are provided to ensure that effective relief can be obtained by 
protesting contractors and to encourage competition in contracting.907 US law also differentiates 
between pre-award and post-award protests filed to the GAO respecting suspension.908 If a 
protest is filed before award, a contract may not be awarded after the agency’s receipt of the 
notification of protest from the GAO.909 On the other hand, if a protest is filed after award, the 
contracting agency must immediately direct the contractor to cease performance under the 
contract.910 Although the Iraqi procurement system designed after the US model as it allows pre-
award protests, Order 87 does not recognize this differentiation because it only covers the effect 
of post-award suspension, resulting in cessation of contract performance.911 
The GAO must notify the contracting agency of the filing of the protest in a specified 
time limit. The time limit starts running “on the date of contract award and ends on the later of 
(A) the day that is 10 [calendar] days after the date of the contract award; or (B) the date that is 5 
[calendar] days after the debriefing date offered to an unsuccessful offeror for any debriefing that 
906 See 31 U.S.C § 553 (c), which states that “except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a contract may 
not be awarded in any procurement after the Federal agency has received notice of a protest with respect to such 
procurement from the Comptroller General and while the protest is pending.” See for more information, Government 
Accountability Office Bid Protests: An Overview of Time Frames and Procedures, 10, available at, 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40228.pdf.   
907 See supra note 706, at 199. 
908 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1708. 
909 31 U.S.C § 553(c), supra note 906, see for more information, Michael J. Schaengold Et Al, Choice Of Forum For 
Federal Government Contract Bid Protests, 18 Fed. Circuit B.J. 243, 285 (2009). 
910 31 U.S.C. § 553 (d)(3), see also Schaengold, Id. 
911 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(b) states that “upon the filing of a tender protest after award, the 
governmental unit or agency that awarded the public contract shall immediately order the awarded contractor to 
cease working on the contract.” 
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is requested and, when requested, is required.”912 If the GAO fails to notify the agency of 
receiving a protest, the offeror’s right to suspension will be effectively abolished. In addition, 
contracting agencies are required to suspend procurement procedures only when they receive the 
notice of a protest from the GAO, meaning that notice by the protester does not trigger 
suspension.913            
If a unsatisfied contractor requests a suspension of procurement procedures before the 
COFC, the award of such suspension is subject to several conditions. The COFC uses the 
traditional four-part test required for injunctive relief in order to award suspension, which is not 
easy to be established.914 The COFC considers: (1) the protester’s likelihood of success on the 
merits of the case; (2) whether the contractor suffers irreparable harm if the court rejects 
injunctive relief; (3) whether the balance of hardships to the respective parties favors the grant of 
injunctive relief; (4) whether it is in the public interest to grant injunctive relief.915    
Similar to Iraqi law, the COFC may require a protester to furnish a bond to the court, 
which can be expensive and the protester might lose it if the protest is denied.916 Nevertheless, 
under Iraqi law, pledging a bond is a prerequisite to filing a bid protest and such a bond is 
submitted to the contracting agency not to the court.917 In addition, US law requires that the 
contracting agency suspend the procurement procedures on receipt of a notification of a protest 
from the GAO.918 Thus, it is the GAO’s obligation to ensure that the contracting agency receives 
the notice of a protest in a very short period of time.   
912 31 U.S.C. § 3553 (d)(4), see also Schaengold, supra note 909, at 285-286.  
913 31 U.S.C. § 3553 (c)(1), see Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1709. 
914 See Schaengold, supra note 909, at 310.  
915 Hydro Eng’g, Inc. v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 448 (1997), see alsoSchaengold, Id., at 310-311. 
916 SeeSchaengold, Id., at 311. 
917 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10(c). 
918 See Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1709. 
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In contrast, Order 87 and the IRGC are silent on the issue of notice. Yet, the notice of 
CRCs and the IAT to the contracting agency of the filing of a protest is hugely important. If the 
contracting agency is unaware of a protest, it might conclude the contract and limit the relief that 
a protester can obtain. Order 87 or the IRGC should thus have covered such notice and provided 
for a time limit for CRCs and the IAT to notify the agency in order to prevent unnecessary delay 
in the protest procedures. If CRCs and the IAT are given unspecified time to notify the 
contracting agency of a protest, they might not act as quickly as it is required under the principles 
of speedy resolution of bid protests.  
3.2.3 Suspension under the WTO/GPA, UNCITRAL, and the EC Remedies Directives  
 UNCITRAL also provides for a suspension of procurement procedures. Although it 
recognizes the importance of an automatic suspension, as it allows the settlement of disputes in 
non-judicial fora making the settlement more economical and efficient, granting such a 
suspension is subject to several conditions.919 First, the protest must not be frivolous.920 Second, 
it must contain a declaration by the protester demonstrating that he or she will suffer irreparable 
injury in the absence of suspension.921 Third, the likelihood of success of the protester in his or 
her claim is also considered.922 Fourth, the suspension should cause disproportionate harm to the 
procuring entity or to other contractors.923  
This approach, according to UNCITRAL, is designed to strike a balance between the 
right of the supplier to have the protest reviewed and the contracting agency to conclude a 
contract in an economic and efficient way without delay and disruption in the procurement 
919 See supra note 762, Art. 56(1). 
920 Id. 
921 Id. 
922 Id. 
923 Id. 
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process.924 Regarding the rejection of frivolous protests, UNCITRAL states that the reviewing 
body should have the power to look on the face of the complaint to reject such protests.925 With 
respect to the second requirements, UNCITRAL states that the declaration that is required is not 
intended to be adversarial or evidentiary.926 Instead, the protester merely needs to affirm the 
existence of certain circumstances that may cause him or her suffer irreparable injury.927 
In addition, UNCITRAL limits the suspension initially to seven days and allows an 
extension for up to 30 days.928 The head of the contracting agency, the approving authority, and 
the administrative body are allowed to extend the period of the suspension to 30 days in total.929 
UNCITRAL explains that the initial seven-day suspension is intended to allow the contracting 
agency or the administrative body reviewing the protest to assess the merits of the complaint and 
to determine whether an extension of the suspension is necessary.930 Further, UNCITRAL limits 
the disruption and delay resulting from bid protest through the 30-day cap on allowed 
suspension.931 
On the other hand, suspension of the procurement procedures under EU Directives is also 
available to unsatisfied protesters. Under the EC Remedies Directive for the Utilities Sector, 
member states shall include measures “to take, at the earliest opportunity and by way of 
interlocutory procedure, interim measures with the aim of correcting the alleged infringement or 
preventing further injury to the interests concerned, including measures to suspend or to ensure 
the suspension of the procedure for the award of a contract or the implementation of any decision 
924 Id., Art. 56(2). 
925 Id. 
926 Id. 
927 Id. 
928 Id., Art. 56 (2)&(3). 
929 Id., Art. 56(3). 
930 Id. 
931 Id. 
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taken by the contracting entity.”932 Nonetheless, such suspension is not automatic because the 
Directive allows the reviewing body to take into account the impacts of the suspension on the 
interests of all parties concerned including the public.933  
Thus, courts in most member states apply a balance-of-interests test according to which a 
protester seeking suspension may have to show that he will suffer irreparable and serious harm if 
interim measures are not granted.934 In addition, the harm must outweigh the damage which the 
suspension would cause both to the contracting agency and the public interest at large.935 Finally, 
the complainant might also be required to show that the damage or harm he is likely to suffer, if 
the interim measure is not granted, could not be adequately compensated through monetary 
damages.936 
The EU Remedies Directives also introduced a standstill period in which the contract 
may not be concluded following the award decision for at least 10 calendar days from the day 
following the date on which the award decision is sent to the tenderers and candidates 
concerned.937 If fax or electronic means are used or, if other means of communication are used, 
the standstill period is 15 calendar days following the date the award decision is communicated 
to the contractors concerned. Or the standstill period is 10 calendar days following the date of 
receipt of the contract award decision when electronic or other means used for 
communication.938 This mechanism is unique to the EC procurement regime compared to other 
international and regional agreements dealing with public procurement. The standstill period is 
important for contractors submitting tenders in the EC because in many European countries 
932 See EU Directive 92/13/EEC, supra note 462, Art. 2 (1)(a). 
933 Id., Art. 2(4), EU Directive 89/665/EEC, supra note 38, Art 2(4), and see for more information Bovis, supra note 
18, at 504. 
934 See Bovis, Id. 
935 Id. 
936 Id., at 504-505. 
937 See EU Directive 92/13/EEC, supra note 462, Art. 2(a)(2). 
938 Id. 
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when the contract is concluded there is no chance for a set aside of the award decision and the 
remedy in such cases is limited to monetary damages.     
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has examined the standstill period and suspension 
measures. Since the remedies available to unsatisfied bidders in many member states are limited 
to monetary damages after the contract is concluded, the ECJ took the view that the review 
mechanisms exist so that a bidder may have the chance to set aside an award decision before the 
conclusion of the contract.939 According to the ECJ, the legal systems of some member states 
make it impossible to set aside an award decision because the contract is concluded the moment 
the award decision is issued.940 In such legal systems, the occurrence of the award and 
conclusion at the same time deprive bidders from the cancellation of a defective award 
decision,941 making monetary damages the only remedy available to unsatisfied bidders after the 
conclusion of a contract,  
Accordingly, the ECJ states that “complete legal protection requires that it be possible for 
unsuccessful tenderers to examine in sufficient time the validity of the award decision.”942 Thus, 
a reasonable period of time must elapse between the time the contracting agency notifies 
unsuccessful offerors of the award decision and the conclusion of the contract in order to allow 
granting interim measures.943 In addition, the Court emphasized that complete legal protection 
also requires notifying offerors of the award decision.944 Requiring agencies to notify only the 
winning contractor of the award decision, as is the case in some member states, would decrease 
939 Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria, C-212/02 (2004), see also Bovis, supra note 
18, at 505. 
940 Id. 
941 Id. 
942 Id. 
943 Id. 
944 Id. 
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the possibility of challenging award decisions because unsuccessful contractors would not be 
aware of the award decision.945  
The ECJ interpreted the existence of such legislation that requires notifying only the 
winning contractor as a barrier to prevent the set aside or annulment of award decisions.946 Thus, 
the Court stated that the mere existence of a time lapse in which tenderers may take action 
against the award decision is not sufficient without having an obligation on contracting agencies 
to keep offerors informed of the award decision.947 The intention of the ECJ in this interpretation 
is the fact that one of the incentives for offerors to challenge award decisions is to obtain the 
tender or at least to have the award decision be set aside or annulled. However, when the contract 
is concluded, the remedy is limited to monetary damages. Accordingly, the court states that “the 
right of review for tenderers must be independent of the possibility for them to bring an action 
for damages once the contract has been concluded.”948  
The EC Remedies Directives do not deal with matters related to which court or 
independent body should have the jurisdiction to grant suspension. This jurisdictional matter is 
left to the legal system of the member states. In France either administrative courts or ordinary 
civil courts may decide on the application requesting suspension.949 This jurisdictional 
distinction depends on the difference between administrative contracts versus ordinary contracts. 
In other words, the application requesting interim measures with respect to an administrative 
contract before it is concluded must be submitted to the administrative court.950 The president of 
945 Id. 
946 Id. 
947 Id. 
948 Id. 
949 See Bovis, supra note 18, at 515-516. 
950 Id., at 515. 
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the administrative court has the power to issue some preventative measures including the 
suspension of procurement procedures.951  
After the contract is concluded, application for obtaining interim measures cannot be 
brought to the administrative court because it does not have the competence to decide on these 
issues.952 The party seeking suspension after the contract is signed must follow an expedited 
proceeding known as procédure en référé,953 which is similar to the summary judgment process 
in common-law systems. Generally speaking, the power of a court deciding en référé is limited 
to interim measures.954 However, under provisions implementing Directive 89/665, the court’s 
powers have been expanded to include the power to render an administrative act null and void.955 
The decisions of the juge des référés are provisional in nature and may be reversed by a court 
that the juge des référés is a member adjudicating the case on its merits.956 A judgment that has 
been rendered based on procédure en référé is final.957  
Under Order 87 and the IRGC, the contract is not concluded the moment the contracting 
agency issues the award decision, because according to the IRGC, the award decision must be 
approved by the head of the contracting agency.958 A bidder does not need to apply for 
suspension because it is automatic.959 More importantly, the conclusion of the contract does not 
prevent suspension because suspension also extends to the performance stage of the contract.960 
Order 87 is clear in stating that the contracting agency must order the contractor to cease working 
951 Id. 
952 Id. 
953 Id. 
954 Id. 
955 Id., at 515-516. 
956 Id., at 516. 
957 Id. 
958 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 7(19). 
959 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(b) which states that “upon a filing of a tender protest after award, the 
governmental unit or agency that awarded the public contract shall immediately order the awarded contractor to 
cease working on the contract.” 
960 Id. 
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on the contract when a protest is filed.961 Thus, contractors are saved from applying for 
suspension before reviewing bodies or ordinary civil courts.   
With respect to the WTO/GPA, it states that “challenge procedures shall provide for rapid 
interim measures to correct breaches of the Agreement and to preserve commercial 
opportunities, such action may result in suspension of the procurement process.”962 Granting 
suspension relies on several factors963 that are similar to the requirements for preliminary 
injunction under the US system. The first is the strength of the applicant’s case as it is not 
appropriate to order suspension for cases that do not have sufficient merits.964 For instance, the 
applicant might be required to show that the case is arguable and there is a likelihood of 
success.965  
Second, many countries require the applicant seeking suspension to demonstrate that 
irreparable damages will be suffered if suspension is not awarded.966 However, in many 
jurisdictions where the award of damages is sufficient to remedy the situation, no irreparable 
damage is suffered in the absence of suspension.967 Third, suspension sometimes is denied or 
granted after conducting a balance of interests by review bodies.968 The review body usually 
examines the adverse consequences of the suspension on the interests involved.969  
These interests can include; first, the disruption consequence of the suspension on the 
delivery of public services to third parties.970 For instance, the disruption can be significant as in 
961 Id. 
962 The WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX (7)(a). 
963 See Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 773. 
964 Id. 
965 Id. 
966 Id. 
967 Id. 
968 Id., at 774. 
969 Id. 
970 Id. 
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the case where the contract is for the construction of an urgently needed hospital.971 The interest 
might not be significant as in the case where the contract is for furnishing an office or building. 
In the former example suspension might not be granted as the delay might cause serious damages 
to the public, but in the latter example it is likely that suspension would be granted because 
public interest will not suffer significant damages. 
Second, the interests of other firms participating in the procurement activity are also 
considered in granting suspension.972 The interests of the winning contractor are seriously taken 
into account especially when it has started working on the contract.973 “The longer the 
proceedings take to complete, the greater will be the damage caused by suspension, and the 
greater the reluctance of the review body to order such a measure.”974 Considering these interests 
in granting suspension necessitates providing for an exception according to which contracting 
agencies are allowed to override suspension. 
Third, sometimes a review body may require that an undertaking be pledged by the 
applicant seeking suspension to pay any damage that may result in the suspension in case the 
applicant loses the protest.975 In the field of public procurement, this undertaking means that the 
protester will compensate the contracting agency for any losses suffered because of a delay 
resulting from the suspension.976 This undertaking represents a significant deterrence to 
protesters seeking suspension.977 These conditions that are required to grant suspension are not 
mentioned in the WTO/GPA specifically because regional and international agreements leave 
these details to the legal systems of member states. 
971 Id. 
972 Id. 
973 Id. 
974 Id. 
975 Id. 
976 Id., ar 774-775. 
977 Id., at 775. 
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3.3 Exception to the Suspension Procedure 
 Order 87 provides for an exception of suspension of procurement procedures. It states 
that a minister or a senior official responsible for contracting activities is authorized to require 
the contractor to keep working on the contract, if he or she determines that the protested contract 
is of such importance to the public interest that ceasing work will unduly harm public interest.978 
There are three requirements for this exception to be exercised by a minister or senior 
contracting official. First, undue harm must be explained in writing by the head of the 
contracting agency.979 Second, the head of the contracting agency must notify the IAT of his or 
her intention to exercise this exception.980 Third, the head of the contracting agency is required 
to consider the likelihood of success of the protest.981    
Two of the three major requirements are under the discretion of the senior contracting 
officials. The exception would have been more preventive of abuse, if the provision introduced 
some types of restrictive measures such as requiring the consent of the IAT or the OGPCP 
instead of mere notification. Further, the provision should have introduced some incidents, at 
least as examples, that may be considered important to public interest or may constitute undue 
harm. Discretion without proper restrictions has the potential of leading to abuse and corruption.  
 Since Order 87 was enacted after the US procurement model, some explanations from the 
US case experience might be helpful to understand how this exception is exercised. Under the 
US law, the contracting agency may override the suspension on a finding of urgent and 
compelling circumstances or when the override is in the government’s best interest.982 The 
COFC in its early decisions granted more deference to the agency’s determination of “urgent and 
978 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(b)(i) &( ii). 
979 Id., Sec. 12 (1)(b)(i). 
980 Id. 
981 Id., Sec. 12 (1)(b)(ii). 
982 Supra note 866, at 1238. 
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compelling circumstances” or “best interest of the United States”.983 However, the COFC has 
taken a far less deferential attitude since its decision in Reilly’s Wholesale Prooduce, Inc. v. 
United States.984 In Reilly, the COFC identified several factors that agencies must consider in 
analyzing both “best interest” and “urgent and compelling circumstances” to invoke the 
exemption, override.985 These factors are: 
(i) whether significant adverse consequences will necessarily occur if the stay is 
not overridden; (ii) conversely, whether reasonable alternatives to the override 
exist that would adequately address the circumstances presented; (iii) how the 
potential cost of proceeding with the override, including the costs associated with 
the potential that the GAO might sustain the protest, compare to the benefits 
associated with the approach being considered for addressing the agency's needs; 
and (iv) the impact of the override on competition and the integrity of the 
procurement system, as reflected in the Competition in Contracting Act.986  
 
These factors restrict the discretion of the contracting agency to a limited extent. They are still 
subject to the discretion of the contracting agencies because determination of the existence of 
each factor requires the contracting agency to evaluate the situation and make a discretionary 
decision. Nonetheless, they prevent a contracting agency from exercising unfettered discretion 
by considering unreasonable factors and circumstances as constituting the “best interest of the 
government” or “compelling and urgent circumstances”. According to the IAT’s decisions 
available to the author, the issue of the exception has not been raised in any of the cases. The 
IAT should develop some standards and tests to be used by heads of contracting agencies in 
deciding the exemption to suspension. 
The exception on the suspension measure is not peculiar to public procurement systems 
of various countries and regional and international agreements. All UNCITRAL, the WTO/GPA, 
983 Id., at 1239. 
984 Reilly’s Wholesale Prooduce, Inc. v. United States , 73 Fed. Cl. 705 (2006), see also Cibinic, supra note 515, 
1710. 
985 Id. 
986 Id., see also Cibinic, supra note 515, at 711.  
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and the EU Directives allow exceptions from suspension. Under UNCITRAL, the contracting 
agency may override suspension when urgent public interest considerations require the 
procurement to proceed.987 The grounds of the override must be explained in a certificate that 
urgent considerations exist.988 Such certificate is made part of the record of the procurement 
proceedings and it is conclusive with respect to all levels of review except judicial review.989  
On the other hand, both the WTO/GPA and the EU Remedies Directives provide for an 
exception to suspension. They both allow the exception based on the balance-of-interests test. 
The WTO/GPA states that “procedures may provide that overriding adverse consequences for 
the interests concerned, including the public interest, may be taken into account in deciding 
whether such measures should be applied.”990 Further, the EC Directive states that “member 
states may provide that the body responsible for review procedures may take into account the 
probable consequences of interim measures for all interests likely to be harmed, as well as the 
public interest, and may decide not to grant such measures when their negative consequences 
could exceed their benefits.”991 
 In addition, the EC Remedies Directives also allow exceptions on the standstill period in 
three instances. First, if EC Directives do not require prior publication of a notice for the contract 
concerned in the Official Journal of the European Union.992 Second, if there is only one tenderer 
who is awarded the contract and there are no other candidates involved in the procurement 
activity.993 Third, “contracts based on framework agreements and dynamic purchasing systems 
987 UNCITRAL Model Law 91994), supra note 39, Art. 56(4). 
988 Id. 
989 Id. 
990 See WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX(7). 
991 The EU Directive 92/13/EEC, supra note 462, Art. 2(4). 
992 Id., Art. 2(b)(a). 
993 Id. 
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as long as the value of the individual contract is under the thresholds and all the relevant 
provisions of the substantive Directives have been followed.”994  
3.4 Corrective Actions  
 A protester’s preferred remedy in the review proceedings is usually to correct the breach 
that occurred and require the contracting agency to re-solicit the tender in question.995 For 
instance, a contractor may allege that in evaluating a bid the procuring entity considered a factor 
not indicated to offerors in advance, breaching national procurement rules.996 The protester in 
this example seeks an order to set aside the original bid evaluation process and require the 
agency to reevaluate the tender.997 Corrective actions may include several acts such as annulment 
of the award decision, awarding the contract to the protester, or terminating a concluded 
contract.998  
Under Order 87, the IAT must rule on the protest and may direct the contracting agency 
to take corrective action, including but not limited to, terminating the awarded contract, re-
soliciting tenders, reevaluating tenders received for consideration.”999 Since Order 87 was 
enacted after the US model, these corrective actions are similar to those that the GAO is allowed 
to recommend in deciding protests. Under the FAR, the GAO may recommend that the 
contracting agency: 
(A) refrain from exercising any of its options under the contract; 
(B) recompete the contract immediately; 
(C) cancel the solicitation issued pursuant to the public-private competition 
conducted under Office of Management and Budget Circular A–76 or any 
successor circular; 
(D) issue a new solicitation; 
994 Jane Golding & Paul Henty, The New Remedies Directive Of The EC: Standstill And Ineffectiveness, P.P.L.R. 
2008, 3, 146-154, 149. 
995 See Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 781. 
996 Id. 
997 Id., at 781-782. 
998 See for example Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(a)(ii), See also 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(2). 
999 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(a)(ii). 
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(E) terminate the contract; 
(F) award a contract consistent with the requirements of such statute and 
regulation; 
(G) implement any combination of recommendations under clauses (A), (B), (C), 
(D), (E), and (F); or 
(H) implement such other recommendations as the Comptroller General 
determines to be necessary in order to promote compliance with procurement 
statutes and regulations.1000  
 
Both the US and Iraqi systems allow review bodies to terminate a concluded contract. This 
approach is in contrast to many legal systems of European countries because they do not 
empower the review body to terminate a concluded contract.1001 Thus, the only remedy available 
to unsatisfied bidders with respect to a concluded contract in most European countries is 
monetary damages.1002 In fact, the decision of the review body requiring termination of a 
protested contract does not directly affect its validity because a contract is an agreement between 
two parties and only those parties can terminate it.1003 However, the decision to cancel an award 
would be a legal basis for contracting agencies to rely on in terminating a concluded contract. 
 Recognizing the diversity in legal systems, UNCITRAL does not identify specific 
remedies to be made, instead it provides for a list of options.1004 According to UNCITRAL, an 
independent administrative body may grant or recommend,1005one of the following remedies: 
(a) Declare the legal rules or principles that govern the subject-matter of the 
complaint; 
(b) Prohibit the procuring entity from acting or deciding unlawfully or from 
following an unlawful procedure; 
(c) Require the procuring entity that has acted or proceeded in an unlawful 
manner, or that 
1000 31 U.S.C. § 3554(e)(2).  
1001 See Bovis, supra note 18, at 504-505. 
1002 Id., at 504. 
1003 Id., at 526. 
1004 See Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 782. 
1005 Uncitral Model Law (1994), supra note 39, Art. 54, this optional language from UNCITRAL is to accommodate 
the legal systems of countries where administrative review bodies are not empowered to grant remedies but they 
may make recommendations to contracting agencies, 
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has reached an unlawful decision, to act or to proceed in a lawful manner or to 
reach a  lawful decision; 
(d) Annul in whole or in part an unlawful act or decision of the procuring entity, 
other than any act or decision bringing the procurement contract into force; 
(e) Revise an unlawful decision by the procuring entity or substitute its own 
decision for such a decision, other than any decision bringing the procurement 
contract into force.1006 
 
 In Canada, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) has jurisdiction over procurement 
disputes arising out of the GPA, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
internal Canadian procurement disputes between the Canadian provinces.1007 The CITT may 
recommend various corrective measures, but it must take into account a number of factors 
provided for in the CITT’s Act in choosing such measures.1008 The Act states that “where the 
Tribunal decides to conduct an inquiry, it shall, within the prescribed period after the complaint 
is filed, provide the complainant, the relevant government institution and any other party that the 
Tribunal considers to be an interested party with the Tribunal’s findings and recommendations, if 
any.”1009 
 In addition, where the Tribunal determines that a complaint is valid, it may recommend 
such remedy as it considers appropriate, including any one or more of the following 
remedies1010: 
(a) that a new solicitation for the designated contract be issued; 
(b) that the bids be re-evaluated; 
(c) that the designated contract be terminated; 
(d) that the designated contract be awarded to the complainant; or 
(e) that the complainant be compensated by an amount specified by the 
Tribunal.1011 
1006 Id. 
1007 Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 783. 
1008 Id. 
1009 Id. 
1010 Id. 
1011 Id. 
209 
 
                                                          
 
 
(3) The Tribunal shall, in recommending an appropriate remedy under subsection 
(2), consider all the circumstances relevant to the procurement of the goods or 
services to which the designated contract relates, including 
(a) the seriousness of any deficiency in the procurement process found by the 
Tribunal; 
(b) the degree to which the complainant and all other interested parties were 
prejudiced; 
(c) the degree to which the integrity and efficiency of the competitive 
procurement system was prejudiced; 
(d) whether the parties acted in good faith; and 
(e) the extent to which the contract was performed.1012 
 
Nullifying the award decision is one of the most important corrective actions. However, the 
controversial issue is what constitutes an award decision. Is the award decision limited to the 
final decision that determines the winning contractor, or does it include other preliminary 
decisions taken by the contracting agency that complement the final award decision? This issue 
is closely related to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the IAT and CRCs discussed in Chapter II. 
Under Order 87 and the IRGC, the award decision that is reviewable before the IAT and CRCs is 
limited only to the decision that identifies the winning contractor.1013  
In other words, contracting agencies’ actions that occur prior to the issuance of the award 
decision and that are conducted with the sole purpose of reaching the award decision are beyond 
the jurisdiction of CRCs and the IAT. For instance, the decision to exclude an offeror from 
competition or to disqualify technical specifications and financial capabilities of a contractor 
occurs before the award decision but affects the right of contractors to participate in the tender. 
The award decision can be described as a combined administrative act that consists of several 
other preliminary decisions. Limiting the meaning of award decision to the sole decision 
1012 Id. 
1013 In fact, this is the interpretation of the IAT based on the IRGC that limits the jurisdiction of the review bodies to 
award decisions. However, the author disagrees with this interpretation because award decisions consist of several 
processes that cannot be dealt with separately.  
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identifying the winning contractor excludes many important agencies’ decisions from effective 
review.    
Thus, if a contractor wants to challenge a decision of the contracting agency excluding 
him or her from competition because of wrongful evaluation of technical or financial 
capabilities, the IAT or CRCs would not have jurisdiction to review and annul such a decision. 
However, some contracting-related actions, such as the one in the previous example, except for 
the award decision, can still be challenged before the agency that issued the decision or before 
the administrative court under the CSA.1014 Any decision that is related to award of a contract 
such as exclusion of a contractor form participating whether because of violation of procurement 
rules or as a result of improper evaluation of tenders should be under the jurisdiction of the IAT. 
In contrast to Iraqi law, EC Directives affords a broader meaning to the award decision. 
The ECJ has found that Article 2(1) (b) of Directive 89/665 allows annulment of improper 
decisions of contracting agencies in relation to the technical and other specifications, not only in 
the solicitation provisions, but also in any other document associated with the award in 
question.1015 This interpretation may include documents containing decisions of the contracting 
agency issued at a stage prior to the invitation to tenders.1016 More importantly, the Court held 
that a decision of a contracting agency to withdraw an invitation to tender for a public contract 
must be open to review.1017 On the other hand, the GAO in rare cases recommends that award of 
the contract be made to the protester.1018  
1014 The CSL, supra note 634, Art. 7(4). 
1015 Bovis, supra note 18, at 527 
1016 Id., at 527-528. 
1017 Id., at 528. 
1018 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1743. 
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3.5.1 Monetary Damages 
 Monetary damages are one of the types of remedies that contracting agencies are required 
to provide to contractors under certain circumstances. They are another way of encouraging 
contracting agencies to comply with procurement laws and to correct breaches in public 
contracting.1019 Many jurisdictions provide for monetary damages for protesters. However, the 
requirements of determining and quantifying such damages vary from one jurisdiction to another 
and from one procurement agreement to another. The most common damages that are available 
to protesters are bid or proposal preparation costs and protest costs. 
3.5.2 Bid or Proposal Preparation Costs  
 Order 87 and the IRGC are both silent on the issue of bid or proposal preparation costs. 
However, under Iraqi laws, the concept of damages is available when complainant’s rights have 
been infringed by public or private parties. Ordinary civil courts have jurisdictions over cases 
seeking monetary damages.1020 In contrast to the Iraqi procurement system, many countries and 
regional and international procurement agreements provides for damages, especially bid 
preparation costs. For instance, the US procurement system, the EC Remedies Directives, the 
UNCITRAL, and the WTO/GPA provides for bid preparation costs as a form of damages.  
 Under the US procurement system, the GAO is allowed to recommend awarding bid 
preparation costs to a successful protester.1021 In one decision the GAO held that the basis of 
recovery of bid preparation costs is the theory that the government, by announcing a solicitation, 
enters into an implied contract with bidders or contractors that their bids or proposals will be 
1019 Bovis, supra note 18, at 572. 
1020 The CPL, supra note 653, Art. 32. 
1021 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1744. 
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fairly and honestly considered.1022 The GAO’s opinion was based on Heyer Products Co. v. 
United States case.1023 However, bid preparation costs are not granted merely because a bid 
protest is sustained.1024 Thus, in order for bid preparation costs to be awarded, a protester has to 
be unreasonably excluded from competition and no other remedy is appropriate to remedy the 
infringement occurred.1025 Examples of inappropriateness of remedies except for damages are 
often when the performance of the contract is complete or when it is impractical to terminate the 
contract because performance has reached its final stages.1026  
 Nonetheless, GAO will not generally grant bid preparation costs if the protester has not 
been in line for award of the contract in question.1027 In one case, the GAO “found that a 
protester had a substantial chance of receiving the award when the protester was one of three 
contractors in line for award.”1028 If a solicitation is withdrawn for proper reasons not related to 
the protest, no bid preparation costs will be awarded.1029 In addition, a protester will not be 
granted bid preparation costs if it will have the chance to compete for the contract under a 
resolicitation that has been conducted as a result of its own protest.1030 
 On the other hand, the COFC may also award bid preparation costs. The Court held that 
an offeror may recover bid or proposal preparation costs if it can prove that the Government’s 
consideration of the proposals submitted was arbitrary or capricious.1031 In MVM, Inc. v. United 
States the Court stated that: 
1022 Gary L. Hopkins, The Universe Of Remedies For Unsuccessful Offerors On Federal Contracts, 15 Pub. Cont. 
L.J. 365, 418 (1985). 
1023 Heyer Products Co. v. United States 140 F. Supp. 409 (Ct. Cl. 1956), for more information Hopkins, Id.  
1024 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1744. 
1025 Id. 
1026 Id. 
1027 Id., at 1745. 
1028 Id. 
1029 Id. 
1030 Id. 
1031 Supra note 1022, at 418. 
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An award of bid proposal and preparation costs will also advance the public 
interest and help to ensure government compliance with procurement regulations. 
Offerors incur expenditures in preparing a bid proposal. When the government 
makes a prejudicial error, a disappointed bidder may expend additional funds on a 
bid protest action. If the disappointed bidder knows that it will be unable to 
recover any costs, it will have less incentive to bring a bid protest action due to 
the helps to ensure that the government complies with procurement 
regulations.1032              
 
Further, bid or proposal costs may not be awarded if the protester has a reasonable chance of 
winning the competition when the corrective action is taken.1033 Accordingly, if the court awards 
an injunction providing the protester with a fair opportunity to win the competition, such costs 
may not be recovered.1034 In contrast, bid preparation costs are awarded if the protestor has no 
chance to win the competition.1035 In one case the Federal Circuit held that the “agency 
responded to injunction by recompeting using Federal Supply Schedule and protester had no 
schedule contract.”1036 
 In order for successful protesters to obtain bid preparation costs before the COFC, the 
protester is required to demonstrate that such costs are allocable and reasonable.1037 According to 
the Federal Circuit, expenses considered as bid preparation costs are those spent on researching 
specifications, reviewing bid forms, examining cost factors, and preparing draft and actual 
bids.1038 The Federal Circuit states that “costs incurred in anticipation of or to qualify for a 
contract award are not recoverable bid preparation expenses.”1039 Although costs must have been 
1032 MVM, Inc. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 361 (2000), at 366. 
1033 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1795. 
1034 Id. 
1035 Id., at 1796. 
1036 Id. 
1037 Id. 
1038 Id. 
1039 Id. 
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incurred in preparing an initial or revised proposal, there is no requirement that a solicitation 
must be issued before such costs may be recovered.1040 
Under the EC procurement regime, member states are required to take corrective actions 
or “to take at the earliest opportunity if possible by way of interlocutory procedures and if 
necessary by a final procedure on the substance, measures other than those provided for in points 
(a) and (b) with the aim of correcting any identified infringement and preventing injury to the 
interests concerned; in particular, making an order for the payment of a particular sum, in cases 
where the infringement has not been corrected or prevented.”1041 In addition, the EC Directives 
obligate member states to award damages to persons injured by infringement of EC procurement 
rules.1042 However, some details regarding which court is empowered to award such damages or 
the quantity of those costs are left to the national law concerned.1043   
With respect to the costs of preparing bids or proposals, the Remedies Directive for 
Utilities Sector, 92/13/EEC, provides for the recovery of such costs. However, the Remedies 
Directive for the Public Sector is silent on the issue of bid preparation costs. The Remedies 
Directive for Utilities states that  
where a claim is made for damages representing the costs of preparing a 
bid or of participating in an award procedure, the person making the claim shall 
be required only to prove an infringement of community law in the field of 
procurement or national rules implementing that law and that he would have had a 
real chance of winning the contract and that, as a consequence of that 
infringement, that chance was adversely affected.1044  
 
The requirements set forth for the eligibility of obtaining such costs is similar to that of the US 
procurement system. The protester seeking damages must demonstrate that there was an 
1040 Id. 
1041 EU Directive 92/13/EEC, supra note 462, Art. 2(c). 
1042 Id., Art. 2(d). 
1043 Henrik Leffler, Damages liability for breach of EC procurement law: governing principles and practical 
solutions, P.P.L.R. 2003, 4, 151-174, 153. 
1044 Eu Directive 92/13/EEC, Art. 2(7). 
215 
 
                                                          
 
 
infringement of EC procurement rules such as violation of the principle of contract 
advertisement, allowing changes in bids submitted, or failure to set aside noncompliant 
bidders.1045 Further, similar to the US system, the protester must prove that he or she would have 
had a real chance of winning the competition, but because of the infringement he or she lost that 
chance.1046 In other words, the aggrieved contractor has the burden of proving the causal 
relationship between the infringement and the loss of the contract. In contrast, if the contractor 
would not have won the contract for whatever reasons, he would not have made a profit any way. 
In such cases, he is not entitled to recover bid preparation costs.       
One controversial issue under the EC Remedies Directives is grounds for granting bid 
preparation costs. It has been argued that a contractor has no basis of recovering bid preparation 
costs under the Remedies Directives because of lack of causal relationship.1047 The reason is that 
either the protester would have won the contract and should then be entitled to damages in the 
form of lost profit; or he would not, and then his bid preparation costs would have been wasted 
anyway.1048 In the latter case, his position would not have been different from the one in which 
the relevant procurement rules would have been followed, and therefore there is no causal link 
between the infringement and the damage, loss of bid preparation costs.1049 Thus, it has been 
argued that a bidder should normally bear the risk of losing his or her tender preparation costs 
because participation in a tender procedure does not guarantee that a contractor’s tender will be 
accepted.1050     
1045 Supra note 1043, at 156. 
1046 Id., at 159. 
1047 Id., at 162. 
1048 Id., at 160. 
1049 Id. 
1050 Id., at 162. 
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However, the lack of the causal link has been denied as a factor by other reviewing 
bodies as they believe that bid preparation costs are recoverable.1051 The rationale behind the 
recoverability of bid preparation costs is two major reasons.1052 First, a contractor is entitled to 
be treated fairly and in a nondiscriminatory manner.1053 Inviting offerors to participate in a 
tender procedure is not a guarantee that his or her tender will be accepted.1054 However, every 
offeror is entitled to a legitimate expectation that his or her tender will be considered and 
assessed on an equal basis with other participants.1055 Second, granting such costs for 
procurement breaches enhances the integrity of the procurement process and reduces 
discrimination as it provides offerors incentives to challenge decisions of contracting agencies 
which may then deter agencies from infringements.1056  
3.5.3 Protest Costs  
 Order 87 and the IRGC are both silent on the issue of recoverability of protest costs. Still 
US procedures are relevant given the drafting history of Order 87. With respect to the US 
procurement system, the GAO is empowered to recommend granting protest costs, including 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and consultant and expert witness fees.1057 The GAO has consistently 
rejected that its authority to grant protest costs applies to costs incurred before another forum.1058 
In one case the GAO held that its “statutory authority to recommend reimbursement of costs 
does not extend to the costs associated with Sodexho’s administrative appeal of the initial A-76 
cost comparison.”1059 
1051 Id. 
1052 Id. 
1053 Id. 
1054 Id., at 162-163. 
1055 Id., at 163. 
1056 Id. 
1057 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1746. 
1058 Id. 
1059 Id. 
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In addition, protest costs are not granted if the GAO has not made a decision on the 
merits of the case.1060 For instance, if “an agency cancels a solicitation for a valid reason 
unrelated to the protest, the protester will not be entitled to recover the costs of filing and 
pursuing its protest.”1061 Generally, the GAO recommends awarding protest costs regarding all 
the issues challenged, not merely those upon which the protester succeeds.1062 In contrast, “if the 
GAO finds that losing protest issues are so severable as to essentially constitute a separate 
protest, then the GAO will recommend that the agency pay only those protest costs which are 
allocable to the winning issues.”1063  
Protest costs can be awarded even when the agency took corrective actions in a sustained 
protest.1064 However, the protester is not entitled to recover protest costs in every case in which 
an agency decides to take corrective action; rather, a protester is granted protest costs where an 
agency unduly delayed its decision to take corrective action in the face of a clearly meritorious 
protest.1065 “Undue delay in taking corrective action is generally found if the agency takes the 
action after the filing of the agency report.”1066 For instance, the GAO held that corrective action 
occurred after the protester filed its comments on the agency report, and the GAO attorney 
assigned to the protest had requested additional information.1067   
As a prerequisite to recover protest costs when a protest is resolved by the agency via 
corrective action, not only must the protest have been meritorious, but it also must have been 
1060 Id. 
1061 Id. 
1062 Id., at 1747. 
1063 Major Marci A. Lawson, Contract And Fiscal Law Developments Of 2006--The Year In Review: Special Topics: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2007-JAN Army Law. 109, 111. 
1064 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1746. 
1065 Id., at 1748. 
1066 Id. 
1067 Id. 
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“clearly meritorious”.1068 According to the GAO, “a protest is clearly meritorious when a 
reasonable agency inquiry into the protester’s allegations would show facts disclosing the 
absence of a defensible legal position.”1069 Further, the GAO held that its “willingness to inform 
the parties through outcome prediction ADR that a protest is likely to be sustained is generally an 
indication that the protest is viewed as “clearly meritorious.”1070 
To recover protest costs when the agency takes corrective action, the protester must file 
with the GAO within 15 calendar days after it has been informed of the agency’s corrective 
action.1071 Further, a protester must submit a copy of his or her protest-costs request and the 
agency has 15 days to respond.1072 The GAO will not grant costs that might be related to the 
protest but they are not properly documented.1073 The burden is on the protester to properly 
document costs incurred, and the protester cannot rely on standard rates to establish its claim.1074  
The GAO will also deny legal expenses or fees that are not adequately documented by 
the law firm.1075 “Attorneys’ fees usually are the primary component of a claim for protest costs 
and may be part of proposal preparation costs.”1076 The GAO generally accepts the number of 
attorney hours requested by the protester.1077 However, the contracting agency may determine 
specific hours as excessive and deny paying such costs provided that it undertakes a reasonable 
analysis as to why they are excessive.1078 “The GAO will examine the reasonableness of attorney 
1068 Id., at 1749. 
1069 Id. 
1070 Id., at 1751. 
1071 Id. 
1072 Id. 
1073 Id., at 1754. 
1074 Id. 
1075 Id. 
1076 Id., at 1755. 
1077 Id. 
1078 Id. 
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hours claimed to determine whether they exceed, in nature and amount, what a prudent person 
would incur in pursuit of his or her protest.”1079  
There is a statutory cap on attorneys’ fees, except where the protester is a small business 
concern.1080 The highest rate recoverable to large businesses for attorneys’ fees is $150 per 
hour.1081 However, the attorneys’ fees limit may be raised where “the agency determines, based 
on the recommendation of GAO on a case-by-case basis, that an increase in the cost of living or 
a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings 
involved, justifies a higher fees.”1082 With respect to outside consultant and expert witnesses’ 
fees, there is a statutory limit regarding recoverability of such fees on large businesses.1083 The 
rate is limited to the “highest rate of compensation for expert witnesses paid by the Federal 
Government.”1084 
The UNCITRAL also allows the recoverability of protest costs. It states that contracting 
agency shall award “any reasonable costs incurred by the supplier or contractor submitting the 
complaint in connection with the procurement proceedings as a result of an unlawful act or 
decision of, or procedure followed by, the procuring entity.”1085 In contrast, the EC Remedies 
Directives are silent on the issue of granting protest costs. The Remedies Directive for the 
utilities sector mentions only granting bid preparation costs.1086 The Remedies Directive for the 
Public Sector does not even mention bid preparation costs because it merely states that member 
states shall provide for award of damages to persons harmed by a breach.1087 
1079 Id. 
1080 Id., at 1756. 
1081 Id. 
1082 Id. 
1083 Id., at 1758. 
1084 Id. 
1085 UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), Art. 54 (3)(f).  
1086 EU Directive 92/13/EEC, supra note 462, Art. 2(7). 
1087 Id., Art. 2 (1)(c). 
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3.5.4 Lost Profit 
 Some procurement regimes award lost profit for infringement of procurement rules as 
monetary damages. EC Remedies Directives does not prevent the protesters from recovering lost 
profit when their rights are infringed by contracting agencies.1088 However, the burden of proof 
is on the protester to demonstrate that in the absence of the alleged breach, he or she would have 
been awarded the contract.1089 French law also grants monetary damages in the form of loss of 
profit provided that the complainant proves the existence of a fault, the damage suffered, and the 
causal link between the fault and the damages.1090 In addition, the complainant has to 
demonstrate that he or she has had a substantial chance of winning the competition.1091 Damage 
claims, under the French law, are brought to ordinary civil courts.1092  
 UNCITRAL does not mention granting lost profit as a remedy as it states that the 
contracting agency shall grant compensation for “loss or injury suffered by the supplier or 
contractor submitting the complaint in connection with the procurement proceedings.”1093 The 
Working Group that enacted UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement in the 1990s discussed 
thoroughly the issue of awarding damages other than bid preparation costs including lost 
profit.1094 It has been argued that some jurisdictions do not allow granting damages such as 
losses of profit because awarding such damages is deemed to be highly disruptive to the 
procurement process.1095 The reason for this disruptive effect is that such damages provide 
1088 Bovis, supra note 18, at 572-573. 
1089 Id., at 573. 
1090 Id., at 582. 
1091 Id. 
1092 Id. 
1093 UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), supra note 39, Art. 54 (3)(f). 
1094 Caroline Nicholas, Remedies For Breaches Of Procurement Rules And 
the UNCITRAL Model Law  On Procurement, P.P.L.R. 2009, 4, NA151-159, 158. 
1095 Id. 
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contractors with incentives to challenge agencies’ decisions and such challenges lead to more 
delay.1096  
 In addition, granting lost profit as damages would make contracting agencies pay large 
amounts of money, thus burden the public fund.1097 Thus, some members of the Working Group 
believed that damages should be limited to the costs of preparing and submitting tenders.1098 In 
contrast, others argued that losses of profits should be included in the list of damages available to 
contractors when provisions of the Model Law are violated by contracting agencies.1099 As a 
result of these different perspectives toward damages including lost profits, there was an 
agreement in 1994 to leave the issue of whether or not to award damages other than bid 
preparation costs to contractors injured to the enacting states.1100 Finally, the Working Group in 
2009 discouraged granting loss of profits in the 2009 Model Law.1101  
With respect to the US procurement system, both the GAO and the COFC have 
uniformly denied recovery of anticipated profits.1102 The Federal Circuit held that it is” improper 
to award lost profits in the absence of a contract and no certainty that protester would have 
received award.”1103 In another decision refusing to award lost profits, the Court held that “lost 
profits are speculative in nature and have consistently been denied.”1104 Generally speaking, 
granting lost profits is allowed under the Iraqi laws,1105 but protest cases available to the author 
do not include a case in which the issue of lost profits has been triggered. In addition, the IAT 
1096 Id. 
1097 Id., at 159. 
1098 Id. 
1099 Id. 
1100 Id. 
1101 Id. 
1102 Cibinic, supra note 515, at 1743 & 1794. 
1103 Id., at 1794. 
1104 Id. 
1105 Iraqi Civil Code No. 40 (1941), Art. 169 (2). 
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does not have the jurisdiction to decide cases claiming damages.1106 Cases claiming damages are 
under the jurisdiction ordinary civil courts.  
3.6 Conclusions 
 Effective remedies are crucial for a successful bid protest system. Regional and 
international agreements also emphasize the importance of availability of remedies to unsatisfied 
bidders when procurement laws and regulations are breached. Iraqi public procurement law 
provides contractors major types of remedies such as, suspension of procurement procedures, 
corrective actions, and other monetary damages.  However, there are ambiguities regarding the 
conditions or requirements of awarding such remedies. For instance, the suspension is automatic 
according to Order 87, while the IAT made it conditional upon the approval of its members.  
Another condition that has also been introduced by the IRGC deters unsatisfied bidders 
from protesting and requesting suspension of procurement procedures. Such condition requires 
unsatisfied bidders to submit a formal undertaking according to which the protester promises to 
pay all damages that is occasioned because of the protest in case the protest is frivolous. There 
are other ways that can be used to punish a contractor who frivolously submit protests in order to 
delay the procurement process. For instance, procurement laws and regulations can impose fines 
on offerors who take advantage from the protest mechanism. In addition, there is an exception to 
suspension of contracting procedures. Such an exception does not seem unreasonable or peculiar 
to Iraqi procurement system. However, it is discretionary and may lead to abuse if there are not 
restrictions on agencies regarding how frequently they use it. 
There are other types of remedies including corrective actions. Corrective actions may 
include nullifying the award decisions, directing the agency to re-solicit the contract, or in rare 
cases may include cancellation of a contract. There are some issues about the forum that is to 
1106 See Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 41. 
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award corrective actions and the bases of sustaining or refusing contractor’s requests for such 
remedies. For instance, the IAT and CRC are not granted the power to review the complaint of a 
contractor who is being unfairly removed from competing for a contract. Such complaint should 
be submitted to the administrative court sits at the Council of State. The IAT and CRC should be 
allowed to review any decisions that us related to the award of a public contract.              
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Chapter IV 
4. The Potential Role of Anti-Corruption Bodies in the Bid Protest Process 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter examines the possibility of the role of anti-corruption institutions in Iraq in the 
bid protest processes. The basis of this examination is the major purpose that both the anti-
corruption system and the bid protest process share: strengthening integrity and reducing the 
level of corruption in public institutions. The fundamental task of fighting corruption in Iraq is 
assigned to three anti-corruption bodies; the Integrity Commission (IC), the Board of Supreme 
Audit (BSA), and Offices of Inspectors General (OIG).1107 Similarly, one of the major purposes 
of establishing bid protest system is reducing corruption and irregularities in public procurement 
activities.1108 
Corruption is widespread in Iraq especially in the field of public procurement because public 
contracting is considered a lucrative opportunity that involves transactions worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars.1109 In addition, large amounts of the Iraqi annual budget are allocated to 
procurement projects that are mostly conducted through public contracting.1110 Thus, corruption 
stands in the center of the bid protest and anti-corruption systems. Nonetheless, none of the anti-
corruption institutions in Iraq is involved in the bid protest process. There might be some 
cooperative relationship between the two systems; however, the relationship does not seem to 
1107 See Integrity Commission Law (ICL) No. 30 (2011) of Iraq, Art. 21. 
1108 Order 87, Supra note 5, Sec. 1 (b)(c). 
1109 Transparency International, Corruption and Public Procument, 1, available at 
file:///C:/Users/Ali/Downloads/2010_5_TI_CorruptionandPublicProcurement_EN.pdf.   
1110 Iraq Budget law, supra note 9, Art. 2, see for more information Chapter One of this dissertation, at 3.  
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have a systemic or formal structure, although cooperation in the efforts of limiting corruption is 
considered an essential element in the success of anti-corruption policies.1111 
This chapter examines the relevance of effective relationship between the two systems. If 
there is necessity of establishing effective coordination between them, what types of relationship 
would limit the level of corruption in the public procurement? Should anti-corruption institutions 
be involved in the bid protest process? Should the potential relationship between bid protest fora 
and anti-corruption agencies be passive by intervening or cooperating only when they request 
assistance from each other? Or is a formal active cooperation required in which anti-corruption 
institutions have a role in the resolution of bid protests? The relationship between the two 
systems will be examined through analyzing the jurisdictions of each institution or mechanism 
under their enabling statute and other relevant regulations.  
4.2 Anti-Corruption System in Iraq 
The anti-corruption system was established after 2003 by Order 55,1112 which was enacted 
by the CPA, the American-led authority that governed Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime. 
Order 55 was abolished by Integrity Commission Law (ICL) No. 30 (2011) enacted by the Iraqi 
Parliament.1113 The ICL is similar to Order 55 with respect to maintaining the structure of the 
anti-corruption system, consisting of the three major institutions previously mentioned.1114 The 
IC is the main body responsible for enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations in Iraq.1115 
The second body is the BSA which is the highest public audit agency in the country. Order 77 
reorganized the BSA, but it too was abolished by the Board of Supreme Audit Law (BSAL) No. 
1111 See the UNCAC, supra note 181, Art. 1, 37, 38, and 39. 
1112 Order 55, supra note 433, Sec. 1. 
1113 See the ICL, supra note 1107. 
1114 Id., Art. 21. 
1115 Id., Art 3. 
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31 (2011).1115F1116 Finally, the OIG is the third part of the anti-corruption system which was 
established in every ministry under Order 57. 1116F1117 
The IC is an independent agency with its own budget and staff. It is also answerable to 
Parliament.1118 It is headed by a person who enjoys the rank of a cabinet minister and he or she is 
appointed by Parliament for a 5 year term by absolute majority.1119 The head of the IC must have 
a bachelor in law with no less than 10 years of experience in law-related fields.1120 The IC is 
responsible for enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations and has been granted various 
powers to fulfil its duties.1121 For instance, it has the power to investigate corruption cases 
through investigators under the supervision of investigative judges.1122 In addition, if a 
corruption case is investigated by regular investigative courts rather than the investigators’ of the 
IC, the IC must Follow-up such cases.1123  
The IC is also required to spread the culture of integrity and transparency including 
observing professional and ethical standards in both the public and private sectors.1124 In 
addition, it must develop other programs that educate the public regarding the devastating impact 
of corrupt practices.1125 Further, it is empowered to propose bills to Parliament that strengthens 
anti-corruption programs.1126 It must also promulgate regulations that have the force of law 
1116 See the Board of Supreme Audit Law (BSAL) No. 31 (2011), available, in Arabic, at, 
http://nazaha.iq/pdf_up/1545/low_nazaha.pdf.  
1117 See Order 57, supra note 783. 
1118 The ICL, Art. 2. 
1119 Id., Art. 4. 
1120 Id., Art. 5 (1). 
1121 Id., Art. 3. 
1122 Id., Art 3 (1). 
1123 Id., Art. 3 (2). 
1124 Id., Art. 3 (3). 
1125 Id. 
1126 Id., Art. 3 (4). 
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requiring public officials to disclose their financial interests and any conflicts-of-interests inside 
and outside Iraq.1127  
Another major duty of the IC is issuing a code of conduct for public officials to follow that 
contains ethics rules to guarantee proper performance of their public duties.1128 In addition, the 
IC is empowered to perform any act that results in reducing corruption provided that two 
conditions are met.1129 First, the act that is to be performed is necessary for preventing or 
fighting corruption.1130 Second, such an act is effective in achieving the purposes of the 
Commission.1131 Thus, the IC has been granted fairly broad jurisdictions with respect to 
enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations.  
The Commission has a two-fold jurisdiction: preventive and curative.1132 Preventive 
measures include requiring public officials to disclose their financial interests and potential 
conflicts of interests.1133 They also require officials to sign the code of conduct and observe it in 
their daily activities and educating the public regarding the negative impact of corruption on 
society.1134 On the other hand, curative measures include investigation of corruption cases 
through its investigators or becoming a party in any corruption case that is not investigated by 
1127 Id., Art. 3 (5). 
1128 Id., Art. 3 (6). 
1129 Id., Art. 3 (7). 
1130 Id., Art. 3 (6) & (3). 
1131 Id., Art. 3(7). 
1132 Traditionally anti-corruption measures were curative according to which authorities intervened only after 
corruption happened through investigation and prosecution. However, anti-corruption efforts have seen significant 
changes that resulted in dedicating more attention to preventive measures in order to deal with corruption before it 
happens. For instance, Article 5 (2) of the UNCAC, supra note 181, states that “each State Party shall endeavor to 
establish and promote effective practices aimed at the prevention of corruption.” In addition, the Inter-American 
Convention against Corruption (IACC) (1996), dedicates part of the agreement to organize preventive measures, see 
the Organization of American States: the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Chapter III, available at, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/iacac.pdf.  It requires member states to adopt preventive measures 
including code of conduct, conflict of interest measures, and programs for educating the public regarding 
transparency and integrity.  
1133 The ICL, supra note 1107, Art 3 (5). 
1134 Id., Art. 3. 
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the IC itself.1135 The IC is required to perform its duties in tackling corruption in cooperation 
with the BSA and the OIG.1136 
 The BSA constitutes the second pillar of the anti-corruption system. The Board is not 
new to Iraq, having been established in 1927.1137 Similar to the IC, it is an independent body 
with its own budget and staff subject to the control of Parliament.1138 It is also headed by an 
official appointed by the absolute majority of Parliament for four years and he or she enjoys the 
rank of a cabinet minister.1139 All public agencies of the government of Iraq or any other body 
that uses public funds are subject to the jurisdiction of the BSA.1140 However, the judiciary is 
exempted from the BSA’s jurisdiction, though only in the course of exercising judicial 
powers.1141  
The BSA has broad powers in performing its duties. For instance, it is empowered to access 
any documents, receipts, transactions, or administrative orders that are related to the function of 
auditing and oversight.1142 It also has the power to obtain answers, explanations, and information 
necessary to conducting its duties from any administrative departments in question.1143 More 
importantly, all secret programs and expenditures related to national security are also subject to 
the jurisdiction of the BSA.1144 The power to investigate such expenses was very limited in the 
past.   
1135 Id. 
1136 Id., Art. 21 which states that “the Commission shall perform its duties in cooperation with the Board of Supreme 
Audit and the Offices of Inspector General.” 
1137 The Baord of Supreme Audit (BSA) Website: the Historical Development, available at http://www.d-raqaba-
m.iq/pages_en/about_history_e.aspx#h1.    
1138 The BSAL, supra note 1116, Art. 5. 
1139 Id., Art. 22. 
1140 Id., Art. 8. 
1141 Id., Art. 9. 
1142 Id., Art. 13 (1). 
1143 Id. 
1144 Id., Art. 13 (2). 
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In contrast to the IC, the jurisdiction of the BSA is limited to financial auditing. Thus, the 
BSA does not have jurisdiction to investigate administrative or criminal issues. However, if the 
BSA discovers a violation of law in performing its duties, it may request the IC or the OIG to 
investigate such violation.1145 If the financial violation constitutes a crime, the BSA is required to 
inform the Public Prosecution Office, the IC, the OIG, or specialized investigative units.1146 The 
head of the BSA may request from them minister or the head of the agency that is subject to 
oversight to investigate with the official responsible for the violation and he or she may demand 
that such official be dismissed from his or her official duties.1147 In addition, the BSA may bring 
a civil lawsuit on behalf of the government to recover the damages resulting from the alleged 
violations.1148  
The third pillar of the anti-corruption system is the OIG. The CPA designed the OIG after 
the US model of Inspector Generals’ program through Order 57. There is an OIG in every Iraqi 
ministry that is headed by an Inspector General (IG).1149 The IG is to be appointed by the Prime 
Minister for a 5-year term subject to the approval of Parliament by the majority vote of its 
members.1150 Such an appointment may be renewed once under the same requirements of the 
initial appointment.1151 The purpose of establishing the OIG is to strengthen the integrity and 
performance of ministries through mechanisms of audit, investigation, and performance 
review.1152 
The OIG is under obligation to “audit all records and activities of the ministry, for purposes 
of ensuring the integrity, transparency and efficiency of ministry operations, and provide 
1145 Id., Art 14. 
1146 Id., Art. 16. 
1147 Id., Art. 15 (1). 
1148 Id., Art. 15 (2). 
1149 Order 57, supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1).  
1150 Id., Sec. 2 (5). 
1151 Id.  
1152 Id., Sec. 1. 
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information for decision-making and recommend improvements to ministry programs, policies 
and procedures as appropriate.”1153 It is also required to conduct administrative investigations 
and review the processes and programs of the ministry for measuring performance.1154 Order 57 
requires the OIG to receive and assess complaints of waste, fraud, abuse of authority, and 
mismanagement.1155 It also requires the OIG to take measures to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse 
of power, including but not limited to legislative and regulatory reviews and evaluating programs 
and process of the ministry in order to identify gaps that facilitate abuse and fraud.1156 
In fulfilling its duties, the OIG has been granted various powers. It is empowered to have 
“full and unrestricted access to all offices, limited access or restricted areas, employees, records, 
information data, reports, plans, contracts, memoranda, and any other materials including 
electronic data of the ministry.”1157 It also has the “authority to subpoena witnesses, administer 
oaths or affirmation, to take testimony and to compel the production of such books, papers, 
records and documents, including electronic data as is deemed to be relevant to any inquiry or 
investigation undertaken.”1158 In addition, the IG is allowed reasonable access to the head of any 
governmental entity or office.1159 The IGs also have the authority to obligate any official of the 
ministry to report fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption acts to the OIG.1160 Thus, the OIG has 
broad power in performing its functions.  
1153 Id., Sec. 5 (1). 
1154 Id., Sec. 5 (2). 
1155 Id., Sec. 5 (4). 
1156 Id., Sec. 5 (8). 
1157 Id., Sec. 6 (1)(a). 
1158 Id., Sec. 6 (1)(b). 
1159 Id., Sec. 6 (1)(c).  
1160 Id., Sec. 6 (1)(d). 
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4.3 The basis of cooperation between the anti-corruption system and the bid protest 
processes  
 The basis of cooperation or overlap of jurisdiction between anti-corruption and bid 
protest systems can be identified through the goals they are designed to achieve. Reducing the 
level of corruption and enhancing transparency and integrity of the administrative process are 
among the major goals these systems were designed to protect. In other words, both systems 
share the jurisdiction of fighting corruption and enhancing integrity of the area they are 
empowered to function. However, fighting corruption is extremely broad and it includes legal, 
administrative, financial, and even cultural aspects. 
 Generally speaking, strengthening transparency and integrity of public contracting is one 
of the major goals of every public procurement system.1161 Under Order 87, the major principles 
of the Iraqi procurement system include: “international standards of transparency, predictability, 
fairness and equality of treatment”1162; and “procurement process integrity, minimum ethical 
standards and non-conflict of interest.”1163 Establishing effective bid protest processes is the 
mechanism through which procurement officials may enhance the integrity of public 
procurement. Accordingly, “offeror’s rights to file tender protests and related appeals”1164 and 
“tender dispute resolution mechanisms and the timely resolution of such disputes”1165 are 
fundamental principles of the public procurement process. 
 Corruption has a broad scope because it contains administrative, criminal, and financial 
elements. In fact, it is difficult to describe it in a comprehensive definition. “Attempts to develop 
such a definition invariably encounter legal, criminological and, in many countries, political 
1161 See Schooner, supra note 10, at 104.  
1162 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 1 (b). 
1163 Id., Sec. 1 (c).  
1164 Id., Sec. 1 (d). 
1165 Id., Sec. 1 (e). 
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problems.”1166 This complexity made some anti-corruption agreements avoid introducing a 
definition to corruption. For instance, the United Nation Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC) and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (African 
Union Convention) do not define corruption.1167 Instead, they list those acts that constitute 
corrupt practices.1168  
Regardless of the difficulty that accompanies defining corruption, there is a general 
definition that is used frequently by academics and professionals. According to this definition 
that is introduced by the World Bank corruption is “the abuse of public office for private 
gain”.1169 This definition has been criticized because it excludes misuse of power within the 
private sector.1170 Thus, the TI has introduced a broader definition of corruption which states that 
corruption is “misuse of entrusted power for private gain”.1171 The controversy surrounding the 
definition of corruption is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the purpose is to show the broad 
nature of the concept of corruption. 
Such broadness in meaning and scope results in understanding the issue of cooperation 
among various stakeholders as a strong tool in reducing the level of corruption.1172 Cooperation 
1166 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, The Global Program against Corruption; United Nations Anti-
Corruption Toolkit: (page 10 on the PDF version), without page numbers, available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/toolkit/corruption_un_anti_corruption_toolkit_sep04.pdf.   
1167 Id., see also the African Union, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
(AUCPCC) (2003), Art.1 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_UNION_CONVENTION_PREVENTING_COMBATING_COR
RUPTION.pdf, which states that “corruption means the acts and practices including related offences proscribed in 
this Convention”, available at  
1168 See the AUCPCC, Id., Art. 4, and the UNCAC, supra note 181, Chapter III which criminalizes all offenses that 
are considered corrupt practices.  
1169 W. PAATII OFOSO-AMAAH ET AL, COMBATING CORRUPTION: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF 
SELECTED LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE PRACTICES AND MAJOR INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES 2 
(World Bank 1999). 
1170 Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: the Misunderstood Role of Law, 39 Int’l Law. 717, 722 (2005). 
1171 Transparency International: FAQS on Corruption, How Do You Define Corruption, available at 
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_corruption/2/.  
1172 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Guidebook On Anti-Corruption In Public Procurement And The 
Management Of Public Finances, Good Practices In Ensuring Compliance With Article 9 Of The United Nations 
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among various agencies in tackling corruption is required in both domestic and international 
efforts. One of the purposes of the UNCAC is to promote, facilitate and support international 
cooperation and technical assistance to prevent and combat corruption, including in asset 
recovery.”1173 Furthermore, under the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials (CCBFPO) of the Organization of Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD), 
each party shall, to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant treaties and 
arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party for the purpose of 
criminal investigations and proceedings brought by a Party concerning offences within the scope 
of this Convention.”1174 
In addition, some of these agreements also stress the significance of the role of cooperation 
among domestic authorities to prevent and cure corruption. Under the UNCAC, all state parties 
are required to cooperate “between, on the one hand, its public authorities, as well as its public 
officials, and, on the other hand, its authorities responsible for investigating and prosecuting 
criminal offences.”1175 In addition, state members must take measures to encourage, according to 
its domestic law, cooperation between domestic investigative and prosecuting authorities and 
establishments of the private sector in relation to corrupt practices criminalized under the 
UNCAC.1176 The OECD considers close cooperation between public authorities responsible for 
the enforcement of anti-corruption laws and the private sector as one of the fundamental 
Convention Against Corruption 25, available at  
https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2013/Guidebook_on_anti-
corruption_in_public_procurement_and_the_management_of_public_finances.pdf. Furthermore, in more than 
several occasions, the UNCAC, supra note  181, emphasizes the importance of cooperation in fighting corruption 
including dedicating an entire chapter, Chapter IV, for international cooperation, cooperation between private sector 
and public authorities, Article 39, and cooperation among government agencies themselves, Article 38. 
1173 The UNCAC, supra note 181, Art. 1 (b). 
1174 OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, 
Art. 9, available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf.  
1175 The UNCAC, supra note 181, Art. 38. 
1176 Id., Art 39 (1). 
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principles in fighting corruption in the public procurement arena.1177 Thus, collective action or 
cooperation among public bodies, private firms, international organizations, and civil society is 
particularly important in the field of public procurement in order to tackle corruption 
effectively.1178       
While international cooperation will not be discussed, this chapter examines inter-agency 
cooperation to fight corruption in the public procurement field. The difficult question is how 
such cooperation can be achieved among agencies with different statutory mandates and 
jurisdictions. Limiting corruption is a shared goal between the anti-corruption system and bid 
protest processes. Is there any place for the anti-corruption bodies in the resolution of bid 
protest? Thus, the rest of this chapter examines the concept of inter-agency cooperation. 
4.5 Hypothesis of interaction between the anti-corruption system and bid protest processes  
 Fighting corruption as a shared goal is broad in terms of having potential multiple areas 
of interaction. Major bases for review of bid protest mechanism include the solicitation terms to 
determine whether such terms unfairly restrict full and open competition.1179 They also examine 
the award of contracts to determine whether protesters received fair treatment in the award 
process.1180 The underlying reasons that make the terms of a provision restrictive to full and open 
competition and make an award decision unlawful are sometimes corruption-related acts. 
Restrictive tender provisions and unfair treatment are more likely to be the result of bribery, 
extortion, conflict of interest, abuse of power or any other illegal acts that are subject to the 
jurisdictions of anti-corruption institutions.  
1177 OECD, supra note 3, at 36. 
1178 Supra note 1172, at 25-26. 
1179 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 12 (1)(a). 
1180 Id. 
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 Any illegal acts, such as fraud waste, and abuse of power, in a ministry is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the OIG to investigate it administratively and recommend proper solutions to the 
minister or head of a non-cabinet agency.1181 In addition, any financial irregularities in awarding 
public contracts are subject to the jurisdiction of the BSA.1182 Finally, the IC has broad 
jurisdiction but most prominently is its jurisdiction of investigating and forwarding corruption 
cases that involve criminal elements to trial.1183 Thus, there is a strong connection between the 
function of the bid protest bodies and that of the anti-corruption institutions.  
 The rampant corruption that Iraq suffers from requires cooperative efforts especially in 
the area of public procurement. Tackling corruption from various fronts without a coordinated 
policy and strategy undermines anti-corruption efforts. One of the major reasons of these divided 
tasks between the anti-corruption and the bid protest systems is the fact that the legislative 
branch enacts laws in different time period, without coordination.1184 Although Order 55 was 
enacted before Order 87, there is no provision in Order 87 to address cooperation with the anti-
corruption institutions. The legislator apparently failed to consider the importance of cooperation 
between the anti-corruption and the bid protest systems.1185  
Article 11 of the IRGC requires that the Public Contract Divisions (PCD) work with the 
OIG.1186 This is the only example of a provision that addresses cooperation with the anti-
corruption institutions in both Order 87 and the IRGC. In addition, according to an 
administrative order describing the structure of the PCD, one of the major functions of the PCD 
1181 Orde 57, supra note 783, Sec. 5. 
1182 The BSAL, supra note 1116, Art. 6. 
1183 The ICL, supra note 1107, Art. 11-15. 
1184 Order 55, supra note 33, has been enacted on January, 2004, while Order 87, supra note 5, has been enacted on 
May, 2004. 
1185 Id. 
1186 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 11. 
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is coordination with other government institutions including the BSA.1187 However, none of 
these provisions provide any more details to explain the forms of such cooperation. A mere 
requirement of cooperation is not sufficient for effective cooperation. The legislator again failed 
to establish mechanisms to achieve effective interaction between the two systems.   
 In addition to the failure of the legislator to consider meaningful cooperation, agencies 
that are empowered to enforce these laws also failed to establish an effective cooperation based 
on the shared jurisdiction of fighting corruption. Although this dissertation does not suggest that 
there is no cooperation between these agencies at all, there is, in fact, no indication of even 
occasional cooperation according to the websites of these agencies.1188 This explains the lack of 
interest in professional interaction between the two systems. However, this dissertation 
recommends systemic cooperation that is based on effective involvement with coordinated 
policies and strategies, including regular meeting with the heads of the agencies involved in 
order to respond to new challenges. 
 The traditional perspective regarding the administrative process, consisting of several 
bodies in isolation might be the reason for limited cooperation between these agencies. In this 
view, “each agency is supposed to enjoy significant discretion in its choices of priorities, 
substantive policies, the forms of which it implements those policies, how it enforces them and 
against whom, and so on.”1189 This model is practically applied in Iraq rendering any suggestion 
of strong cooperation unacceptable because such close interaction might be seen as intervention 
in the jurisdictions of agencies involved. However, considering the strict positivism that is 
1187 The OGPCP, supra note 555, Sect. 4. 
1188 See the website of the OGPCP, Public Contracts Section, available, in Arabic, at 
http://www.mop.gov.iq/mop/index.jsp?sid=1&id=597&pid=580, and see also the Website of the Integrity 
Commission (IC), available, in Arabic, at http://www.nazaha.iq/default.asp.     
1189 Keith Bradley, The Design Of Agency Interactions, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 745, 747 (2011). 
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applied in Iraq, organizing such a potential interaction by law should facilitate overcoming this 
resistance on the part of various agencies. 
4.6.1 Advantages of Involvement of Anti-Corruption in the Bid Protest Process  
 This dissertation suggests that there should be involvement of anti-corruption institutions 
in the bid protest processes. The level of corruption in public administration and especially in the 
public procurement sector and the lack of a comprehensive or coordinated strategy to fight 
corruption warrant such an involvement. The function of bid protest mechanisms complements 
that of anti-corruption institutions. The two systems are designed to detect corruption, fraud, and 
abuse of power. Thus, the author believes that the two systems should not work in isolation from 
each other. There are several reasons why the involvement of the anti-corruption bodies is 
beneficial to the bid protest processes. These reasons are considered below. 
4.6.2 Strengthening the Independence of the Bid Protest Review 
 One of the essential elements of a successful bid protest system is the independence of 
the review body.1190 Independence is a major aspect in the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
every forum. However, the difficult question is what is independence? How can independence be 
achieved and secured? Independence is a term of art and it has different elements in every legal 
and administrative system. Thus, regional and international agreements avoid imposing a 
specific concept for independence on the member states. Instead, they merely provide several 
criteria for an institution to be considered an independent body. The following sections examine 
those criteria.  
Regional and international procurement agreements do not introduce strict requirements for 
the independence of the agency-level bid protest mechanism. They leave the issue of organizing 
agency-level bid protest processes to the legal system of member states. However, some 
1190 See Troff, supra note 95, at 123. 
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jurisdictions, such as the US procurement system, attempt to mitigate the impact of lack of 
independence of the agency-level mechanism. Under the US system, agencies are required to 
allow unsatisfied contractors an opportunity to submit protests to an agency official who is senior 
to the contracting officer in the agency hierarchy.1191 
 The idea is that “there will be less likelihood of institutional bias in the review process if 
the review function is kept out of the hands of the person who was directly involved in making 
the original allegedly improper decision.”1192 As a result, each contracting agency is under 
obligation to identify the official or officials who will perform such independent review.1193 In 
addition, contracting agencies are required, when practicable, to ensure that officials conducting 
this review have not had previous personal involvement in the procurement activity.1194 This 
mechanism can be helpful because offerors might feel more comfortable having their protests 
reviewed by an official other than the one who was involved in the decision-making process.   
 On the other hand, regional and international agreements dedicate several provisions to 
the issue of independence of non-agency review bodies. Every jurisdiction and regional and 
international procurement agreement or model identifies various independence requirements. 
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law, administrative review must be conducted by a body that is 
independent of the procuring entity.1195 In addition, if the reviewing body is the one that under 
the law is to approve certain actions or decisions of the procuring entity, care should be taken to 
ensure that the part of the body exercising the review function is independent of the section that 
1191 FAR, supra note 144, 33.103 (d)(4) which states that “in accordance with agency procedures, interested parties 
may request an independent review of their protest at a level above the contracting officer…[emphasis added].” 
1192 Troff, supra note 95, at 146. 
1193 FAR, supra note 144, 33.103 (d)(4). 
1194 Id. 
1195 Guide to UNCITRAL Model Law (1994), supra note 762, Art. 54 (3). 
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performs the approval function.1196 “This independence is necessary to ensure both fairness and 
the appearance of fairness.”1197  
 The concept of independence under the WTO/GPA is that “challenges shall be heard by a 
court or by an impartial and independent review body with no interest in the outcome of the 
procurement and the members of which are secure from external influence during the term of 
appointment.”1198 Accordingly, the review body must not benefit from the procurement 
transaction in question in order to be considered impartial or independent. In other words, the 
procuring agency is not considered independent because it benefits from the protested 
procurement. Thus, agency-level review bodies are not independent for the purposes of this 
Article.   
 In addition, the members of such a body must be secure from external influence.1199 
However, Arrowsmith suggests that this provision is controversial with respect to review bodies 
that are not courts.1200 For instance, “it is not clear what safeguards must exist against dismissal 
or other termination of the term of office, or the extent to which pay and other conditions must 
be guaranteed.”1201 The term “independent agency” has its own meaning under the legal system 
in every country. Thus, such a term should be examined under the legal principles of every 
country separately.    
 Furthermore, a review body which is not a court should either be subject to judicial 
review or have procedures which provide that:  
(a)        participants can be heard before an opinion is given or a decision is 
reached; 
1196 Id. 
1197 See Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 767. 
1198 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX (6).  
1199Id. 
1200 See Arrowsmith, supra note 450, at 247. 
1201 Id. 
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(b)        participants can be represented and accompanied; 
(c)        participants shall have access to all proceedings; 
(d)       proceedings can take place in public; 
(e)        opinions or decisions are given in writing with a statement describing the 
basis       for the opinions or decisions; 
(f)        witnesses can be presented; 
(g)        documents are disclosed to the review body.1202 
 
The requirements of the EC Remedies Directives for a body to be considered independent are 
similar to those of the WTO/GPA. Under the EC Remedies Directives,  
Whereas bodies responsible for review procedures are not judicial in character, 
written reasons for their decisions shall always be given. Furthermore, in such a 
case, provision must be made to guarantee procedures whereby any allegedly 
illegal measures taken by the review body or any alleged defect in the exercise of 
the powers conferred on it can be the subject of judicial review or review by 
another body which is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 of the 
Treaty and independent of both the contracting entity and the review body.1203   
 
In addition, “the members of the independent body referred to in the first [the above] paragraph 
shall be appointed and leave office under the same conditions as members of the judiciary as 
regards the authority responsible for their appointment, their period of office, and their 
removal.”1204 Article 2(9) states that “at least the President of this independent body shall have 
the same legal and professional qualifications as members of the judiciary.”1205 “The 
independent body shall [also] take its decisions following a procedure in which both sides are 
heard, and these decisions shall, by means determined by each Member State, be legally 
binding.”1206 Accordingly, there are strict structural and procedural requirements for the 
independence of a body. 
Features of independence include written reasons for the bid protest review decisions, 
meeting the requirements of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, and being independent of the 
1202 WTO/GPA, supra note 38, Art. XX (6). 
1203 See EU Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC, supra notes 38 & 462, Art. 2 (9). 
1204 Id. 
1205 Id. 
1206 Id. 
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contracting agency. The requirements of Article 234 of the EC Treaty have been interpreted by 
the European Court of Justice.1207 The Court states that “the question whether a body is a 
tribunal or a court within the meaning of Article 234 is determined by whether the body is 
established by statute, is a permanent establishment, is the compulsory judicial body, applies 
contradictory procedure to the hearing of cases, makes decisions based on the rule of law and is 
independent.”1208 Thus, the requirements of the EU Remedies Directives are quite strict and 
amount to those of a judicial body.  
4.6.3 Evaluation of the CRC and the IAT under the Independence Requirements Set Forth 
in Regional and International Agreements 
If bid protest mechanisms in Iraq, the CRC and the IAT, are examined to determine to what 
extent independence requirements exist, there will be two different results because the CRC and 
the IAT are different in their structure and function. With respect to the CRC, the IRGC does not 
specify which party or official is authorized to establish the CRC. It only states that there must be 
a CRC in every ministry, independent bodies, region, and in every province.1209 It, further, states 
that a CRC must be connected to the head of the agency or to anyone who has been authorized 
by the head of the agency.1210 The IRGC should have determined the official that is to be 
empowered to establish a CRC and appoint and remove its members from duties.   
Furthermore, the CRC must report to the head of the agency,1211 which means that it is part 
of the contracting agency that issued the challenged decision. Accordingly, it is not independent 
under the independence requirements set forth by the UNICTRAL Model Law, the EC Remedies 
Directives, and the WTO/GPA. More importantly, all decisions of the CRC are 
1207 Supra note 17, at 367. 
1208 Id. 
1209 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (1)(a). 
1210 Id. 
1211 Id. 
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recommendations subject to the approval of the head of the agency concerned.1212 Considering 
the structure of the Iraqi ministries, which consists of several general directorates in the 
provinces, the CRC appears to enjoy some level of independence when reviewing the decisions 
of these general directorates. Such independence is based on the fact that CRCs are not part of 
these general directorates. Instead, CRCs are housed in the headquarters of the ministries or non-
cabinet agencies and subject to their control, not the director-general who runs the agency its 
action under protest.1213  
In other words, this structure is similar to the mechanism that the US procurement system 
adopted to enhance the independence of the agency-level review. In such a mechanism, 
protesters are allowed to request that their protests be reviewed by an official other than the one 
who initially made the protested decision.1214 Accordingly, the CRC is independent in the sense 
that it is not the contracting agency which issued the decision. Instead, it is a separate ministerial 
committee above the contracting agency. Nonetheless, both the CRCs and subsidiary general 
directorates are parts of the same ministry or non-cabinet agency and subject to their control. As 
a result, the CRC has some level of limited independence compared to the standards set forth by 
regional and international procurement agreements.            
Yet, this modest level of independence is disturbed in that both CRCs and general 
directorates have an interest in the outcome of the contract. Both of them are part of the ministry 
or non-cabinet agency that ultimately benefit from the services or goods potentially received 
based on the proposed contract. In addition, although the IRGC is silent on the appointment and 
removal of the members of the CRCs, it can be inferred that the head of the agency has the 
power to remove the members of the CRCs as they are considered lower-level officials to the 
1212 Id., Art. 10 (1)(b). 
1213 Id., Art. 10 (1)(a). 
1214 FAR, supra note 144, § 33.103. (d)(4). 
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minister or heads of non-cabinet agencies. CRC members are also selected among the officials of 
the ministry or non-cabinet agencies and subject to all administrative disciplines that the minister 
or an agency head is allowed to exercise on his or her officials. 
With respect to the independence of the IAT, the IRGC contradicts Order 87 as the Order 
states that the OGPCP shall establish and adopt the rules and procedures of the IAT,1215 while 
under the IRGC, the IAT is to be established by a decision of the Minister of Planning.1216 Since 
Order 87 is silent on the details of the IAT, the IRGC organized the composition and other 
details of the court. For instance, rules regarding who may invoke the jurisdiction of the IAT and 
the time limit for filing protests are regulated by the IRGC. The IAT shall, under the IRGC, 
consist of four members headed by a judge selected by the Higher Judicial Council (HJC).1217  
In addition, the IAT has a specialized and experienced representative from each of the MOP 
by an official with the rank of director general or higher, the Iraqi Contractors Union, and the 
Chambers of Commerce. 1218 The provision of the IRGC is vague as it is not clear whether the 
other members, other than the judge, are appointed by the Minister of Planning. Nevertheless, 
since the IAT itself is established by the Minister, the only possible conclusion absent a clear 
guideline to the contrary is that the other members of the IAT are also to be appointed by the 
Minister of Planning.  
On the other hand, regional and international agreements emphasize that when an 
administrative body functions as a final instance or judicial forum for bid protests, like the IAT, 
two conditions should prevail. The first is independence of the body, and the second is adherence 
1215 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1)(b, ii). 
1216 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (3). 
1217 Id. 
1218 Id.  
244 
 
                                                          
 
 
to certain procedural standards similar to those found in a court proceedings.1219 Examining the 
IAT in light of the two requirements does not provide us with a clear answer. The structure and 
jurisdiction of the IAT is quite unique compared to other judicial bid-protest forums in other 
jurisdictions.   
The IAT meets some requirements of independence set forth by the above mentioned 
agreements such as independence from the contracting agency. It is also a body that has no 
interest in the outcome of the procurement transaction in question. However, it does not meet 
other requirements because its members are appointed by the Minister of Planning, except for the 
judge.1220 In contrast, the above mentioned agreements require that the appointment of members 
of such body shall be similar to the appointment of members of the courts.1221  
Another point regarding the composition of the IAT is that it has a member who is an 
official representing the MOP.1222 The rationale behind such an appointment is not clear and it is 
against the principle of independence because there are obviously no representatives of the 
executive among court members. Under Order 87, the IAT is named a tribunal1223 and in Arabic 
the IAT is called a court.1224 There should not have been a member from the MOP in the 
composition of the IAT in order to secure the independence of the court.  
In addition, the IAT has two other members from the Iraqi Contractor’s Union and Iraqi 
Chamber of Commerce. Three members of the IAT are also not appointed like members of the 
judiciary. This structure potentially undermines the independence of the IAT in the view of the 
contractor community and the public in general. Since there are three members in the 
1219 See Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 768, and for the detail of these conditions, see this chapter at P. 16-19. 
1220 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (3). 
1221 EU Directives 89/665/EEC, supra note 38, and 92/13/EEC, supra note 462, Art. 2 (9). 
1222 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (3). 
1223 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1)(b)(ii). 
1224 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (3), there is no such distinction in Arabic between “court” and “tribunal”. 
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composition of the IAT that are not from the judiciary, the decision-making process could appear 
biased because each one of the members represents a specific interest rather than the public or 
general interest.  
Nonetheless, the existence of representatives from the industry and business sectors has its 
own benefit. It allows participation of the stakeholders in the decision-making process. Thus, the 
appointment of the members of the IAT does not conform to the requirements of the regional and 
international agreements. However, these agreements are not binding on Iraq, even if their 
requirements may be beneficial as guidance. It should be noted that Order 87 specifically 
requires the OGPCP to use these agreements as guidance in issuing its implementing 
regulations.1225 
Hong Kong has a similar experience as its Review Body consists of 12 members appointed 
by the Secretary of Commerce, Industry, and Technology.1226 Such positions are classified as a 
chairman, two deputy chairmen, and nine members.1227 The Review Body has always included 
one representative from the legal profession, construction, engineering, or architectural firms, 
and universities.1228 Most of the members are lawyers and, in order to ensure the legality of the 
review process, it is required that the chairman and the two deputy chairmen all have legal 
qualification.1229 
Thus, to ensure and strengthen the independence of the IAT, one solution could be changing 
the members of the IAT to three judges appointed by the HJC. Further, the appointment powers 
of the Minister of Planning should be cancelled. Another solution might be to increase the IAT 
members similar to the Hong Kong example to include representatives from a wider spectrum of 
1225 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 6 (2). 
1226 See Gao, supra note 96, at 218. 
1227 Id. 
1228 Id. 
1229 Id. 
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experts. The best solution is to amend Order 87 to reorganize the structure and function of the 
IAT similar to other independent agencies. Independent agencies under the Iraqi legal structure 
are discussed in subsequent sections. 
According to such potential amendment, all powers regarding the appointment and removal 
of the IAT members may be vested with the Judiciary or Parliament. This step is important to 
free the IAT members from the influence of the Minister of Planning. Such influence is possible 
because members appointed by the minister might seek to please him or her in order for the 
minister to renew their positions.  Further, the IAT’s function should be regulated more 
extensively by such potential amendment to include, for instance, strengthening the jurisdiction 
of the IAT to access documents regarding the protest in question.            
The IAT does meet the second requirement of independence, which is adherence to certain 
procedural guarantees in the resolution of bid protests.1230 The IAT is required under the IRGC 
to follow the procedural standards set forth in the Civil Procedure Law (CPL) for regular civil 
courts on matters that are not been covered by Order 87 and the IRGC.1231 Order 87 and the 
IRGC include very limited procedural rules for the IAT to follow in resolving bid protests. 1232 
As a result, the IAT extensively applies the CPL in bid protest resolution.  
Finally, the dissertation suggests that it is equally important to improve the quality of the 
review offered by various forums, in addition to structural and composition issues. Indeed, the 
independence of the review process may be more important than the structural independence of 
the body. There might be an agency-level protest mechanism that is very effective and efficient; 
therefore, it is respected by all parties. In contrast, there might be an independent body that meets 
1230 Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 768. 
1231 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (6). 
1232 Id., Art. 10, which only determines rules related to the establishment of the IAT, time limit for issuing a 
decision, and the appeal of its decisions before the Federal Supreme Court. It does not cover any more procedures 
the IAT should follow except stating that it has to follow the rules of the CPL.     
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the legal requirements of independence and adherence to certain procedural guarantees, but in 
practice it is not honest and contractors would not rely on its review.  
In addition, the effectiveness of protest mechanisms depends on the situation of the integrity 
and governance of the entire administrative and legal structure in a particular country. The mere 
factor of structural independence, sometimes, matters little. However, providing bid protest 
mechanisms with structural independence and procedural rules facilitates their effectiveness. 
4.6.4 The Concept of Independent Agencies under the Iraqi Legal System 
The above analysis evaluated the independence of the CRC and the IAT under the standards 
of regional and international agreements. However, the concept of independence is different 
under the Iraqi legal and administrative structures. The Iraqi Constitution has dedicated Chapter 
Four to the organization of independent agencies. It states that “the High Commission for Human 
Rights, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Public Integrity are 
considered independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives, 
and their functions shall be regulated by law.”1233 In addition, Article 103 states   
First: The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communication 
and Media Commission, and the Endowment Commissions are financially and 
administratively independent institutions, and the work of each of these 
institutions shall be regulated by law.  
Second: The Central Bank of Iraq is responsible before the Council of 
Representatives. The Board of Supreme Audit and the Communication and Media 
Commission shall be attached to the Council of Representatives.  
Third: The Endowment Commissions shall be attached to the Council of 
Ministers.1234 
 
However, the detail of what independence means in these articles is not clear and left to the 
statutes organizing the structure and functions of these independent agencies. In addition, the 
Constitution mentions two types of independence. Article 102 states that the Electoral 
1233 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114,  Art. 102. 
1234 Id., Art. 103. 
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Commission, the IC, and the Commission for Human Rights are “independent”. On the other 
hand, Article 103 states that the Central Bank, the BSA, the Communication and Media 
Commission, and the Endowment Commission are “financially and administratively 
independent”. Thus, under the Constitution, there are “independent” agencies and there are also 
“financially and administratively independent” bodies. 
 The Federal Supreme Court interprets the difference between “independent” and 
“financially and administratively independent” agencies. In Decision No (228/T/2006) (the 2006 
decision), the Court states that the independence mentioned in Article 102 of the Constitution is 
that the officials of the IC are independent in performing their duties according to the ICL.1235 
No party has control over the Commission’s officials except for laws regulating the 
Commission’s functions and no public institutions are allowed to intervene or influence the 
IC.1236 Nonetheless, the IC is subject to Parliament’s oversight according to Article 102 of the 
Constitution.1237 Parliament is the only party that is allowed to question the IC’s officials only 
when they exceed their statutory boundaries.1238 Accordingly, the decision concludes that the 
term “independent” means that these institutions mentioned in Article 102 are self-organized 
agencies and functions according to the statutes organizing them without any intervention from 
other bodies.1239    
 On the other hand, the Court in a very misleading analysis states that the term 
“financially and administratively independent” mentioned in Article 103 restricts the meaning of 
independence to financial and administrative matters.1240 It will not provide more than the 
1235 Raheem Al-Augaily: Independent Agencies: Full Independence or Financial and Administrative Independence, 
Al-Augaily’s Blog, available online http://rahimaqeeli.blogspot.com/2012/05/2003.html.   
1236 Id. 
1237 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114, Art. 102. 
1238 Al-Augaily, supra note 1235. 
1239 Id. 
1240 Id. 
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previous sentence in describing the meaning of financial and administrative independence. Based 
on the analysis of the court, it is extremely difficult to identify a difference between the two 
types of independence in Article 102 and 103 of the Constitution. Such a sensitive issue needs 
more than half a page of analysis from the highest court in the country. This decision does not 
provide a clear analysis as to what it means that an agency is described as independent 
financially or administratively.  
Regardless of the inconclusive analysis of the FSC in the above decision, the FSC has 
recently issued an interpretive decision No. 88/Federal/2010 in 2011 (the 2011 decision), that 
created strong controversy among politicians, scholars, and civil society activists.1241 The 2011 
decision is vague and misleading similar to the 2006 decision. Further, it was controversial 
because the Court gave the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) oversight power over 
independent agencies.1242 The following sections cover the content of the decision in detail. The 
decision was controversial to the extent that the Speaker of Parliament requested an explanation 
from the FSC.1243  
The 2011 decision was issued to respond to a petition from the OPM requesting the Court’s 
interpretation regarding constitutional provisions organizing independent agencies.1244 The OPM 
1241 See the Middle East Newspaper, The Speaker of the Parliament; the Decision Linking Independent Agencies to 
the Office of the Prime Minister Is a Real Threat, The Middle East, Feb. 3, 2011, available at 
http://classic.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=606703&issueno=11755#.VBPt-PmSwmk.  The Speaker of 
Parliament considered the decision a threat on the Constitution, he announced that there will be steps from 
Parliament that determine better the relationship between independent agencies and other branches of the 
government. In addition, major political parties condemned the 2011 decision. For instance, the Kurdistan Coalition 
described the decision as unsuccessful because it undermines the independence of these agencies. Further, the Iraqi 
National List considered the decision a coup d’état on the Constitution requiring Parliament and other political 
parties to take a strong stand to protect democracy in the country. Finally, the Central Bank of Iraq requested the 
FSC to issue a decision explaining the 2011 decision.      
1242 The Federal Supreme Court (FSC) Of the Republic of Iraq, Decision No. 88/Federal/2010 ( January 1, 2011), 
available, in Arabic, at http://www.iraqja.iq/krarat/2/2010/88_fed_2010.pdf.   
1243 The Website of the Higher Judicial Council: Response Of The Federal Supreme Court Regarding the Letter Of 
The Council of Representatives Requesting Explanation about Independent Agencies, available, in Arabic, at 
http://www.synisys.com/hjc/index.jsp?sid=3&nid=80&y=2011&m=2&d=8.      
1244 The FSC, supra note 1242. 
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stated in its petition that members of Parliament thought that independent agencies are attached 
to Parliament and are not related to the OPM in any possible ways.1245 Such an interpretation, 
according to the OPM, contradicted with the duties and function of these agencies which are 
executive in nature.1246 In addition, the OPM asserted that such interpretation contradicts with 
constitutional provisions as well as the principle of separation of powers.1247  
The OPM rejected any interpretation that suggested that independent agencies are out of the 
reach of the executive by attacking the notion of independence itself.1248 Independence to the 
OPM meant that these agencies would not be completely independent.1249 Instead, such agencies 
are only financially and administratively independent.1250 As a result of this misunderstanding of 
the Constitution, the OPM argued, these independent agencies acted without any supervision and 
oversight,1251 because of Parliament’s limited enforcement capacity and hence its inability to 
perform sufficient oversight.1252 In contrast, the executive had various enforcement powers that 
enable it to exercise proper oversight and supervision.1253 More importantly, subjecting these 
agencies, the OPM argued, to the follow-up and supervision of the OPM does not mean stripping 
Parliament from oversight jurisdiction over public institutions.1254  
The Court’s response to the OPM starts by interpreting these phrases from the Constitution: 
“attached to the Council of Representatives or the Office of the Prime Minister”, “subject to 
oversight of the Council of Representatives”, and “responsible before the Council of 
1245 Id. 
1246 Id. 
1247 Id.  
1248 Id. 
1249 Id. 
1250 Id. 
1251 Id. 
1252 Id. 
1253 Id. 
1254 Id. 
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Representatives”.1255  There are only four independent agencies that are expressly mentioned by 
the Constitution to be “attached” to Parliament and only two that are “attached” to the OPM.1256  
According to the Court, attachment means that the higher authority determines the general policy 
for the independent agency that has been linked to it by the Constitution.1257 However, the FSC 
does not explain what constitutes the general policy of an agency. It emphasizes that such higher 
authority does not have the power to intervene in the decision-making process of the attached 
agency.1258 Such agencies have been granted independence by the Constitution to ensure 
impartiality and objectivity in their decisions.1259 
Although the FSC acknowledges attachment of four agencies to Parliament by express 
constitutional provisions, it held that this status does not prevent the OPM from supervising the 
activities of these agencies.1260 The foundation of this claim by the court is Article 80 (1) of the 
Constitution. Article 80 states that the OPM is empowered to plan and execute the general policy 
and plans of the government of Iraq and supervise the function of ministries and non-cabinet 
agencies.1261 Independent agencies are non-cabinet agencies as mentioned in Article 80 (1). 
Accordingly, this interpretation of the Constitution strips independent agencies expressly 
established by the Constitution from the privilege of independence. This interpretation appears to 
contradict well-settled principle of interpretation that a specific term supersedes a general one.        
1255 Id. 
1256 See the Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114, Art. 103, 104 135, and 136 for the agencies that are attached to 
Parliament, which are the BSA, the Communication and Media Commission, according to Article 103 (2) and the 
Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice, according to Article 135, and the Property Claims 
Commission, according to Article 136. In addition, Independent agencies that are attached to the OPM are the 
Endowment Commissions, according to Article 103 (3), and the Martyrs’ Foundation, according to Article 104.  
1257 The FSC, supra note 1242. 
1258 Id. 
1259 Id. 
1260 Id. 
1261 The Iraqi Constitution, Art. 80 (1). 
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Interestingly, the court also criticizes the attachment of some of these agencies to 
Parliament. It states that attaching those agencies that are performing executive-related functions 
to Parliament is not justifiable.1262 The justification of the FSC’s perspective regarding this issue 
is three major points. First, such attachment contradicts the jurisdictions of Parliament set forth 
in Article 61 and 62 of the Constitution which basically are lawmaking and oversight.1263 
Second, it does not conform to the principle of separation of powers.1264 Finally, it contradicts 
the practices of parliaments worldwide.1265 According to the FSC, parliaments in other countries 
are not empowered to run bodies that perform executive-related functions because they do not 
have sufficient tools that enable them to properly exercise oversight and supervision on such 
agencies.1266 However, the Court does not explain what constitute executive-related functions.  It 
also fails to demonstrate the rationality of each of the reasons it presented as to why Parliament 
cannot perform its oversight and supervision duties on independent agencies. Indeed, it appears 
that the FSC merely substituted its own judgment over that of the drafters of the constitution. 
On the other hand, there are still agencies that have not expressly been attached to 
Parliament or the OPM and some others that are categorized as being “subject to oversight of the 
Council of Representatives” or “Responsible before the Council of Representatives” by 
constitutional provisions. The FSC held that all these agencies should be attached to the OPM 
because the function of these agencies is close to the function of the executive.1267 It also 
emphasizes the meaning of attachment as the one that has been explained above.1268 Attachment 
means that the OPM has the power to determine the general policy of these agencies provided 
1262 The FSC, supra note 1242. 
1263 Id. 
1264 Id. 
1265 Id. 
1266 Id. 
1267 Id. 
1268 Id. 
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that it will not intervene in their affairs.1269 However, the FSC emphasizes that Parliament still 
has oversight jurisdiction over such agencies as any other government bodies according to the 
Constitution.1270  
This decision triggered widespread opposition to the FSC among politicians, scholars, civil 
society activists. The Speaker of Parliament sent a petition to the FSC requesting an explanation 
from the Court regarding the content of the 2011 decision.1271 The FSC’s response to the Speaker 
is misleading by creating an uncertain legal framework for independent agencies. The response 
emphasizes that the content of 2011 decision is the same as the one of the 2006 decision.1272 The 
FSC excerpts some paragraphs of the 2011 decision regarding the concept of attachment.1273 It 
also excerpts the paragraph that addresses acknowledgement of express constitutional provisions 
attaching some of independent agencies to Parliament or the OPM.1274 With respect to those 
agencies that are not mentioned in the Constitution as being attached to Parliament or the OPM, 
the higher authority for these agencies must be determined according to the nature of their 
function.1275  
The FSC also states that mentioning Article 80 in the 2011 decision comes from the notion 
that constitutional provisions interpret each other.1276 It also reaffirms the content of Article 80 
that the OPM is empowered to determine the general policy and supervise the works of all 
ministries and non-cabinet agencies.1277 Empowering the OPM, according to the Court, of such 
1269 Id. 
1270 Id. 
1271 The Website of the HJC, supra note 1243.  
1272 Id. 
1273 Id. 
1274 Id. 
1275 Id. 
1276 Id. 
1277 Id. 
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supervision does not affect the independence of these agencies.1278 Thus, the Court concludes its 
response to the Speaker of Parliament by emphasizing the obligation of respecting the 
professional, financial, and administrative independence of these agencies.1279 In addition, it also 
requires all parties to respect the laws that organize the function and duties of these agencies.1280 
4.6.5 Evaluation of the FSC’s Analysis in Both the 2006 and 2011 Interpretive Decisions 
With respect to the 2006 decision, the FSC provides a high level of independence to 
agencies that are mentioned in Article 102. The decision affirms that no party is allowed to 
intervene in the affairs of these agencies.1281 It also states that such agencies are subject only to 
the authority of law.1282 Although these agencies are attached to Parliament, Parliament’s 
intervention is limited to the situation when one of these agencies violates its regulating 
statute.1283 Granting an important weight to the statute organizing the structure and function of 
these agencies is in conformity with the Constitution. Article 102 states that the function of these 
agencies shall be regulated by law.1284  
 On the other hand, the Court states that financial and administrative independence, 
mentioned in Article 103, is more limited compared to the concept of independence mentioned in 
Article 102.1285 Although agencies in the former example enjoy financial and administrative 
independence, they are still subject to control of the bodies they are attached to in performing 
their duties.1286 Such agencies are allowed to act independently in their financial and 
1278 Id. 
1279 Id. 
1280 Id. 
1281 Al-Augaily, supra note 1235. 
1282 Id. 
1283 Id. 
1284 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114, Art. 102. 
1285 Al-Augaily,supra note 1235. 
1286 Id. 
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administrative affairs.1287 However, such independence does not prevent bodies to which 
independent agencies are responsible before from intervening in their function because such 
higher bodies have supervision and oversight power over them.1288  
The court’s analysis of financial and administrative independence is problematic. It does not 
explain the parameters of financial and administrative independence. It also allows Parliament or 
the OPM to which such agencies are attached to intervene in their affairs through the power of 
supervision and oversight.1289 The supervision and oversight power is a term of art under the 
Iraqi legal system. It means that the body that is granted the power of supervision and oversight 
has jurisdiction to intervene by approving, amending, or cancelling actions of the subordinate 
agency.1290 This interpretation does not conform to the Constitution by virtue of several reasons 
discussed in the following sections when analyzing the content of 2011 decision.            
With respect to the 2011 decision, several major problems need to be addressed. First, the 
FSC contradicts itself, as the 2011 decision in some parts takes a different approach than the 
2006 decision. In the 2011 decision, the FSC focuses its attention on differentiating between 
“agencies attached to the Council of Representatives”, “subject to oversight of the Council of 
Representatives”, and “responsibility before the Council of Representatives”.1291 In the 2006 
decision, the FSC focused on differentiation between “independent” and “financial and 
administrative independent”.1292 Accordingly, the result and content of the two decisions became 
different.  
1287 Id. 
1288 Id. 
1289 Id. 
1290 See for more information, AMMAR BUZIAF, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ORGANIZATION, Arab Academy in Denmark, 2009-2010.  
1291 The FSC, supra note 1242. 
1292 Al-Augaily, supra note 1235. 
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In the 2006 decision, the court provided independent agencies mentioned in Article 102 of 
the Constitution with a high level of independence. It stated that these agencies are independent 
and no party or authority is allowed to intervene in their activities as such agencies are subject 
only to the law organizing them.1293 The problem of the 2006 decision was the Court’s 
interpretation of financial and administrative independence as it is discussed above. Under the 
2011 decision, Parliament and the OPM to which some independent agencies are attached by 
express constitutional provisions, have the power to determine the general policy for these 
agencies.1294  
Nonetheless, Parliament or the OPM must not intervene in the function of these agencies 
because they are independent.1295 Allowing Parliament or the OPM to determine the general 
policy of independent agencies is a violation of the plain text of the Constitution, because the 
concept of attachment used by the court undermines the concept of independence. In addition, 
the court held that other independent agencies that are not attached to either Parliament or the 
OPM but that perform executive-related function must be attached to the OPM.1296 Thus, the 
FSC provided two totally different opinions in the 2006 and 2011 decisions.  
The Court fails to acknowledge that the Constitution organizes the provisions of 
independent agencies in a separate chapter.1297 Section Three of the Constitution is dedicated to 
the organization of the government.1298 Chapter One of this Section covers the legislative branch, 
Chapter Two covers the executive branch, Chapter Three covers the judiciary, and Chapter Four 
covers independent agencies.1299 Dedicating a separate chapter for independent agencies is 
1293 Id. 
1294 The FSC, supra note 1242. 
1295 Id. 
1296 Id. 
1297 See Section Three: Chapter Four of the Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114. 
1298 Id. 
1299 Id. 
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purposeful.1300 It reflects the foundation on which the constitution is established.1301 If the 
Constitution wanted independent agencies to be part of one of the three branches, it would have 
not dedicated a separate chapter to their organization.  
When the Constitution mentions that an independent agency is attached to Parliament or the 
OPM, it does not mean that such an agency is under their control. Instead, the attachment 
appears to be for the purposes of appointing and removing the head of the agency. For instance, 
the IC, under the Constitution, is responsible to Parliament,1302 but what controls the function of 
this agency is the ICL, formerly Order 55.1303 According to the ICL, the head of the IC fully 
directs and administers the agency.1304 In addition, the BSA is attached to Parliament based on 
Article 103 of the Constitution.1305 Nonetheless, Parliament’s involvement in the affairs of the 
BSA is extremely limited to appointment and removal of the head of the BSA as well as annual 
reporting to Parliament.1306 The entire jurisdictions of the BSA are to be exercised under the 
direction of the BSA Council.1307       
Second, the FSC ignored the statutes that organize the structure and function of these 
independent agencies. Article 102 and 103 of the Constitution state that functions of these 
independent agencies “shall be regulated by law.”1308 Accordingly, the Court should have 
reviewed the issue of independence in light of these enabling laws or statutes. Under Order 55, 
which organized the structure and functions of the IC and was in effect at the time the FSC 
1300 Qasim Hassan AL-Abudi, an Analytical Review for the Federal Supreme Court Decision No. (88/Federal/2010), 
Al-Nur Institution for Culture and Media, available, in Arabic, at http://www.alnoor.se/article.asp?id=105770.   
1301 Yahya Al-Kubaisy, Federal Supreme Court and the Allocation of Power, Iraqi Writers’ Website, available, in 
Arabic, at http://www.iraqiwriters.com/INP/view.asp?ID=2735.   
1302 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114, Art. 102. 
1303 See the ICL, supra note 1107.  
1304 Id., Art. 6.   
1305 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114, Art. 103. 
1306 See the BSAL, supra note 116, Art. 22, 24, & 28. 
1307 Id., Art. 21.  
1308 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114,  Art. 102 & 103. 
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issued the 2011 decision, the head of the IC is responsible for running the Commission.1309 The 
head of the IC is required to “authorize, direct, and control all operations of the commission and 
ensure that it fulfills its duties under law.”1310 Further, he or she shall prepare the budget for and 
approve expenditures of the IC and hire, fire, or discipline the personnel of the Commission.1311 
Thus, except for the appointment and removal of the head of the IC as well as a reporting 
requirement, there is no involvement of Parliament or the OPM in the exercise of the IC’s duties. 
In addition, the new ICL refutes the fundamental argument of the Court in holding that the term 
attached to Parliament or the OPM allows them to determine the general policy of the agency. 
In contrast, the ICL states that the head of the IC, shall determine the general policy of the 
Commission.1312    
Another implication that the constitution intended complete independence for these agencies 
is the change of the philosophy of governance that occurred after the fall of Iraq’s previous 
regime. This change can be demonstrated in Order 77, enacted in 2004 as an amendment to the 
BSAL. Order 77 states that “all powers and authorities granted by the Board of Supreme Audit 
Law to the now-dissolved Office of the President, Revolutionary Command Council, and its 
Council Chairman are hereby revoked.”1313 Among the powers of the President, according to the 
old BSAL, was the appointment of the head of the BSA,1314 but now such an appointment is 
vested in Parliament.1315             
 Moreover, some terms the court uses in the 2011 decision are very important to determine 
the nature of relationship between Parliament or the OPM and the independent agency 
1309 Order 55, supra note 5, Sec. 5. 
1310 Id., Sec. 5 (2)(a). 
1311 Id., Sec. 5 (b)(c). 
1312 The ICL, supra note 1107, Art. 6. 
1313 Order 77, supra note 432, Sec. 2 (1). 
1314 The Baord of Supreme Audit Law (BSAL) No.6 (1990), Article 19 (2). 
1315 The BSAL, supra note 1116, Art. 22 (1). 
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concerned. For instance, although the Court held that these agencies are independent, Parliament 
or the OPM to which these agencies are attached must determine the general policy of such 
agencies.1316 However, it does not define what general policy of an independent agency means. 
The lack of precise definition of the concept of general policy allows Parliament or the OPM to 
interpret it broadly in order to intervene in the function of an independent agency attached to it. 
In addition, the FSC states that independent agencies that perform executive-related functions 
must be attached to the OPM.1317 However, it also fails to identify, at least as an example, what 
these functions are. Further, it does not explain based on what legal principle these agencies that 
are described as “independent” should nevertheless be attached to the OPM. 
The most troubling part of the 2011 decision is the Court’s analysis that all independent 
agencies including those that are attached to Parliament are subject to the supervision of the 
OPM.1318 The FSC justifies its controversial analysis based on Article 80 of the Constitution. 
Under Article 80, the OPM is allowed “to plan and execute the general policy and general plans 
of the State and oversee the work of the ministries and departments not associated with a 
ministry.”1319 Accordingly, independent agencies, being non-cabinet agencies and part of the 
Iraqi government, are subject to Article 80 (1).1320  
The Court’s justification is troubling because, again the Constitution dedicated a separate 
chapter for the organization of independent agencies. It is true that independent agencies are part 
of the government of Iraq. However, this fact does not specifically mean that they are part of the 
executive. If the Constitution intended to subject independent agencies to the supervision of the 
OPM, it would have stated so expressly in Chapter Four. Subjecting independent agencies to the 
1316 The FSC, supra note 1242.  
1317 Id. 
1318 Id. 
1319 The Iraqi Constitution, supra note 114, Art. 80 (1). 
1320 The FSC, supra note 1242. 
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supervision of the OPM strips them from the independence that is guaranteed by the 
Constitution. 
Finally, the court misinterprets the principle of separation of powers when it states that the 
attachment of independent agencies must be determined according to their nature of activities. If 
the nature of the function of an independent agency is close to that of the executive, the FSC held 
such agency must be attached to the executive. The court’s analysis indicates that it strictly 
applies the principle of separation of powers according to which there should be sharp 
jurisdictional distinction among the three major branches.1321 However, the strict application of 
separation of powers is not so easily delineated anymore because it is impossible to draw a line 
between the jurisdictions of the three branches.1322     
In conclusion, the status and features of independent agencies are not clear, and the FSC’s 
response to the inquiry of the Speaker regarding the 2011 decision exacerbated this uncertainty. 
The FSC declared in that response that the 2011 decision is not different from the content of the 
2006 decision.1323 However, there are huge differences between the two decisions. The 2006 
decision provides some of the independent agencies strong independence status that conforms to 
the intent of the Constitution. Nonetheless, agencies that are independent financially and 
administratively, under the 2006 decision, are not granted strong independence similar to the 
independence status presented in the 2011 decision. On the other hand, the content of the 2011 
decision provides independent agencies with little independence because it allows the authority 
to which the agencies are attached to supervise the functions of such agencies. In addition, it 
subjects all independent agencies to the supervision of the OPM without exception.  
1321 Al-Abudy, supra note 1300. 
1322 Id. 
1323 The HJC Website, supra note 1243.   
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Even with uncertain and weak standards of independence contained in the FSC’s 2011 
decision, it is difficult to conclude that the CRC is an independent body. The CRC is structurally 
part of one of the ministries or non-cabinet agencies, so it is not independent. In addition, it is not 
functionally independent because all decisions of the CRC are recommendations subject to the 
approval of the head of the agency. Further, there are no strict procedural requirements for the 
CRC to follow in the resolution of bid protests. The appointment and removal of the members of 
the CRC are not regulated by law as it is subject to the discretion of the head of the agency. 
Thus, the CRC can be considered as the agency-level bid protest mechanism in Iraq. 
4.6.6 Benefiting from the Experience of Anti-corruption Institutions and the Powers They 
are Granted  
 Anti-corruption institutions have ostensibly 10 years of experience in fighting corruption 
in Iraq.1324 In fact, the BSA has over 85 years of experience auditing financial records of the 
Iraqi government.1325 Cooperation of bid protest mechanisms with the IC, the BSA, and the OIG 
will be beneficial to the resolution of bid protest processes. These agencies have obtained 
specific knowledge regarding corrupt practices in the government. The reports of the IC 
demonstrate that the Commission is active on fighting corruption, considering the difficult 
situation of working on such a sensitive issue in Iraq.  
According to the 2013 Report, there have been 109,531 notifications of corruption brought 
to the attention of the Commission since 2004.1326 The number of notification of corruption was 
3491 in 2004-2005, while the number in 2013 increased to 14,070 notifications.1327 In addition, 
1324 Order 55, supra note 5, Sec. 3, which established the anti-corruption system in Iraq. It has been issued by the 
CPA in 2004. 
1325 See the Website of the BSA, History of the BSA, available, in Arabic, at http://www.d-raqaba-
m.iq/pages_ar/about_history_ar.aspx.  
1326 The Iraqi Integrity Commission, the 2013 Annual Report, 1, available, in Arabic, at 
http://www.nazaha.iq/pdf_up/2340/p2.pdf.  
1327 Id., at 1. 
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408 persons were referred to courts for prosecution in 2008, while the number is 4625 in 
2013.1328 The number of convicted individuals in 2004-2006 was 103, while the number of 
individuals convicted in 2013 was 1464.1329 Three ministers, 40 directors-general, two 
candidates for Parliament, and eight candidates for provincial councils were among those who 
have been convicted.1330  
 With respect to preventive measures, only 1535 financial disclosure forms were received 
by the IC in 2004-2005, while in 2013 the number increased dramatically to 11,883.1331 In 2011, 
the IC received 15,673 financial disclosure forms from senior public officials.1332 The response 
rate of senior officials submitting their financial disclosure forms to the IC has been increasing 
since 2004. With respect to the members of Parliament, the percentage rate of those forms 
submitted to the IC was 10% in 2004-2005, while this number increased to 65% in 2012 and 
50% in 2013.1333 Further, 42% of all ministers submitted financial disclosure forms to the IC in 
2005, but 93% of ministers submitted their disclosure forms in 2013.1334 From the 11,883 
disclosure forms received by the IC, 4316 of them have been inspected by the Commission.1335  
 The above numbers demonstrate the growing role of the commission in fighting 
corruption in Iraq. There is no doubt that the level of corruption is still among the highest in the 
world. However, the situation would have become even worse if the IC had not existed. The 
Commission’s efforts had a positive effect on the level of corruption especially corruption of 
lower-level officials, at least by obtaining a few convictions. In addition, there is no better ways 
to fight corruption except through an independent agency like the IC. Some observers are 
1328 Id., at 9. 
1329 Id., at 13. 
1330 Id. 
1331 Id., at 21. 
1332 Id. 
1333 Id. 
1334 Id., at 22. 
1335 Id., at 24. 
263 
 
                                                          
 
 
skeptical about the role of anti-corruption commissions as it has a limited effect on 
corruption.1336 Nonetheless, efforts should be directed to strengthening the Commission through 
exerting influence on politicians to work seriously in reducing the level of corruption.  
In addition, the BSA and the OIG perform their duties in fighting corruption, but there are 
no data to show the details of their functions in the past couple of years. Data reflecting the 
experience of these agencies would be helpful to the bid protest processes. The only way for the 
anti-corruption institutions and the bid protest processes to address corruption properly is close 
cooperation. More importantly, involvement of the anti-corruption institutions, in the author’s 
view, is necessary to strengthen protest resolution as challenged procurement transactions 
usually involve corrupt acts. The question, however, is how these agencies can be involved in the 
bid protest processes. The following sections will address this question.  
An advantage of having anti-corruption institutions involved in protest resolution is the 
powers that these agencies are granted under their respective statutes. The powers each anti-
corruption institution possesses are not the same. The IC’s powers are mostly related to the 
criminal investigation of corruption allegations.1337 The IC is empowered to investigate any 
corruption cases through its investigators under the supervision of a magistrate.1338 Corruption 
cases are mostly those actions that involve office-related crimes such as bribery and 
embezzlement.1339 
In addition, the IC’s investigative powers have priority over the jurisdiction of any other 
bodies that investigate corruption cases including military and security force’s investigation 
1336 See for more information, Michael Johnston, Why Do So Many Anti-Corruption Efforts Fail? 67 N.Y.U. Ann. 
Surv. Am. L. 467 (2012). 
1337 The ICL, supra note 1107, Art. 11-15. 
1338 Id., Art. 11 (1). 
1339 Id., Art 1. 
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units.1340 Such military bodies are required to forward all documents to the IC related to the 
case.1341 Further, the IC is allowed to utilize all forensic and technological means in preventing 
and investigating corruption cases.1342 Magistrates are required to inform the IC when they open 
an investigation in any corruption cases.1343 Finally, all government agencies are required to 
cooperate with and to provide the IC with any documents the Commission requests that are 
related to a corruption case.1344 
On the other hand, the BSA is the highest auditing agency that is empowered to inspect all 
documents and records of government agencies to ensure that money is spent according to laws 
and regulations.1345 It is the highest auditing agency in the country and all government agencies 
are subject to its jurisdiction.1346 Similar to the IC, the BSA also has the power to access all 
documents, files, papers, orders, and decisions that are related to the Board’s auditing and 
oversight function.1347 In addition, the OIG is also empowered to have full and unrestricted 
access to all offices, employees, data, reports, plans, and other materials related to the work of 
the IG.1348  
All of the three agencies have specific function in the anti-corruption efforts. Under the ICL, 
the BSA shall forward all evidence on acts of fraud, corruption, waste, and abuse of power to the 
IG concerned.1349 The IG is required to conduct inspection and administrative investigations on 
the content of the reports of the BSA and submit the results of it investigation to the appropriate 
1340 Id., Art 11 (2). 
1341 Id. 
1342 Id., Art. 12. 
1343 Id., Art. 14 (1). 
1344 Id., Art. 15 (1). 
1345 The BSAL, supra note 1116, Art. 6. 
1346 Id., Art. 8. 
1347 Id., Art. 13.  
1348 Order 57, supra note 5, Sec. 6 (1)(a). 
1349 The ICL, supra note 1107, Art. 21 (3). 
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minister or head of non-cabinet agencies concerned.1350 In addition, the IG is also required to 
inform the IC or relevant investigative authorities about any act that constitutes a crime 
according to applicable laws.1351 Finally, the IC is the only body that is vested with the power to 
open a criminal investigation on corruption cases.1352 
Thus, through effective cooperation, bid protest fora can benefit from the experience of the 
anti-corruption institutions in the fight against corruption in the public procurement process. Bid 
protest mechanisms might come across some issues that, if investigated properly, will reveal 
corrupt acts. However, they do not have the mandate to investigate corruption cases; therefore 
corrupt acts might escape investigation. In addition, bid protest mechanisms can benefit from 
unlimited powers to access documents of government agencies granted to anti-corruption 
institutions. The only way to achieve this goal is through close cooperation. Yet, the important 
matter is determining types of effective cooperation which will be discussed in the subsequent 
sections. 
4.6.7 Benefitting from the Advantages of Inter-Agency Cooperation 
 Involving anti-corruption in the bid protest process may achieve the advantages of inter-
agency cooperation. First, interagency cooperation can be productive.1353 Most agencies focus on 
one area of interest1354 such as the anti-corruption institutions focusing on fighting corruption. 
Thus, agencies can share their expertise and knowledge with another agency for better outcomes 
in dealing with a particular issue.1355 In fact, this cooperation could allow one agency modify its 
decision-making process1356 to consider some factors that would have not been addressed 
1350 Id., Art. 21 (4). 
1351 Id., Art. 21 (4). 
1352 Id., Art. 21 (5). 
1353 J.R. DeShazo Jody Freeman, Public Agencies As Lobbyists, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2217, 2233 (2005). 
1354 Id., at 2239. 
1355 Id., at 2233. 
1356 Id. 
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initially. This scenario is feasible because agencies usually represent different constituencies, and 
adhere to different statutory mandates.”1357 
 In addition, inter-agency interaction has been identified as a factor to reduce abuse of 
power and deviation from the purposes specified by lawmakers.1358 The Federalist Paper covered 
this concern by stating that “experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions” that “so contrive the interior structure of the government as that its several 
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their 
proper places.”1359 Further, it has been argued that inter-agency cooperation allows decision-
makers to consider different interests, values, and arguments.1360 In such instances, agencies’ 
decisions are more likely acceptable to the people concerned and may survive judicial review.1361 
   Inter-agency cooperation has been viewed as making agencies function as lobbyists 
toward their counterparts.1362 The traditional theory of administration contemplates that agencies 
are roughly independent actors performing specific tasks.1363 Each agency is granted significant 
discretion “in its choices of priorities, substantive policies, the forms in which it implements 
those policies, how it enforces them and against whom.”1364 However, this traditional theory has 
been criticized because it ignores the influence that agencies can have on each other.1365 
Agencies interact with each other frequently from high level officials to filed officers.1366 Indeed, 
1357 Id.  
1358 Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination In Shared Regulatory Space, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1187 
(2012). 
1359 The Federalist No. 51 (Hamilton or Madison). 
1360 See Freeman, supra note 1358, at 1184. 
1361 Id., at 1185. 
1362 See for more information Agencies as Lobbyists, supra note 1353, arguing that agencies affect each other 
through inter-agency interactions in a way that they change their policies and processes of decision-making.  
1363 Supra note 1189, at 747. 
1364 Id. 
1365 Id., at 748. 
1366 Id. 
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these interactions are probably more intense and more frequent than each agency’s dealings with 
the executive, legislative, or judicial branches.”1367 
“Agency interactions are not simply a competition for resources, power, or presidential 
attention.”1368 Rather, they are sometimes intentional and part of the design structure of 
agencies.1369 In addition, they constitute significant restrictions on agencies’ discretion when 
they execute policies and regulations.1370 In addition, inter-agency cooperation saves the 
government money and effort. Such cooperation is more efficient than having two agencies 
empowered to address the same issue, such as corruption. Simultaneous action results in wasteful 
governmental expenditures, dual prosecutions, or inconsistent regulation.1371 Cooperation is 
necessary for the fight against corruption as discussed above. In Iraq to date, there is no 
indication of effective cooperation between anti-corruption institutions and bid protest 
mechanisms, or between the former and the public procurement process in general. 
Still, the traditional administrative approach has its own advantages. In this model, each 
agency enjoys its independence in performing its duties emanating from laws and regulations.1372 
Accordingly, agencies rarely interact with each other because they follow their jurisdictional 
boundaries.1373 In addition, when two agencies cooperate to work on an issue, this interaction 
might offer twice as many opportunities for capture, attract twice the parliamentary scrutiny, and 
subject more bureaucrats to lobbying from legislators.1374 “Thus, divided administration presents 
risks, both to the strength of the Executive and for efficient government.”1375 
1367 Id. 
1368 Id. 
1369 Id. 
1370 Id 
1371 See Freeman, supra note 1358, at 1150. 
1372 See Freeman, supra note 1189, at 747 . 
1373 Id. 
1374 Id., at 748. 
1375 Id. 
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The above criticisms of inter-agency interaction might occur in Iraq if this model is adopted 
between the anti-corruption and bid protest systems. It would not be reasonable to prejudge the 
success of inter-agency cooperation before it has been practiced on the ground. Effective inter-
agency cooperation requires careful plans including specific identification of issues to be worked 
on in cooperation, regular meetings between high-level officials to discuss new challenges, and 
strong enforcement mechanisms. Otherwise, mere agreements to work in cooperation on issues 
that are not clear or are overly general will not achieve productive inter-agency interactions.     
The major problem for any possible introduction of inter-agency cooperation in Iraq is the 
culture of the administrative environment. The common perspective in Iraq is the traditional one 
according to which agencies are viewed as separate from each other. Changing such an 
environment will be no easy task and requires educating senior officials of the importance of 
cooperation and working together more closely. Agencies in Iraq work like intelligence-type 
agencies in terms of restricting access by the public and other agencies to their operations and 
documents. Thus, any cooperation attempt might be viewed as intervention in the affairs of 
another agency.     
There are instances of inter-agency cooperation, but they are based on an informal structure 
and conducted only when statutes or regulations require them. Even though cooperation might be 
required by law or regulations, in practice it becomes a mere routine by the passage of time. The 
point is such cooperation is usually procedural. For instance, contractors are required to have a 
document from the General Commission for Taxes certifying that they do not owe any taxes in 
order to be eligible to bid to win a contract.1376 Introducing substantive cooperation in the public 
procurement and anti-corruption fields requires involvement of senior officials from both sides to 
establish strong plans and enforcement mechanisms. 
1376 See Ibrahim, supra note 565, at 119. 
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4.7 Potential Cooperation Forms between the Anti-Corruption System and Bid Protest 
Mechanisms 
 As it has been discussed above, the major difficulty for Iraq is not whether inter-agency 
cooperation between the two systems results in reducing the level of corruption in public 
procurement. The author believes that the lack of cooperation between anti-corruption and bid 
protest systems has a negative impact on the anti-corruption efforts in public contracting. 
However, the difficult question is what the best types of cooperation are that can be suggested 
for cooperation between the two systems. Forms of cooperation may include consultation, 
involvement of anti-corruption institutions in the bid protest processes, or partial involvement 
according to the request of bid protest mechanisms. The anti-corruption system consists of three 
bodies with varying degrees of jurisdictions and independence. According to their jurisdictions 
and structures, their participation in the bid protest processes differs.  
 The best interaction of the OIG in the bid protest processes would be through 
participating as a member in the agency-level bid protest mechanisms. It is a major failure for 
lawmakers in Iraq that they did not involve the OIG in the CRCs, even though the OIG is the 
party that is responsible for reducing abuse, fraud, and waste in every ministry and non-cabinet 
agencies.1377 Public procurement is a major field that might involve many suspicious acts 
regarding corruption and abuse of power. It is the OIG’s duty to detect corruption in the 
operations of the ministry he or she serves.1378 The best way to detect illegal acts in public 
procurement is to be involved in bid protest resolution.   
1377 Order 57, sura note 5, Sec. 1, which has been issued in 2004. The Ministry of Planning issued the IRGC, which 
organizes the establishment of the CRC, in 2008. Accordingly, the Ministry of Planning should have considered the 
OIG when it determined the form and structure of the CRC.  
1378 Id., Sec 1. 
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The OIG has a strong mandate to conduct administrative investigation about any actions, 
decisions, orders or documents of the respective ministry in which the IG is initially 
appointed.1379 It has also been granted extensive powers to achieve this mandate including 
unlimited access to documents, files, or records of the ministry.1380 In addition, it has the power 
to subpoena witnesses.1381 More importantly, the powers of the OIG have been determined by 
statute.1382 Thus, it is difficult for agencies of a ministry subject to the jurisdiction of the OIG to 
challenge or ignore the IG’s requests.  
In contrast, the IRGC that organizes the establishment and function of the CRCs does not 
assign any power to the CRC. For instance, it is silent on the CRC’s access to documents of the 
procurement transaction in question. CRC might have some powers in resolving bid protests. 
However, there is a difference between powers specifically identified by law or regulations and 
powers exercised based on practice in terms of strength and ability to impose an obligation on 
parties subject to such laws and regulations. Accordingly, the statutory powers of the OIG enable 
the IG to work more independently.  
  In addition, the structure of both the agency-level bid protest forum and the OIG facilitates 
such involvement without triggering major administrative challenges or difficulties. One reason 
that makes inter-agency interactions difficult in Iraq is the view that such interactions lead 
agencies to intervene in the affairs of each other. Such fears have no basis in the involvement of 
the OIG in the CRC. Every ministry or non-cabinet agency has its own CRC and OIG.1383 The 
1379 Id., Sec. 5. 
1380 Id. 
1381 Id. 
1382 Order 57, which has been issued by the CPA, is considered a statute under the Iraqi legal system 
1383 See the IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10, which states that “there should be in every ministry or non-cabinet agency 
a central committee responsible for receiving and reviewing bid protests responsible before the Minister or the head 
of non-cabinet agency. Such a committee shall consist of several experts and a rapporteur.” In addition see Order 57 
Sec 2, which states that “there is hereby established within each Iraqi ministry an Office of Inspector General to be 
headed by an Inspector General.”   
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jurisdiction of both of them is limited to the actions of the ministry they are working in. In 
addition, the headquarters of both the OIG and the CRC are in the main offices of ministries or 
non-cabinet agencies.1384 In other words, the involvement of the OIG should not cost 
government any more expenditure. Thus, no difficulty or resistance should emerge from 
involving the OIG into the CRC.  
With respect to the potential role of the BSA in the bid protest processes, the BSA can work 
in close cooperation with the CRC or the IAT whenever it needs consultation with respect to 
financial matters. Public procurement involves documents with complex values and numbers 
which require special skills to be detected or audited that cannot be conducted by the CRC or the 
IAT. In addition, there are certain letters contractors are required to submit to contracting 
agencies from banks to be eligible to participate in a tender.1385 These include for instance, 
letters confirming that the contractor has sufficient funds for the projects and security guarantees.  
Such letters are sometimes submitted by contractors in collusion with the bank without 
having any factual bases. The BSA is the best institution to detect the authenticity of such 
documents. The BSA does not need to be involved in the bid protest processes as an active 
participant. Instead, there is always room for cooperation of the BSA and the bid protest 
mechanisms. More than 80 years of auditing experience should not be ignored because it has the 
potential to be helpful in multiple ways. More importantly, the BSA enjoys extensive powers 
over all government agencies with respect to financial auditing.1386 If an agency refuses to 
1384 Id. 
1385 Id., Art. 7(10)(c), which requires contractors to submit their annual financial statements in order to be eligible to 
participate in public tendering as part of the evaluation of financial capacity of contractors for the project in 
question. In addition, the IRGC allows contracting agencies to use Letters of Credit when they deal with foreign 
contractors, see the IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 9. 
1386 The BSAL, supra note 1116, Art. 13, which covers the powers of the BSA in performing its duties and it has 
been mentioned above. 
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submit documents to the CRC that are related to the resolution of a protest, the BSA can 
intervene and obtain the documents much more easily. 
Finally, with respect to the IC, the IC can interact with bid protest mechanisms in many 
ways including consultation, participation or involvement in the resolution of bid protests, or 
even becoming a forum itself. Consultation can potentially occur when the IAT or CRC seeks the 
assistance of the IC for a matter that is related to corruption, for instance, whether certain acts 
constitute corruption sufficient for the IC to intervene and take appropriate measures against 
them. Consultation is considered the weakest forms of cooperation or interaction with the bid 
protest mechanisms.  
Further, the IC can be involved in bid protest resolution with both the CRC and the IAT. It 
has strong investigative skills and experience in detecting illegal acts in any government actions 
or processes. It should be involved in the bid protest resolution because it is the major anti-
corruption institution in the country. It is a fundamental gap in the anti-corruption efforts that the 
IC does not participate in such an important field that involves many corruption opportunities. 
One of the major purposes of establishing bid protest mechanisms is strengthening transparency 
of the procurement system.1387 Thus, each CRC should have had a representative from the IC 
whether it is an investigator or an employee with legal background.  
There is admittedly a practical problem for this suggestion, which is related to the structure 
of both the IC and the CRC. The IC is considered an outside agency to any CRC and it is 
considered within the ambit of Parliament.1388 Unlike the IC, the OIG belongs to the same 
ministry as the one to which the CRC belongs,1389 making any possible involvement of the OIG 
1387 Arrowsmith, supra note 13, at 749. 
1388 See the ICL, supra note 1107, Art. 2, which states that the IC is an independent and non-cabinet agency 
responsible before Parliament. Accordingly, it is not part of the Executive unlike the CRC. 
1389 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (1). 
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in the CRC easy. More importantly, the involvement of the IC in the CRC affairs might create 
problems related to the separation of powers. As the IC is a Parliamentary body, CRC is part of a 
particular ministry which is an executive function. This argument might be used by ministries as 
they may resist the involvement of the IC in the bid protest mechanisms.  
The solution is not that difficult because if there are negotiations between the OGPCP and 
the IC, they might reach an agreement to amend the IRGC to include a representative from the 
IC to the CRC. Another way to do so is amending the ICL to allow such involvement. Amending 
the IRGC is easier because it is a regulation and does not need to undergo the complex 
procedures of enacting or amending statutes. The OGPCP is empowered to amend the IRGC on 
its own initiative.1390 On the other hand, if the involvement occurs based on amending the ICL, 
its stability and strength would be more protected.  
With respect to the involvement of the IC in the IAT, similar to the CRC, an IC should have 
a representative in the IAT. In fact, it is necessary for the IC to be involved in the IAT because 
the IAT has representatives, other than the judge, from the Ministry of Planning, Contractor’s 
Union, and Iraqi Chambers of Commerce, but no one from the IC. The IC as a major anti-
corruption institution has a huge interest in the bid protest processes which is to detect illegality 
in awarding public contracts. Thus, the IRGC should be amended to include in the formation of 
the IAT a representative from the IC.  
Similar to the involvement of the IC in the CRC, the issues related to separation of powers 
might also arise here. However, this involvement should cause no difficulty because the IAT 
already has two members from the private sector. Accordingly, adding a member from the IC 
should not trigger any arguments regarding violating separation of powers. In fact, the legal basis 
1390 See Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1)(b), which empowers the OGPCP to issue the implementing regulations to 
Order 87. The text does not specify the power to amend the IRGC. However, if the OGPCP has the power to issue 
regulations to implement Order 87, it has also the power to amend such regulations.  
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of including a representative from the IC is much stronger than including members from the 
private sector. The IC has a broad mandate to fight corruption in all government agencies 
including in the public procurement sector. In addition, the IC is a government agency not a 
private-sector entity. Thus, a potential amendment to the IRGC that includes the IC in the IAT 
solves this problem. The establishment of the IC is governed by the IRGC, which is a regulation, 
not statute.  
Finally, the best form of involvement of the IC in the bid protest processes is, in the author’s 
view, making the IC the third forum for resolution of bid protests. Establishing the IC as a forum 
for the bid protest resolution would not be easy. Doing so requires Parliament to amend the ICL 
to empower it to receive and review bid protests. In addition, it requires hiring experienced staff 
in the field of public procurement in order to be able to conduct bid protest review. The IC 
already has skillful investigators, but it does not have public procurement experts. Further, such 
potential amendment should identify detailed procedural rules for receiving and resolving bid 
protests. Such rules should include determining who has the power to challenge contracting 
agencies’ decisions, what can be challenged, the time limit for submitting protests and resolving 
them by the IC, and the binding effect of the decisions of the IC made with respect to bid 
protests. 
There are two rationales for this proposal. First, the CRC’s independence is quite limited 
because it is part of a ministry or non-cabinet agency and all of its decisions are 
recommendations subject to the approval of the head of the agency.1391 Although the IAT is an 
independent tribunal according to Order 87,1392 it is still established by the decision of the 
1391 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (1)(b). 
1392 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1)(a)(ii). 
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Minister of Planning.1393 Further, two of IAT’s members are also appointed by the Minister of 
Planning making its independence limited.1394 In contrast, the IC is an independent body 
responsible before Parliament, which appoints its head, and it has its own budget and staff.1395  
Second, effectiveness and speediness are other reasons for justifying the establishment of the 
IC as a third forum. Agency-level bid protest mechanisms are usually not the preferred forum by 
contractors except for simple issues. They are not independent structurally and procedurally 
because they are under the control of the head of the contracting agency. The CRC in Iraq does 
not have the power to issue binding decisions because its decisions are subject to the approval of 
the head of the agency.1396 Furthermore, there are no rules for its review procedures, making it 
subject to the discretion of officials conducting the review.1397  
On the other hand, the IAT is a court under Order 871398 and it adheres to all procedural 
rules set forth in the CPL, which is applied by civil courts in Iraq.1399 The CPL contains strict 
procedural requirements for courts to follow when they decide a case. Applying the CPL by the 
IAT in resolving bid protests results in lengthy and expensive review procedures, while bid 
protest resolution requires a speedy process.1400 Accordingly, the IAT would be expensive and 
time consuming for protesters. Thus, empowering the IC to receive and resolve bid protests will 
be a middle solution between the CRC, which does not adhere to extensive procedural rules, and 
the IAT, which relies on strict procedural rules that may delay resolution of bid protests.  
1393 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (3). 
1394 Id. 
1395 Id., Art 3 & 4. 
1396 Id., Art. 10 (1)(b). 
1397 Id., the only rule identified for reviewing bid protests by the CRC is time limit for receiving and making a 
recommendation on the protest. 
1398 Order 87, supra note 5, Sec. 2 (1)(b)(ii). 
1399 The IRGC, supra note 97, Art. 10 (6). 
1400 Supra note 95, at 122. 
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The success of the IC as a potential third forum for the resolution of bid protests depends 
largely on how much such a forum responds to the fundamental principles of an effective bid 
protest system, which are speediness, effectiveness, independence, and effective remedies.1401 
There should be procedural rules, but such procedures should be clear, simple, and affordable for 
contractors. Further, the amendment should expand the bases for challenging contracting 
agencies’ decisions including challenging the choice of agencies in selecting the method of 
contracting.  
 Such amendment should permit offerors to submit protests to the provisions of tenders. 
Allowing contractors to challenge only award decisions as is the case in Iraq, is not sufficient as 
the Iraqi bid protest system does so. Strict and short time limits for submitting protests by 
unsatisfied bidders and resolving such protests by the IC should be included. The IC should be 
empowered to issue binding decisions on agencies and to be empowered to award effective 
remedies. For instance, it should have the power to cancel or amend the tender documents, 
cancel the award decision, and award corrective actions. Finally, the decision of the IC as a third 
forum could be appealed before the Council of State or the Federal Supreme Court. Such an 
amendment should adopt these principles to make the IG an effective third forum. 
4.8 Conclusion 
 The traditional view of administration, which contemplates agencies in isolation from 
each other, is common in Iraq and is still practiced. Such a perspective for administration 
damages the efficiency of agencies in the area of anti-corruption and bid protest mechanisms. 
These two systems share one enemy that affects their performance, which is corruption. It is no 
longer feasible that these systems work in complete isolation from each other. In fact, both of 
1401 Id., at 122-125. 
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them share statutory duties to fight corruption and strengthen the integrity of the processes they 
are empowered to organize.  
 It is long past time for policy makers in Iraq to transfer from the traditional view of 
administration to a more collaborative, modern public administration system. In such a system, 
effective cooperation and interaction should be encouraged and adopted, especially in dealing 
with complex and multi-dimensional issues such as corruption in public procurement. 
Cooperation among public agencies has a lot of advantages discussed above. More importantly, 
the strong correlation between corruption and public procurement requires close cooperation 
among the anti-corruption and bid protest systems that is missing in the Iraqi example. Of 
course, there are problems with inter-agency cooperation including separation-of-powers 
concerns or inter-agency disputes on issues that are shared. However, lack of cooperation in the 
area of anti-corruption bodies and bid protest mechanisms is even more damaging.  
 The difficult question is what types of interaction should be promoted between anti-
corruption institutions and bid protest mechanisms. Interaction has more than one form or 
structure including consultation or participation in the decision-making process with another 
agency. Since anti-corruption consists of three major institutions, each institution can interact 
with the bid protest mechanisms in certain possible ways. Some methods of interaction of anti-
corruption institutions have been analyzed in the previous sections. However, these are not only 
forms of interaction between the two systems. Rather, they are the most productive ones in the 
author’s view.  
 The interaction of anti-corruption agencies in the bid protest system differs according to 
their structure and jurisdictions. Nonetheless, for the most part, involvement of these agencies in 
the bid protest fora is suggested. Involvement is important because it conforms to statutes 
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regulating these agencies. This dissertation suggests involvement of the OIG in the CRC 
functions because the OIG is responsible for detecting fraud, waste, and abuse of power in all 
activities of the ministry in which the IG is employed. Such involvement of the OIG is in 
conformity with its statute. In addition, this dissertation strongly recommends the IC be involved 
in the bid protest processes because the IC is empowered to investigate corruption in all 
government sectors including public procurement. It also suggests that the best involvement of 
the IC in the bid protest system is to become a third forum together with the CRC and the IAT. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 The dissertation set out to examine methods of effectuating the bid protest system in Iraq 
in order to tackle corruption in public procurement more effectively. Examining such an 
important issue requires analyzing bid protest organization under regional and international 
agreements and procurement systems of other countries. It also requires addressing the 
discussion in the literature about which works best for procurement: oversight or discretion. Bid 
protest processes are considered an oversight mechanism on the entire public-procurement 
process. They often limit the discretion of contracting officers on how they administer the 
procurement process.   
Extensive analysis of the rules and procedures governing resolution of bid protest 
systems was necessary to examine the status of the bid protest system. Rules and procedures of 
bid protest processes determine important issues including whether they fairly allow protesting 
the decisions of contracting agencies or restrict bases of challenging such decisions. In addition, 
the dissertation examined the relationship between corruption and public-procurement, especially 
bid protest processes. It specifically examines the status of cooperation and interaction between 
anti-corruption agencies and bid protest forums.  
1.1 Conclusions 
1.2 Discretion or Oversight 
      The dissertation concludes that striking a balance between discretion and oversight is 
an extremely difficult task in designing public procurement systems. Legal and administrative 
scholars are divided into pro discretion and pro oversight. Pro-discretion scholars strongly 
oppose increasing oversight measures on administrative processes because it undermines the 
innovative spirit of officials in performing their tasks. If their discretion is too limited, these 
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scholars argue, officials will avoid introducing new ideas or programs out of fear of litigation, 
such as bid protests in public procurement.   
In addition, more oversight results in complicating and delaying the entire administrative 
process. For instance, bid protest processes, which are considered forms of oversight, often 
require a reasonable amount of time to resolve a protest. Thus, resolution of bid protests delays 
the conclusion of government contracts, resulting in interruption of services to the public which 
sometimes could bequite harmful to the public good. Bid protests are also expensive because 
they impose significant costs on both government and contractors. Government needs to provide 
bid protest forums to unsatisfied bidders, which requires staff and office buildings. It must also 
pay bid preparation and protest costs in case it loses a protest. Unsatisfied bidders also need to 
spend money preparing bid protests and attorney’s fees for protest and potential litigation. 
On the other hand, pro-oversight scholars mitigate the negative consequences of 
oversight cited by pro-discretion scholars. They present advantages of oversight by bid protests 
on the entire procurement processes. First, bid protest mechanisms correct incidences of 
corruption, abuse of power, and illegalities in awarding public contracts. Second, involvement of 
third parties to challenge decisions of agencies is more cost effective than any other way such as 
parliamentary oversight. Third, since laws and regulations are often complicated and require 
interpretation, bid protest processes is a tool through which such terms can be interpreted.  
These scholars  argue that bid protests are not that common in practice and relatively few 
contractors abuse them, by submitting frivolous protests, or otherwise to obstruct the 
procurement process. There are also other tools to deal with delay such as strict time limits for 
submitting and resolving protests. Contractors are also subject to several administrative and 
criminal punishments if they abuse the bid protest system. More importantly, since contractors 
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have strong financial incentives to scrutinize the procurement process, they play the role of 
private attorneys general. Thus, bid protest processes are the enforcement mechanism for the 
procurement system to achieve its major goals: transparency, integrity, and competition. 
As discussed above, the difficult question is what works best for public procurement: 
more discretion or more oversight. The dissertation concludes that answering such a difficult 
question requires examining several major issues together in a particular jurisdiction to decide 
which works best. In other words, it suggests that generalization should be avoided in examining 
the influence of bid protest on procurement system. For instance, an abstract statement that bid 
protest mechanisms as an oversight tool will not work for procurement system lacks precision 
and adequacy. In contrast, statements such as competition undermines the integrity of a 
procurement system would also not be helpful. 
Examining the administrative structure, the level of transparency and accountability, and 
the status of public procurement processes in the country in question should be the initial step. It 
is also crucial to examine, theoretically and empirically, the influence of bid protest procedures 
on the discretion of officials and on contractors. For instance, evaluating whether the 
procurement system follows strict time limits for resolving bid protests is necessary. The 
frequency of abuse of bid protest mechanisms by unsatisfied bidders who submit frivolous 
protests should also be examined.  
It is essential to analyze the level of discretion of procurement officials in order to 
determine whether there are reasonable restrictions to prevent abuse and corruption. In addition, 
various surveys should be conducted among procurement officials, contractors, scholars, and 
professionals in order to assess the impact of both oversight and discretion on the procurement 
system. Thus, after such careful study of the administrative and procurement environment, 
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designers of procurement system should decide whether a procurement system needs increased 
oversight or more discretion. 
Although the dissertation emphasizes careful examination of the administrative and legal 
structure of a particular country to determine which works best, two general statements are 
almost certainly still valid. First, increased oversight is often indicated for developing countries 
that suffer from high levels of corruption. In such countries, regular oversight mechanisms such 
as administrative judicial review do not function properly. Thus, the solution for developing 
countries would often be establishing independent agencies to be responsible for reviewing bid 
protests. Second, developed countries in which administrative and judicial review function 
properly, granting more discretion to contracting agencies might benefit the procurement 
process. 
1.3 Structure of Bid Protest Mechanisms 
 The structure of bid protest mechanisms is centralized in Iraq because both the agency-
level and the judicial forum are located in the capital. Such centralization negatively affects the 
effectiveness of the bid protest system because it makes access to them difficult by contractors 
not located in the capital. It also makes the bid protest process more costly because it requires 
unsatisfied bidders to travel to Baghdad or to hire a lawyer, an expensive proposition especially 
for small businesses. Bid protest processes rely on speedy resolution of protests, but 
centralization delays the resolution of protests. 
   There are other reasons that for why centralization in Iraq undermines the speediness 
and effectiveness of bid protest processes. Communication between public agencies themselves 
and between agencies and concerned parties is conducted through traditional ways. Even the 
postal services are unreliable and extremely slow. Electronic communication is used rarely by 
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government agencies because of lack of electricity and poor internet services. In addition, there 
are insufficient regulatory frameworks for the organization of legal aspects of electronic 
communication. Finally, the culture is still conservative in relying on electronic communication 
which will need time to change.  
 The dissertation suggests that bid protest mechanisms should be decentralized in order to 
facilitate access to them by local contractors. It would also be helpful in expediting the resolution 
process because of less time required for communication between interested parties and 
contracting agencies. However, there are some disadvantages of decentralized bid-protest 
mechanisms including capture of the system by local dominant businesses or politicians. In 
addition, decentralized mechanisms might create different interpretations and procedures of 
procurement laws and regulations.        
1.4 The Underlying Procedures of Bid Protest Resolutions 
 Another major issue the dissertation asses is the significance of the underlying procedures 
of the bid protest system. Many regional and international procurement agreements provide for 
bid protest mechanisms. However, they do not address details of these procedures because 
organization of such underlying procedures is left to the jurisdictions of member states. States 
have different legal and administrative structures that will have an impact on the organization of 
the bid protest system. For instance, bid protest processes are different according to common law 
and civil law systems. The literature does not address such underlying procedural distinctions 
adequately except for some major principles regulating bid protest processes. 
 The dissertation concludes that the underlying procedures of every bid protest system 
must be examined in order to evaluate the effectiveness of a system. There are several issues that 
cannot be addressed properly except by examining the underlying procedures of a bid protest 
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system. For instance, it is sometimes difficult to identify who an interested party is only from the 
general definition that is posited in many jurisdictions for such an important concept. It is often 
difficult to decide whether a sub-contractor is considered an interested party, or whether such 
definition includes some government agencies.  
 It is also difficult to determine what can be challenged before bid-protest review bodies 
because procurement laws and regulations often state that such bodies are empowered to review 
bid protests. Yet what constitute bid protests can only be identified by going back to the 
underlying procedures of bid-protest resolution. Regional and international agreements often 
require the availability of bid protest mechanisms for breaches of the agreement by a member 
state. However, they do not specify what constitutes a breach because that is left to the 
substantive law of member states.  
Do breaches include only award decisions, i.e., the decisions that identify the contractors 
that won the competitions? Or do they include other decisions related to the award decision, such 
as disqualifying a bidder from a competition? Such issues are important because the jurisdiction 
of bid-protest review bodies is often limited. In such cases, courts or administrative bodies have 
the power to review other procurement-related decisions. Bid protest mechanisms in Iraq, for 
example, are only allowed to receive protests that challenge the award decision itself. In such 
cases, contractors cannot challenge the decision of evaluation committees that remove a 
contractor from competition. Offerors cannot challenge the decision of contracting agencies 
choosing the method of contracting, either. Challenging such decisions should be before other 
courts or administrative bodies. In some civil law countries, public contract disputes are divided 
into those that are subject to the jurisdiction of bid protests and those that are subject to other 
courts or bodies.  
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This concept is called the theory of detachable acts in the civil law system. According to 
the detachable theory, all acts on public contracts are not all similar in their legal effect. There 
are some preliminary steps in public contracting that are not considered contractual decisions, 
but are rather considered administrative in nature. As a result, the body or court that is 
empowered to review public-contract disputes are different from the body or court that has the 
jurisdiction to review administrative decisions. All of these important details can only be 
examined by addressing the underlying procedures of bid protest resolution. 
The dissertation concludes that examining underlying procedures is also essential to the 
dynamic of how varying laws are involved in addressing specific issues such as bid protests. 
Public procurement laws and regulations are not the only laws that are involved in dealing with 
bid protests. In fact, other laws are actively involved in the bid protest resolution including 
administrative law, civil procedural law, or contract law. Bid protest bodies rely on contract law 
to answer basic questions related to contract formation such as offer and acceptance. In addition, 
they highly rely on the law of civil procedure in resolving bid protests including subpoena of 
witnesses, administering oaths, or notification of parties to a dispute. Such issues must be 
examined because they all affect the resolution process. For instance, if an unsatisfied bidder 
fails to follow a time limit that is required under the civil procedures, it might lose the chance to 
submit a meritorious protest. 
With respect to the Iraqi case, examining the underlying procedures revealed several 
major problems that undermine the function of the bid protest system as an oversight tool. For 
instance, the definition of interested parties includes only those contractors that participated in a 
tender. This definition excludes a broad range of contractors from being able to challenge 
contracting agencies’ decisions. In contrast, in many jurisdictions the scope of “interested 
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parties” for purposes of determining who has competence to participate in the protested tender 
includes contractors other than those that participate in a tender. 
Furthermore, the Iraqi procurement system does not allow challenging provisions of a 
tender prepared by contracting agencies. Provisions of a tender contain a wealth of information 
about the requirements of participation in that tender. They can be used to facilitate corruption by 
limiting goods or services to be procured to a certain product or company, or by excluding 
products of certain competitors. Thus, in the Iraqi case, if provisions of a tender are written to 
include certain products, other competitors cannot challenge such provisions instantly because 
they have to wait until the award decision is issued.  
This approach is against the principle of speedy resolution of bid protests. If provisions of 
a tender are problematic, the evaluation process and the award would normally be unfair and 
biased because such provisions restrict competition. Accordingly, it would be far more efficient, 
rather than requiring a bidder to wait until the award decision is issued, to address the problem 
earlier and before, undertaking the award procedures. Allowing interested parties to challenge 
provisions of a tender reduces disputes in later stages of the procurement process and helps 
contracting agencies corrects breaches or mistakes easily. Further, disallowing challenging 
provisions of a tender restricts the right of offerors to scrutinize the procurement process. 
The above examples are to show the significance of the underlying procedures in 
effectuating a bid protest system. Examining and addressing such procedures assist in identifying 
shortages and problems that negatively affect the performance of bid protest mechanisms. 
Accordingly, the dissertation concludes that bid protest procedures in Iraq should be amended to 
expand the scope of protesters’ rights by eliminating the above restrictions. In addition, more 
studies are necessary respecting the underlying procedures of bid protest processes. 
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1.5 Coordination between Anti-Corruption Institutions and Bid Protest Mechanisms 
 The dissertation concludes that there is no effective cooperation or interaction between 
anti-corruption bodies and bid protest forums in Iraq. Lack of effective cooperation or interaction 
between such institutions undermines the entire anti-corruption efforts in public sector including 
public procurement. One of the major goals of both anti-corruption and bid protest systems is 
preventing and reducing corruption in government institutions. However, institutions responsible 
for enforcing anti-corruption laws and regulations and procurement law work in isolation to each 
other. 
 Anti-corruption agreements and conventions emphasize cooperation among national 
authorities as one of the most effective strategies for fighting corruption. In addition, there are 
other factors that justify interaction between the two systems. Anti-corruption agencies 
theoretically enjoy a high level of independence guaranteed by the Iraqi Constitution and the 
laws governing their functions. Such independence is crucial for establishing an effective bid 
protest processes because independence is one of the major concerns in designing a bid protest 
system. By such cooperation or interaction, bid protest mechanisms may benefit from the 
independence of anti-corruption agencies.    
Cooperation or interaction brings a mix of experience and tremendous powers to the anti-
corruption efforts in the public procurement sector. Anti-corruption institutions are granted 
strong criminal, administrative, or auditing investigative powers to prevent and reduce 
corruption. They also have unrestricted access to government programs, documents, data, 
records, or any other materials necessary for exercising their daily functions properly. 
Cooperation or interaction saves government public funds because it should prevent having two 
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or more agencies investigating the same issue separately. It also facilitates sharing of knowledge 
and experience between anti-corruption agencies and bid protest mechanisms. 
The dissertation suggests establishing not only cooperation between such agencies but 
also involvement of the anti-corruption agencies in the bid protest processes. However, such 
potential involvement might be strongly rejected by some legal and administrative scholars. The 
first concern would be separation of powers concerns because some of anti-corruption agencies 
are subject to the control of Parliament not the executive. Thus, such involvement would be seen 
as an intervention by the legislative branch into the affairs of the executive branch. In addition, it 
could create confusion and complicate the procurement process as two agencies try to impose 
their preferred regulatory frameworks. In such cases, the compromise that might be reached is by 
incorporating additional requirements from both sides that are unnecessary. Another possible 
outcome of involvement is conflict between such agencies if they fail to agree on a regulatory 
scheme. 
1.6 Future Research Plans  
 Major issues that have been discussed in this dissertation are all appropriate subjects for 
further and more extensive research. The issue of what works best for public procurement 
between oversight and discretion is one of these issues that needs to be examined under the Iraqi 
administrative law. Such issues have not been examined in the Iraqi academic literature, and it is 
important that they be studied. For historic reasons, the organization of public procurement in 
Iraq is largely left to the discretion of contracting agencies. This often results in contractors not 
being granted fair opportunities to challenge contracting agencies’ decisions. In other words, the 
administrative culture in Iraq was and still is not sufficiently transparent.  
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 Another issue that needs further study is examining the underlying procedures of bid 
protest resolutions. This issue consists of several essential subjects that each can be a separate 
research topic in itself. For instance, topics such as the definition of interested parties, 
jurisdiction of bid protest forums, and what can properly be protested by unsatisfied bidders are 
examples of such important issues. Such issues are important because they can be used to limit 
or expand the opportunity of unsatisfied bidders to challenge the decisions of contracting 
agencies. It can also limit bases of challenging procurement-related decisions.  
 The most promising topic for future research is the cooperation or interaction between the 
anti-corruption agencies and bid protest mechanisms. Addressing such controversial issue 
requires examining fundamental principles of public administration in Iraq. It also requires 
examining the current laws and regulations to identify major forms of cooperation or interaction 
that such laws mandate. In addition, addressing informal forms of cooperation or interaction is 
important as often laws and regulations are silent on details of possible inter-agency interaction. 
In fact, it happens that laws and regulations do not require any form of cooperation or 
interaction, but interaction is sometimes necessary on the ground. Dealing with such a new topic 
in the Iraqi legal literature requires addressing cultural aspects of inter-agency cooperation or 
interaction. The culture is quite conservative and strategies for overcoming resistance to effective 
interaction might not be received easily. Of course, the dissertation does not suggest intervention 
in every activity of agencies. Rather, it suggests effective cooperation in areas that fall under the 
jurisdiction of each agency in one way or another such as corruption for anti-corruption system 
and bid protest processes.  
 Conducting empirical studies on all the major issues discussed in this dissertation would 
be helpful in understanding the status of public procurement in Iraq more accurately. It was 
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almost impossible to conduct such empirical studies for this dissertation because of lack of 
access to information regarding bid protests. However, the author hopes that in the future more 
information will be available to conduct such empirical analysis. Surveys among contractors and 
contracting agencies will reveal major problems facing them. They also provide for more 
accurate information about the level of corruption in the public procurement, how much 
discretion contracting officials have, and abuse of the bid protest system by unsatisfied bidders.  
1.7 Recommendations 
1.8 In the case of Iraq, this dissertation has made the following recommendations:   
* Decentralization of bid protest mechanisms is necessary in order to facilitate access to protest 
forums by unsatisfied bidders. The first step for such decentralization should start from 
decentralizing distribution of procurement powers. Although Order 87 grants contracting powers 
solely to a qualified government agency or a committee within each governmental agency, such 
powers are effectively all in the hand of ministers or head of non-cabinet agencies. In addition, 
the CRC that functions as the agency-level protest mechanism is empowered only to issue 
recommendations. Its decisions are subject to the approval of agency heads. Accordingly, 
contracting powers should be awarded to general directorates in the provinces in order to be able 
to review protests.  
Alternatively, ministers or heads of non-cabinet agencies should be required to delegate 
the power of reviewing bid protests to a general directorate in large cities. In fact, heads of 
contracting agencies are empowered to delegate their powers, but at their sole discretion. 
Delegation should be required not discretional. However, there should be clear rules governing 
such contracting powers that are to be awarded to general directorates or for possible delegation 
of such powers. Clear rules and procedures are required to avoid conflicting or varying results. 
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* Amending procurement laws and regulation to expand the definition of interested parties. Such 
expansion should include not only contractors that actually participated in a tender, but also 
those who did not participate but they are eligible to participate. Generally speaking, contractors 
that are eligible to participate are those working in similar areas. The current definition excludes 
many contractors from challenging decisions of contracting agencies. In fact, it is quite 
problematic to allow only participating contractors to file bid protests because this approach 
leaves some public contracts without the possibility of being protested at all. For instance, when 
a contracting agency decides to award the contract using the sole source contracting method, 
there will be only one contractor that can protest. If that sole contractor gets the contract by 
corruption, there are no other contractors to challenge the award decision.  
* Expanding bases of challenging decisions of contracting agencies.  For instance, allowing 
unsatisfied bidders to challenge provisions of a tender and choice of contracting agencies to 
select contracting methods. The current system allows only challenging to the award decisions 
and excludes all other preliminary stages from the jurisdiction of bid protest forums. In fact, 
preliminary stages can be protested, but they are not under the jurisdiction of bid protest forums. 
They are subject to the jurisdiction of administrative courts. Challenging provisions of a tender 
procedure and choice of contracting agencies to select contracting methods is an international 
standard.  
* Increasing availability of information about public procurement activities to the public is 
crucial for a transparent procurement system. One of the major problems facing the author in 
writing this dissertation was lack of information about public procurement in Iraq. Although 
there is a section for public procurement activities on the website of Ministry of Planning, there 
is little information about bid protest processes. Procurement laws and regulations should require 
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contracting agencies to publish bid protest decisions with adequate reasoning as part of 
enhancing the transparency of the system.  
* Amending procurement laws and regulations regarding remedies available to unsatisfied 
bidders is necessary. For instance, it should include removing the condition requiring protesters 
to submit a pledge promising to pay all the damages resulting from suspension of procurement 
procedures in case the protest is frivolous. In addition, providing for a standstill period in which 
a contracting agency is prevented from concluding a contract even though the award decision has 
been issued, when such a decision is challenged by a bidder. Amendments should include 
empowering the IAT to receive requests for compensation of bid preparation and protest 
litigation costs.  
* Establishing effective cooperation between anti-corruption agencies and bid protest 
mechanisms to tackle more adequately corruption in public procurement. Both systems function 
to enhance transparency and integrity of the procurement system. Such cooperation may be 
conducted by agreement between the two systems without being required by laws or regulations. 
However, statutory or regulatory frameworks that establish mandatory interaction mechanisms 
between such agencies are more effective because law or regulation has a binding effect on 
agencies.            
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